1 MOSCOW, 30 October 2009 (Itar‐Tass) ‐‐ The self‐induced blast of a Tochka‐U tactical missile during the Thursday (Oct 29) shooting practice at the Leningrad military district's Luga training range might have resulted from the missile's engine failure, Rocketry and Artillery Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Sergei Bogatinov said. "The missile really blasted shortly after the takeoff. No one was hurt, and there was no damage. The launcher is intact. The main theory of this incident is a failure of the missile's engine," he said... 2 1. A missile is a collection of systems, subsystems, and components working toward a common purpose, just like an automobile or any other piece of complex machinery •The various subsystems are typically designed, developed and tested independently, and then integrated into a final product •Designers want the newest and best, but often settle for what works, what’s available and what they can afford. 2. We will address the major subsystems that comprise a missile, and consider the materials and equipment needed for production •The STRUCTURE supports and protects the warhead, and provides the carriage by which the warhead is delivered to its destination. Designers want this to be as strong and light as possible, all balanced against cost (materials, availability, manufacturability, supportability, lifespan). •The GUIDANCE system contains those subsystems needed to guide the weapon to its intended target. Designers want these to be as compact, reliable, accurate and efficient as possible. This is again balanced against cost, availability, and complexity. [“Rockets” have no guidance; “Scuds” barely have guidance.] •The PROPULSION system drives the weapon to its target. Designers want high thrust and propulsion efficiency (Specific Impulse, or Isp), but there are limits to how much propellant can be carried, how much internal pressure and heat can be withstood, and how long the engine‐motor can function. 3. Last but not least are the TEST EQUIPMENT needed to ensure the missile will work, and the LAUNCH SUPPORT equipment needed to field, support, and launch these systems. 3 • Rockets and missiles have a finite life span. Well‐made rockets and missiles can last for ten to 20 years, perhaps extended by another five to ten years after robust examination and testing. Poorly‐made rockets and missiles have a much shorter life span; perhaps cut in half. • “Time” inescapably moves us along the missile’s life timeline; “Damage” reduces the length of the timeline. We will talk about that damage and its affects, such as environmental and handling factors, or the fundamental nature of the rocket itself. • Beyond “age” factors, we must be reminded that there are agreements, treaties, or political decisions under which unneeded, expired, or otherwise unsafe rockets and missiles can be demolished. 4 (Flood Photo: Hnin Maung) (Mist photo: Quang‐Tuan Luong ) • What decreases rocket and missile life? • First, there are the environmental factors of heat and water. • Heat dramatically alters the burn behavior of the propellants (liquid or solid). • Heat boosts the chamber pressure and temperature, sometimes higher than the capacity of the motor case. • Solid motors absorb water. When the burn surface approaches the water, the water boils or flash steams, causing surface blow‐outs, increasing the burn pressure, flashing more water, etc. • This can cause high‐frequency pressure fluctuations that can break off chunks of propellant, or fail the nozzle or motor case structure. • Temperature fluctuations damage motor grains by inducing internal stresses. • Motor grain is a rubber‐like insulator. Temperature jumps from up‐down on aircraft, or mountain excursions, or day‐night cycles repeatedly subject the motor to these stresses (I’ll show an illustration in a moment). • Salt hurts everything, by corrosion. • Design margins driven as low as possible to save weight, or compromised by poor‐quality construction, don’t allow for much in the way of strength reduction. • Oh, and liquid propellants collect environmental contaminants from supply tanks, feed lines, etc. 5 • Let’s talk about solid propellants. • Basically, they are explosive compounds that burn at a very rapid rate, but not nearly as fast as “detonation.” • For rocket and missile propellant, there are two basic types: • Homogeneous –essentially all in the same large molecule • These are air‐to‐air missiles, surface‐to‐air missiles, most rockets… • Heterogeneous –remain as separate molecules, bound together • These are ballistic missiles, some rockets… • Higher performing, but a smoky plume… • In addition to temperature and humidity damage, the elastic propellant sloughs due to the constant pull of gravity; the chemical ingredients decompose into original molecules; plasticizer (the ingredient giving it the elastic texture) tends to migrate through and out of the grain. • Look at the figure to the right, which shows how even a few months can cause propellant ingredients to migrate sufficient to be observed in X‐rays. • All of this damage is irreversible; plus motors are damaged by rough handling. 6 • The left figure (a slice through the solid propellant grain) shows how a grain burns back from the original star‐shaped perforation/void, out to the motor case liner. • A different grain is shown on the right to illustrate how internal defects, as small as they might be, can affect burn back. The investigators burned the motor for a brief span, and then rapidly extinguished the burn. • The red line is the original star shape. • The yellow‐green line is what the burn line should look like. • You can see where the burn surface deviates from that yellow‐green line. • These are areas where density differences, voids, cracks, or other defects have locally affected the burn. • If there are enough defects, or severe enough defects, motor grain failure results, which vastly over‐pressurizes the motor case, leading to motor case rupture. • Defects, such as these, occur as a result of the mixing, casting, curing –the quality of the production process. They also occur as a consequence of age. 7 • So, you thought liquid‐propelled rocket systems can avoid problems… I assure you that they cannot. • Liquids are just as problematic, especially sensitive to the quality of manufacture, plus time remains an enemy. • Parts that should slip, slide, and roll are subject to corrosion or foreign particle contamination. • Rubber and plastic parts become brittle and crack or split. Connectors and wire insulators fail. • Springs attain a set (out of calibration). • Explosives used to drive valves that start and stop the engine can become overly sensitive. 8 • Propulsion system failures remain the easiest to point to in terms of quality, age, and environmental degradation, but any of us who’ve repaired old cars or aircraft know, the other systems, subsystems, components also can be compromised. • You gradually face more risk that your weapon system will fail than the target faces a risk of equipment success. The result is that you lose trust in your equipment. You must come to terms with • Other easy examples: • Warheads: Materials swelling, organic components reacting, corrosion, material incompatibilities, plasticizer migration, binder degradation 9 • 9k52 Luna (70 with air brake) • 9k58 Smerch (90 w/o air brake; 70 with air brake) • HY‐1 (Silkworm) • Bal‐E with Kh‐35E • Independent of the hazards of environment, age, build quality, and handling… • We must also recognize the realities of obsolescence combined with decisions to eliminate old, unsafe, and obsolete missile and rocket systems. • In light of what we’ve discussed, I hope you have a new appreciation for why I say that there is no need to retain old and unsafe equipment, especially as it jeopardizes your own crews and civilians. • Whether your decisions are driven by commitments to agreements or treaties, political or military signaling (e.g., acts of good faith), or purely safety and security rationale –decisions to eliminate are sound and practical. 10 • Missile KSAs are an enabler for long‐range WMD delivery. • This is also true for unguided and guided rockets, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial systems. • The Hague CoC addresses the two principal paths of proliferation. 1. Vertical –A country acquiring or building better or more missiles; and 2. Horizontal –A country spreading the knowledge, technologies, production infrastructure, and materials to design, construct, and field missile systems. • Combating proliferation can occur at many levels, from entire systems down to the smallest component. • Standing at the forefront or assisting partners. • Fighting knowledge and technology transfers as much as physical goods. • Fighting financial transfers among members of the proliferation networks CONSISTENCY – • Consistent application of pressure on proliferators –eliminate bypasses • Consistent interpretation of treaties, regimes, agreements –eliminate potential gaps • Global implementation of same –plug any remaining holes 11 12 HCoC subscribing states make voluntary commitments… General Measures: Abide by HCoC principles and accede to UN Space Treaties & Declarations Transparency Measures: Submit an annual declaration of the country’s ballistic missile and space‐launch vehicle programs Confidence‐Building Measures: Provide pre‐ launch notifications on ballistic missile and space‐launch vehicle launches and test flights • As agreed by the conference in The Hague, Austria serves as the Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat) and