The Counterinsurgency Campaign of the Nigerian Army: The Fight against the Boko-Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria, 1999-2017 Gilbert La’ankwap Yalmi Department of Politics and Contemporary History School of Arts and Media, University of Salford, Manchester, UK Supervisors Dr Samantha Newbery Professor Searle Alaric Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... i List of Figures ...................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. v Dedication ........................................................................................................... vi Abbreviations ....................................................................................................vii Abstract ................................................................................................................ x INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 Gaps in the Literature and Opportunities for New Research ............................ 2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................................... 7 Objective and Significance ................................................................................ 9 Research Methodology .................................................................................... 10 Secondary Sources ........................................................................................... 14 Research Architecture ...................................................................................... 16 CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................. 19 Literature Review ................................................................................................ 19 1.1. Concepts: Insurgency and Terrorism ........................................................ 19 1.1.1. Insurgency ........................................................................................... 19 1.1.2. Terrorism ............................................................................................ 24 1.2. Counterinsurgency Approaches ................................................................ 30 1.2.1. ‘Cold’ and ‘Hot’ Insurgency............................................................... 30 1.2.2. Coordination in Counterinsurgency ................................................... 32 1.2.3. The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Approach ..................................................... 33 1.2.4. The Military-Based Approach to Counterinsurgency ........................ 36 1.2.5. Intelligence in Counterinsurgency ...................................................... 39 1.3. Military Preparedness, Effectiveness and Efficiency ............................... 41 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 53 CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................ 55 Boko-Haram ........................................................................................................ 55 2.1. Synthesis ................................................................................................... 56 i 2.2. Aims and Objectives of Boko-Haram ...................................................... 57 2.3. Leadership, Organisation and Membership .............................................. 65 2.4. Sources of Funding ................................................................................... 67 2.5. Methods of Operation ............................................................................... 68 2.6. Internationalisation ................................................................................... 70 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 73 CHAPTER THREE............................................................................................. 75 Coordination in Counterinsurgency .................................................................... 75 3.1. Response and Coordination of the Federal Government .......................... 76 3.1.1. Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Action ......................................................... 76 3.1.2. Safe Corridor Coordination ................................................................ 77 3.2. Civil-Military Coordination in Counterinsurgency .................................. 79 3.3. Police-Military Coordination .................................................................... 90 3.3.1. The Importance of Police Primacy ..................................................... 90 3.3.2. Police Primacy in the Context of Good Governance ......................... 93 3.3.3. The Police and the Military in Joint Efforts ....................................... 94 3.4. Civil-Military Relations and the Counterinsurgency in Nigeria .............. 98 3.5. The Department of Civil-Military Affairs .............................................. 102 3.6. The Nigerian Military’s Strategies for Counterinsurgency .................... 103 3.7. The Establishment of a Professional Indigenous Police and Military Force (Civilian Joint Task Force) ............................................................................ 106 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 110 CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................. 112 ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Counterinsurgency ........................................................ 112 4.1. The Concept of ‘Hearts and Minds’ ....................................................... 112 4.2. The Nigerian Armed Forces and ‘Hearts and Minds’ ............................ 124 4.2.1. The Good Governance Approach ..................................................... 129 4.3. The Use of Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency ................................ 133 4.3.1. The Use of Minimum Force by the Nigerian Military ..................... 138 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 141 CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................... 142 ii Intelligence in Counterinsurgency .................................................................... 142 5.1. The Importance of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency ........................... 142 5.1.1. The British in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60 ............................ 144 5.1.2. The Police and Human Intelligence ................................................. 146 5.1.3. Counterinsurgencies are Manpower Intensive ................................. 150 5.1.4. Integration of Indigenous Forces ...................................................... 152 5.2. The Collection of Intelligence in Nigeria ............................................... 154 5.2.1. Poor Military Intelligence ................................................................. 154 5.2.2. Surveillance ...................................................................................... 155 5.2.3. Cordon and Search Operations ......................................................... 161 5.2.4. Interrogation ..................................................................................... 170 5.2.5. Informants ......................................................................................... 175 5.2.6. Intelligence Liaison .......................................................................... 175 5.3. Coordination of Intelligence in Nigeria .................................................. 176 5.4. Weaknesses in the Way Intelligence Was Used in Counterinsurgency . 179 5.5. Defence and Intelligence Establishments ............................................... 189 5.6. Dilemmas of the Defence and Intelligence Establishments in Response to the Security Challenge ................................................................................... 191 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 195 CHAPTER SIX ................................................................................................. 197 Military Preparedness for Counterinsurgency .................................................. 197 6.1. Motivation of the Military as an Institution............................................ 198 6.2. Equipment ............................................................................................... 204 6.3. Personnel and Training ........................................................................... 209 6.4. Experience............................................................................................... 213 6.5. Corruption ............................................................................................... 215 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 223 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 225 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................