Significance of Uncertainty in Explaining Institutional Change in Douglass C

Significance of Uncertainty in Explaining Institutional Change in Douglass C

EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW Volume 18, Issue 3, September 2019 p-ISSN 1898-2255, e-ISSN 2392-1625 www.economicsandlaw.pl ORIGINAL ARTICLE received 19.07.2018; revised 31.07.2019; accepted 30.09.2019 Citation: Przesławska, G. (2019). Significance of uncertainty in explaining institutional change in Douglass C. North’s approach. Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law, 18(3): 331–346. doi:10.12775/EiP.2019.023. Significance of uncertainty in explaining institutional change in Douglass C. North’s approach GABRIELA PRZESŁAWSKA University of Wroclaw, Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics, Institute of Economic Science, ul. Uniwersytecka 22/26, 50-145 Wrocław, Poland [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0003-3949-5162 Abstract Motivation: Studies on nature and effects of uncertainty in a non-ergodic world became in Douglass Cecil North’s concept a starting point for explanation of economic changes mechanism. The origin of North’s studies on uncertainty is related to one of key research problems relevant to the emergence of New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach, that is answering the question why some countries are rich and others poor. This problem, according to NIE representatives, cannot be satisfactorily explained in the framework of neoclassical paradigm based on assumptions of perfect information, ideal rationality of market actors and zero transaction costs. Aim: The purpose of the article is to present D.C. North’s concept of uncertainty as a source of beliefs and creating institutions (‘rules of the game’) which place human envi- ronment in order. Results: North’s breakthrough legacy is in emphasizing the role of human intentionality, growth in the stock of knowledge, as a result of human learning, and common cultural heritage in determining the direction and dynamics of economic changes. Considerations included in the article will enable proving the significance given by North to institutions in reducing uncertainty resulting from the nature of non-ergodic world and thus creating basic incentives for growth and evolutionary economic changes. Finally, the analysis con- ducted for that purpose in this article will show the original contribution of D.C. North’s institutional-cognitive approach to the development of NIE (and economic theory in gen- eral) in explaining institutional conditions of development. © 2019 Nicolaus Copernicus University. All rights reserved. cbyd EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 331–346 Keywords: uncertainty; mental models; players; institutions; institutional change JEL: D83, O43 1. Introduction Reflections on the essence of uncertainty became in Douglass C. North’s con- cept a starting point for explanation of economic changes mechanism. The genesis of North’s studies in the scope of uncertainty relates to one of the essential research problems relevant for the emergence of new institu- tional economics trend, that is answering the question, why certain countries are rich and others poor. This problem, according to New Institutional -Eco nomics (NIE) representatives, cannot be sufficiently explained in the frame- work of neoclassical paradigm based on assumptions of perfect information, ideal rationality of market actors and zero transaction costs. Seeking the answers on the causes of differences between countries in terms of effectiveness and prosperity, the leading NIE representatives — Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Douglass Cecil North and Elinor Ostrom — have created and applied in empirical studies the conceptual and analytical tools characteristic for the new approach such as transaction costs, ownership rights and contracts, presently referred to as ‘golden triangle’ of NIE, later supple- mented with significant behavioural assumptions introduced by North in his 2005 work (Menard & Shirley, 2014, pp. 3, 6). The purpose of the article is to present D.C. North’s concept concerning -un certainty as a source of formation of institutions (‘rules of the game’) which place human environment in order and — in this way, through the shaping of institu- tional framework — creating basic conditions for economic development. The specified research task will be performed on the basis of literary stud- ies, mainly based on the D.C. North’s legacy. The logical analysis conducted in the article will show connections and dependencies that North saw between the occurrence of uncertainty and changes in physical and human environ- ment, between uncertainty and creating institutions and beliefs (also vice versa) and between uncertainty and institutional change. 2. The current state of knowledge, uncertainty in economic literature Uncertainty regarding the physical and human environment constitutes, -ac cording to North, the essential feature of a non-ergodic, that is unpredictable and constantly changing world1. At the very beginning of reflections concerning 1 In economic literature it is assumed that North’s concept, in which uncertainty de- rives from the nature of non-ergodic world, constitutes an important progress in the de - velopment of studies on this category. On this subject see Dequech (2006, pp.109–131). Rudolf Richter (2012) points out that North’s approach to uncertainty includes epistemo- 332 EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 331–346 the significance of uncertainty in explaining institutional change, North refers to economic literature, mainly to the canonical work of Frank Knight (1921), in which he specifies the differences between uncertainty and risk. According to him, risk pertains to a condition in which there exists a probability of re- sults, against which we can insure. Uncertainty, in turn, pertains to a condition in which such probability does not exist. North, intending to show the signifi- cance of human intentionality for limiting uncertainty by creating rules ordering environment, modifies and extends Knight’s probabilistic definitions. For this purpose, he refers to an interpretation by Ronald Heiner (1983, pp. 560–595), according to whom uncertainty is ‘the Origin of Predictable Behavior’, which in North’s concept means that it is uncertainty that is the source of rules forma- tion and institutional change (North, 2005, p. 14). As Mark Blaug (2000, pp. 67, 420, 714) reminds us, the problem of choice in conditions of uncertainty had previously been fragmentarily considered by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall as well as John Maynard Keynes (1921), who emphasized non-probabilistic character of uncertainty, which in his words per- meates the entire economic process. A significant contribution to the develop- ment of theory of choice in the conditions of uncertainty and risk was made by Kenneth Arrow (1970; Bochenek, 2012, pp. 46–63). At this point, we will present views on uncertainty expressed by leading NIE representative, Oliver Williamson. He was mainly concerned with behavioral uncertainty. He associated the occurrence of uncertainty with the anticipated increase in transaction costs as costs of limited rationality (Williamson, 1975, p. 4) The uncertainty is — according to Williamson (1985) — an effect of- un predicted changes in consumers’ preferences, lack of communication between decision makers, opportunistic behavior as well as failure to disclose, hiding or distorting information. The ways to solve these problems are court proceedings or adjustments in private order. However, in Williamson’s view, the main role is played by improvements in organisations’ performance, which is examined by transaction costs economics. The way to reduce them is optimization of institu- tions (Richter, 2012). Williamson assesses institutional solutions (rules of the game) in respect of their influence on management effectiveness and privatization results and — more broadly — in order to understand economic development and reform is- sues. As part of research on institutions he adopts two assumptions: (1) of social embeddedness of institutions and (2) of a condition concerning the attributes of human actors (Simon, 1985, pp. 293–303). In the analysis of human behav- ior, he employs research achievements of Herbert Simon, as well as Daniel Kah- neman and Amos Tversky (1982, pp. 123–141) which show that in the process of making decisions by individuals in conditions of uncertainty there are cog- nitive limitations, which means that institutions are not objective. Conclusions derived from the achievements of evolutionary psychology and evolutionary an- logical aspect concerning the nature of economic science, which according to non-ergodic- ity hypothesis, cannot be an exact science. 333 EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 18(3): 331–346 thropology are used by Williamson (1998, pp. 75–79) in research into the gov- ernance structure effectiveness in the pursuit of reducing transaction costs. In this context, he notes that if the ability to recruit individuals capable of making choices under conditions of uncertainty outside the organization is limited, then the solution to the problem is the responsibility of the organization itself. The effective adjustment of various competences of individuals to the assigned tasks will be carried out through specialization, i.e. by dividing complicated tasks into parts and, after their completion, reassembling together. Uncertainty in F. Knight’s sense, understood as lack of knowledge of what future will bring, is the basis of explaining institutions’ effectiveness adopted by other NIE researchers. Searching for ways to increase economic efficiency of institutions by reducing uncertainty constitutes a certain

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