16. Clashing values The 2015 conflict in Hamar district of South Omo Zone, southern Ethiopia Yohannes Yitbarek Introduction Hamar Woreda is a district in southern Ethiopia that has, until recently, been rather detached from the centre. Like most of their ethnic neighbours in South Omo Zone, the Hamar people are agro-pastoralists who have lived somewhat autonomously for a long time in the district. Despite their incorporation into the Ethiopian nation state in the late-nineteenth century, the Hamar were able to continue an indepen- dent lifestyle, with limited contact with the subsequent central governments. Since the mid-1990s, the government’s attempts to actively include all ethnic groups and develop remote areas have changed many things, and interactions between local communities and government have become frequent. These encounters between different people and their value systems have led to innovations, but also ten- sions and conflict. In 2014/5, growing tension between the local authorities and the Hamar community over their clashing values escalated into a serious armed conflict. The resolution of the conflict could only be achieved with much effort, concessions on both side, and a better understanding of and respect for some of the key values of Hamar society. This chapter looks at the causes of the tension, the reasons for the escalation of the conflict and the efforts made by both sides to resolve it. In doing so, I explore the differing value positions, perspectives and strategies employed by local government agents and the Hamar people to achieve their goals.1 1 The fieldwork for this research has been done as part of my PhD project at the Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany. All fieldwork expenses were coveredbythedepartmentofIntegrationandConflictofMPI.Ihaveconductedfieldworkbe- tween September 2016 to September 2017. The data for this research was gathered through structured and semi structured interviews with local people and local government authori- ties in Hamar. 372 YohannesYitbarek The Hamar and their relation with the Ethiopian state The Hamar are one of the largest groups in South Omo Zone of the SouthernNa- tions, Nationalities and People’s Regional State (SNNPRS). According to the Cen- tral Statistical Agency, the Hamar population was estimated to be 59,160 in 2007 (CSA 2008). The Hamar speak their own South Omotic language. Their economy combines the rearing of animals (goats, sheep, cattle), farming (sorghum, maize, varieties of beans), apiculture, and hunting and gathering (Strecker 2010:87). They live in mountainous and lowland areas, in settlement areas consisting of several homesteads. Close relatives are usually clustered together within one homestead. The Hamar social and political organization is rather egalitarian and couldbe called acephalous or, as Amborn (2018), puts it ‘polycephalous’, which means that they have no central leader or chief; rather they live a kind of ‘regulated anarchy’, where seniority and the rhetorical skills of individuals play a role in daily affairs and conflict resolution. The Hamar have two ritual leaders, locally called bitta,2 one from the Gatta clan and the other from the Worla clan, who are responsible for the spiritual well-being of the country, but do not have any political power. They have twenty-four exogamous clans under two moieties (Strecker 2006b:87). Like the other groups in South Omo, the Hamar were incorporated into the Ethiopian state by Emperor Menelik II at the end of the nineteenth century (Don- ham and James 2002, Lydall 2010, Strecker 2013, Tsega-Ab 2005). Under the suc- ceeding governments of Ethiopia, they were governed by rulers whose staff con- sisted mainly of central and northern Ethiopians. As Jean Lydall (2010:322) noted, in the immediate period after Menelik’s conquest and also later during Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule (1931–1974), the governors made no effort to condemn the culture and tradition of the conquered groups; instead they emphasized cultural difference to justify their dominance. Their relations with the local community were confined to issues concerning the ‘adjudication of inter-group conflicts’ and the ‘collection of taxes’ (Lydall (2010:322). With the coming to power of the socialist Derg regime (1974–1991), a few development projects (schools, road, market schemes and relief aid programmes) loaded with ‘a civilizational bias’ (Abbink 1997:2) were introduced to the Hamar, as well as to other groups in Southern Ethiopia. After the downfall of the Derg in 1991, the change of government significantly transformed the relationship between the central state and most of the local groups in Ethiopia, including the Hamar. The ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revo- lutionary Front (EPRDF), adopted the language of democracy, peace and devel- opment, and abandoned a highly centralized, unitary state in favour of what is 2 The term ‘bitta’literallymeans‘thefirst’andreferstothefirstancestoroftheHamartosettle in the area. It also means ‘the first’ in authority and ‘the first’ in transcendental and ritual power (see Strecker 1976:30). Clashingvalues 373 commonly known as ‘ethnic-based federalism’, giving constitutionally based equal power to all ethnic groups and individuals (Belete 2008:447). Since then, the Hamar, like other groups in Ethiopia, have been exercising the right to govern their own affairs. They are also entitled to the ‘right to development’, to education, health services, markets and infrastructure. Although introduced with the objective of improving living standards (FDRE 2015), these development packages contravene Hamar values and have triggered conflicts between the local population and the district administration. Over the past few years, the relationship between the local population and the administra- tion of Hamar Woreda has been increasingly tense. Numerous small and large dis- putes led to an open and armed confrontation that reached a climax in 2015 when open war broke out between the Hamar and the district police. In its aftermath, the conflict continued to engage local, regional and national officials as well as the Hamar people, and to this day it has not been fully settled. The issues that led to the outbreak of the conflict have been topics ofintense debate among the Hamar community, the local authorities, residents of Dimeka, and others who were directly or indirectly involved or affected by the conflict. The Hamar mention two major issues as the causes of the conflict: the denial of access to the Mago National Park; and problems related to the schooling of girls. On the other hand, the local authorities blame the Hamar for being resistant to modernity, characterizing the communities involved in the conflict as rather ‘closed’, locked in their own traditions and stubbornly opposed to any change, citing the Hamar people’s rejection of education and their insistence on hunting game and grazing in the Mago National Park as evidence. Having looked deeper into the topic and talked to many individuals on both sides, I will argue here that the main cause of the conflict is the clash between two different value systems: the rather mobile agro-pastoral production of the Hamar and the top-down development approach of the government. Universal human rights, particular cultures and national interests Over the past decades, social and economic development programmes aimed at changing the lifestyles of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities have been widely introduced by the Ethiopian government. Education provision and the need to re- duce gender disparity in the schooling system and other social service projects are among the key priorities of the government’s social development programme. These programmes are usually framed in the context of universal human rightdis- courses, such as the ‘education for all’ programme established at the Dakar UN Forum in 2000, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim- ination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. The implementation of these 374 YohannesYitbarek social development programmes has generated different responses among local communities, local administrations, national governments and international or- ganizations. To understand these dynamics, it is necessary to contextualize the discussion within the broader debate and negotiation about and legal uses of ‘hu- man rights’ and their conjunction with ‘particular cultures’ (Cowan et al. 2001:1, Johansson 2017:611). The pervasive use of ‘universal rights’ and the way these rights are implemented in local contexts, and resisted by and negotiated in particular cultures and societies offers a more meaningful insight to comprehend the appli- cability of universal rights in local settings. According to Johansson (2017:613), the debate between ‘universal rights’ and ‘particular cultures’ has existed since the adoption of Universal Declaration of Hu- man Rights (UDHR) in 1948. The preamble of the UDHR affirms that ‘Peoples ofthe United Nations (…) faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’ (UN 1948:1). The assembly also proclaims the UDHR as ‘a common stan- dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ (ibid). Following the adoption of the UDHR, countries around the world, including Ethiopia, have ratified sev- eral human right conventions. Many have even gone further, enacting legislation, creating mechanisms and putting into place a range of measures