CHAPTER THIRTEEN NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN Eliz Sanasarian In discussions of social and political dynamics involving the state and society, themes such as religious and ethnic groups, minority and majority, identity and modernization have been used with frequency. Some of these themes have been interchangeable, and in different time periods the focus of studies has shifted. Prior to the 1990s nationalism and nation-building, debates on modernization, communication, integration, and the role of ethnic groups and conflict were dominant. By the late 1990s ‘identity’ had become a new focus, often mixed with a psychological approach. This was “a ‘neo-way’ of addressing identity, and this new tool preordained the questions that would be asked and the answers that would be given. Not explained were the trajectory, ideology, successes, and failures of modern nationalist movements” (Newman 2000: 23).1 Mark Juergensmeyer, reflect- ing on world events in the 1990s, used the term ‘religious nationalism’ as a way of describing “longing for an indigenous form of religious politics free from the taint of Western culture”. This “new cold war” was based on the “resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances” (Juergensmeyer 1993: 1–2). As old models had failed, the new ones were here to challenge Western secular nationalism. World events, in many ways, seemed to be supporting parts, if not all, of Juergensmeyer’s worldview. Yet, as we approached the end of the 1990s, with the spread of internet and intensification of globalization, something was changing. These shifts were throwing all discussions, theories, and argu- ments out of order. Transformations were at both macro and micro levels driven by the information technology.2 Here, for example, the active role of diasporic communities and human rights organizations had intensified 1 This is a study of the evolution of the concept of nationalism. I have discussed the ethnicity literature and its relevance, or lack of, to Iran in Sanasarian 2000: 1–8. 2 This point is cleverly portrayed in the journalistic work first published in 1999 by Thomas L. Friedman 2000. © Eliz Sanasarian, 2012 | doi:10.1163/9789004216846_015 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license. Eliz Sanasarian - 9789004216846 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 12:24:13AM via free access 310 eliz sanasarian with an impact (not yet clearly measurable) on the behavior of societies and states. This transformation has not yet been able to shed light on one very important issue, namely power politics. This dilemma was expressed by John Breuilly: “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or moderni- zation is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power” (Breuilly 1993:1). The significance of Breuilly’s comment is that ultimately power is where the interests lie; therefore, the interests can change depending on the situation. This study places power and powerlessness in the components of nationalism (identity, ethnicity, and religion). It argues that the reason politics is lost is because it is extremely challenging to pinpoint its dynam- ics. Politics and power are not displayed openly, particularly in countries like Iran, making it almost impossible to assess details. When one engages specifically with empirical evidence to find ‘politics’, still mysteries remain. Lack of institutional framework contributes to the complexity; the polity is secretive, multilayered, and personal. The Islamic State with its clergy have become more complicated than the monarchist regime of the past, and James Bill’s comment rings true even more today than ever before: namely that the “processes of power and decisionmaking are usually hidden within the deepest recesses of society, where they exist in a state of constant flux” (Bill 1988: 10). Ultimately, it is almost impossible to assess correctly and clearly both “the shadowy corridors of the political system” (Bill 1988: 10), and the shadowy activities of members of religious minority communities as they act, react, respond, resist, compromise, defend, inform the authori- ties, betray their own communities, or other minority groups. This chapter identifies religious minorities in Iran and their present condition, discusses the legal ramifications of their situation, assesses their responses, and concludes by reverting back to the issue of nationalism. Religious Composition Iran is a heterogeneous society. Group characteristics and geographical settings have led to a society where primordial ties are strong. The over- whelming majority of the population are Shiʿi, about nine percent are Sunni, and the rest are Bahaʾi, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and a very small and little-known group are Mandeans. Muslim groups’ main identification is Eliz Sanasarian - 9789004216846 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 12:24:13AM via free access nationalism and religion in contemporary iran 311 along ethnic or tribal lines: Arab (Shiʿi and Sunni), Azeri (Shiʿi), Bakhtiari (Shiʿi), Baluch (Sunni), Kurd (some Shiʿi, mostly Sunni), Lur (Shiʿi), Qashqai (Shiʿi), Shahsevan (Shiʿi), and Turkmen (Sunni).3 The Sunni Population The majority of the Sunni population resides in the Kurdestan, Sistan, and Baluchestan areas. To address Sunnis as one whole group is erroneous; they are divided regionally and ethnically, and there has rarely been close cooperation among these groups. Sunnism as a minority religion becomes an issue only in one grand context: namely proclaiming Iran a Twelver Shiʿi State. This was a contentious issue from the beginning, clearly reflected in the debates over devising the Constitution in 1980. During the discussions in the Assembly of Experts, Sunni deputies were uneasy about the Shiʿi domination and made several suggestions for change, to no avail. However, even during these debates ethnic identities were overriding Sunnism, as regional sensibilities were voiced. Representatives from large non-Persian speaking regions/provinces showed discontent with the center’s institu- tional domination of policy, and this concern crossed over even to those from some Shiʿi ethnic communities (Sanasarian 2000: 62–3).4 Therefore, the dynamic of regionalism (provincial needs and priorities) were of utmost importance even in 1979–1980. During debates, some Sunni ethnic deputies showed deep discontent with official recognition of Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians in the Islamic Constitution. “How is it that we officially recognize the religions of Israel and the United States who are our formal enemies and their religions are obsolete, . but we do not accept Sunnism?” demanded a deputy from Baluchestan.5 Since the establishment of the Shiʿi Islamic Republic, the Sunni popula- tion has voiced discontent in different areas. A myriad of problems were reported in recent times. Sunni Majlis deputies have complained about discrimination in appointments at the executive and judicial branches and in government-appointed positions in Sunni dominated provinces. Disallowing the teaching of Sunni religious literature in public schools in 3 Precise numbers are hard to come by because the Iranian official census does not include ethnic categories. The CIA World Factbook (February 2007) identifies Persian (51%), Azeri (24%), Kurd (7%), Arab (3%), Lur (2%), Baluch (2%), Turkmen (2%). 4 Analysis of the entire debates, based on the documents of the proceedings of the Assembly, appear in Sanasarian 2000: 58–72. 5 Surat-e Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majilis-e Barrasi-ye Nahaiye Qanun-e Asasiye Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran, 8th session, 31 Mordad 1358 [22 August 1979], p. 184. Eliz Sanasarian - 9789004216846 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 12:24:13AM via free access 312 eliz sanasarian Sunni dominated regions has been another long time complaint (Interna- tional Religious Freedom Report 2008: 4). The Arab minority in the south has protested and clashed with government security forces over plans for forcible relocation under the guise of an agricultural-business project (Jane’s Intelligence Digest and Human Rights Watch). There have also been reports of clashes between government forces and the Baluchis as well as the Kurds, including arrest of some due to their involvement with online writings against the regime (Amnesty International 2009: 3–4 on the Baluch and the Kurds). In a February 2009 report, Amnesty International, identified a host of charges which are used to target members of religious and ethnic minori- ties: “acting against state security”, “spreading lies”, “propaganda against the system”, “creating unease in the public mind”, “insulting the holy sanctities”, and “defamation of state officials” (Amnesty International 2009: 1). The root causes of disturbances involving the Sunni population are a mix of their religious minority status with ethnicity, sectarianism, regional disparity, and cross-border problems. These factors make the Sunni case much more complicated, going beyond mere religious discrimination. Recent reports indicate disturbances are caused by a high unemployment rate among the youth, perpetual poverty (including in the oil-rich southern Khuzestan province where much of the Sunni Arab population is concen- trated), an inferior educational system, and the lawless borderlands (such as the organized drug-smuggling networks along the Baluchestan