LGCS 199DR: Independent Study in Pragmatics Jesse Harris & Meredith Landman September 10, 2013 Last class, we discussed the difference between semantics and pragmatics: Semantics The study of the literal meaning of words and phrases, and the way in which they combine to form more complex literal meanings. Pragmatics The study of how literal meaning gives rise to the intended meaning of an utterance in context. Philosopher H. Paul Grice introduced several terms of art, including a fundamental distinction between what was said and what was intended. Although these terms are a little vague, and sometimes disputed, we’ll assume an intuitive distinction in this class: What was said The literal meaning of an sentence (semantics) “In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the con- ventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered.” (Grice, 1975: 25) H. Paul Grice What was intended The utterance meaning (pragmatics) How would you identify what was said and what was intended in Meredith’s utterance? (1) A fictional conversation: Jesse: John is such a jerk, don’t you think? Meredith: You know, I just can’t believe this weather. 1 Pragmatics deals with the context dependent, non-truth-conditional interpretation of an utterance. To fully understand how pragmatics works, we first need to understand how truth-conditions relate to literal meaning in general. Meaning is notoriously elusive. We follow the advice of philosopher David Lewis, ad- vice which we might (affectionately) call the Forest Gump approach (Meaning is what meaning does). “In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that.” (Lewis, 1970: 22) David Lewis This of course raises the issue what does meaning do? Whatever our theory of meaning ultimately looks like, it should honor the following intuitions: What does meaning do? 1. Meaning describes the world. 2. Meaning allows relationships between expressions: contradiction, entailment, and synonymy. 3. Meaning is productive. Once you know the meaning of two things, you usually have a darn good chance of knowing what they mean when combined. The first criterion can be taken in a couple of different ways. Semanticists tend to think of the relationship between meaning and world in terms of truth conditions: Truth conditions You know the meaning of a sentence S from language L when you know under what conditions S is true. This is all to say that I know what a sentence S means when I know when it is true and when it is false. To know the truth conditions of S doesn’t imply that S is true, just that you recognize how the world would look like if it were true. Let’s take a look at a concrete, if absurd, example. 2 (2) Most Martians feast on cotton candy. I’ll be honest: I have no idea if Martians actually eat cotton candy, let alone feast on it (let alone whether there are actually such things as Martians). But if there were such things as Martians, and most of them eat cotton candy and adore it, then I’m prepared to say that the sentence (2) is true. If any of those conditions are false, e.g., Martians are serverly allergic to cotton candy, then I’m confident that (2) is, in fact, false. Turning to the second criterion – namely, that meaning allows relationships between expressions, let’s turn to examples of semantic relations: contradition, entailment, and synonymy. (3) Contradiction a. All Martians feast on cotton candy. b. Some Martians don’t eat cotton candy. I know that this is a contradiction, even without knowing whether each sentence is true. Relationships between sentences holds by virtue of their form. The more subdued case illustrates a similar point: each clause in (4) cannot simultaneously be true. (4) Contradiction Dylan is brave and Dylan is not brave. Entailment is quite different than contradition. If sentence S entails sentence T, then T cannot be true without S also being true. So, if S is true, then T must also be true. (5) Entailment a. Three detectives failed to find the killer. b. Two detectives failed to find the killer. (6) Entailment a. John brought an apple for lunch. b. John brought a fruit for lunch. It’s not enough for both sentences to be true. Although both sentences in (7) might be true, neither one depends on the other. It’s perfectly possible, for example, then although John brought an apple, Cindy has brought nothing at all. (7) John brought an apple for lunch and Cindy brought some crackers. Further, just because S entails T, doesn’t necessarily mean that T entails S. For example, switch (a) and (b) in (6) above. Does bringing fruit entail bringing an apple? Definitely not! If John brought some fruit, he could have brought an orange instead. 3 When sentences S and T entail the other, then S and T are synonymous. Two sentences are synonymous just in case one cannot be true with the other also being true. (8) Synonymy a. Sue hugged Lydia. b. Lydia was hugged by Sue. These sentences describe the exact same scenario. But this is not to say that picking one over the other is arbitrary. The passive version (b) is non-canonical and might be used in special circumstances, for example to highlight Lydia over Sue. These considerations fall under the domain of Information Structure, a topic which we hope to discuss in a few weeks. In addition, terms like soda and pop may be synonymous, but carry different connotations or be preferred for reasons of dialect: (9) Synonymy a. Sam drank a soda. b. Sam drank a pop. Again, the semantic relations of contradiction, entailment, and synonymy are semantic in nature. Logic is a system that is particularly good at treating such relations. There are many kinds of logic: propositional, predicate, modal, fuzzy, temporal, non- monotonic, etc. These logics share a few things in common. A logic has a set of primitive symbols, rules for generating formulas (expressions) of the language, and rules of infer- ence. We’ll focus on propositional logic here. Propositional logic trades in propositions. Just how to define the term proposition is no simple matter, especially among philosophers of language. Let’s avoid that debate and settle on a vague, but simple, definition. Proposition A bearer of truth or falsity. Sentences express propositions, but not uniquely so. For example, synonymous sen- tences will express the same proposition. We might also think that an English sentence might share a proposition with its translation in, say, Hindi. So, though propositions are expressed by sentences, they are also independent of sentences. The sentence Regi- nald opened the refrigerator only to find an elephant dancing about in the butter expresses a proposition, even if the sentence is never uttered. In the Tractatus, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously proposed that “the world is everything that is the case.” That is, we could give a complete description of the world if only we cared to list all the true propositions (facts) about the world. 4 But this world could have turned out differently. I’ll rely on your commonsense in- tuitions here to make my point. For example, this class could have been taught by someone else, Jay Atlas say, rather than us. Or I could have worn a different shirt than I did. Or you could have decided to skip class and lay out in the sun. The world is what it is, but you probably think that it could have turned differently than (unless you’re a predeterminist or a fatalist). Think of a proposition as something that is potentially true or false depending on how the world actually is. Assume that we have just two types of truth – the True (represented as 1 or >) and the False (represented as 0 or F or sometimes even ?). For example, chances are good that you don’t know what month the person sitting to your left was born in. Here’s a proposition: (10) The person sitting next to you was born in March. You’re going to be right (1) or wrong (0) about this – there are only two possibilities. So much for propositions. The language of propositional logic consist of a basic vocabu- lary (atomic propositions) and a syntax for generating well-formed expressions (complex propositions) via sentential connectives. Sentential connective Logical connective (Additional symbols) not : ∼ and ^ & or _ if . then . ! ⊃ if and only if $ ≡ (11) Syntax for propositional logic L i. Propositional letters standing for atomic propositions p, q, r, etc. in the vocabu- lary of L are formulas in L. ii. If p is a formula in L, then :p is a formula in L, too. iii.If p and q are formulas in L, then (p ^ q), (p _ q), (p ! q), and (p $ q) are formulas in L, too. iv.Only that which can be generated by the clauses (i)–(iii) in a finite number of steps is a formula in L. 5 Ex. 1. Which of the following are well-formed formulas of L? a. :(:p _ q) e. p ! ((p ! q)) b. p _ (q) f. (p ! (p ! q) ! q) c. :(q) g. (:p _ ::p) d. ((p ! p) ! (q ! p)) h. (p _ q _ r) For example, let p represent Padma is sick and q represent Quincy left early. We can form all kinds of fascinating fomulas: Ex. 2. Translate the formula into English: (12) a. p _ q b.