The Uncertain Future 9 of Nuclear Energy Frank von Hippel, Editor A research report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials September 2010 Research Report 9 International Panel on Fissile Materials The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy With contributions by Matthew Bunn, Anatoli Diakov, Ming Ding, Tadahiro Katsuta, Charles McCombie, M.V. Ramana, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Susan Voss, Suyuan Yu Frank von Hippel, Editor www.fissilematerials.org September 2010 © 2010 International Panel on Fissile Materials ISBN 978-0-9819275-7-2 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License. To view a copy of this license, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 Table of Contents About the IPFM i Explanatory Note iii Summary 1 1 Introduction 5 2 Costs 21 3 Countrystudies 27 4 Advancedreactortechnology 43 5 Once-throughversusplutoniumrecycle 53 6 Risksfromlarge-scalereleasesofradioactivity totheatmosphere 59 7 Nuclear-weaponproliferation 63 8 Institutionalrequirements 73 9 Publicacceptance 79 10 Policyrecommendations 83 References 87 Contributors 105 The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy Figures Figure1. Growthofglobalnuclear-powercapacity. 2 Figure2. Nuclearcapacityinstalledbyyear. 2 Figure3. Afissionchainreactioninaslow-neutron reactor. 6 Figure4. GovernmentenergyRD&Dexpenditures intheOECDcountries. 8 Figure5. Power-reactorcapacitybycountry. 10 Figure6. TwoNuclearEnergyAgencygrowth scenariosfornuclearpowerto2050. 14 Figure7. Exampleofcompositionoffreshandspent light-waterreactorfuel. 16 Figure8. Currentspentfueldispositionstrategies. 18 Figure9. Pressurizedlight-waterreactor. 20 Figure10. Rangesof2007-2008“overnight” constructioncosts. 21 Figure11. FrenchandU.S.nuclearreactoraverage constructioncostsbyyear. 23 Figure12. PlansforRussiannuclearpowerexpansion asof2007. 37 Figure13. Totalfissionandbreederresearch,development anddemonstrationfundingintheOECDcountries. 44 Figure14. UraniumResourceAvailability. 46 Figure15. Drycaskstorageofolderspentfuelata U.S. nuclearpowerplant. 58 Figure16. Cesium-137contaminationlevelsaround theChernobylnuclearpowerplant. 60 Figure17. EpidemicofthyroidcancerinBelarus followingthe1986Chernobylaccident. 61 Figure18. Theglobalnuclearsafetyregime. 74 Figure19. Attitudestowardnuclearpowerbycountry. 81 Tables Table1. Globaldistributionofnuclearpowercapacity in2008. 9 Table2. Countriesthathaverecentlyexpressedaninterest inacquiringafirstnuclearpowerplant. 13 Table3. Centrifugeandlaser-enrichmentplants, operating,underconstructionandplanned. 17 Table4. Civilianspent-fuelreprocessingplants. 19 Table5. Countrystatusforspentfuelreprocessing. 54 The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy About the IPFM TheInternationalPanelonFissileMaterials(IPFM)wasfoundedinJanuary2006. It is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from seventeen countries, including both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievablepolicyinitiativestosecure,consolidateandreducestockpilesofhighly enricheduraniumandplutonium.Thesefissilematerialsarethekeyingredients innuclearweapons,andtheircontroliscriticaltonucleardisarmament,halting theproliferationofnuclearweaponsandensuringthatterroristsdonotacquire nuclearweapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon and navalfuelstockpilesfortensofthousandsofnuclearweapons.Onthecivilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number ofweapons.Highlyenricheduraniumisusedincivilianreactorfuelintensof locations.Thetotalamountusedforthispurposeissufficienttomakehundreds ofHiroshima-typebombs,adesignpotentiallywithinthecapabilitiesofterrorist groups. ThePanelisco-chairedbyProfessorR.RajaramanofJawaharlalNehruUniversity inNewDelhiandProfessorFrankvonHippelofPrincetonUniversity.Itsmembers includenuclearexpertsfromBrazil,China,France,Germany,India,Ireland,Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.ProfessorJoséGoldemberg of Brazil stepped down as co-chair of IPFM on July 1, 2007. He continues as a memberofIPFM. IPFMresearchandreportsaresharedwithinternationalorganizations,national governmentsandnongovernmentalgroups.Ithasfullpanelmeetingstwiceayear incapitalsaroundtheworldinadditiontospecialistworkshops.Thesemeetings andworkshopsareofteninconjunctionwithinternationalconferencesatwhich IPFMpanelsandexpertsareinvitedtomakepresentations. Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security provides administrativeandresearchsupportfortheIPFM. IPFM’s initial support is provided by a five-year grant to Princeton University fromtheJohnD.andCatherineT.MacArthurFoundationofChicago. The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy i ii Explanatory Note This report is a shortened version of a second draft of the chapter on nuclear energy that is to appear in the 2010 report of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA). It is being published as an IPFM report with the permission of the GEA becauseitprovidesusefulbackgroundforIPFMstudiesrelatingtonuclearpower. ItdoesnotincludeasubstantialsectiononfusionenergyauthoredbyProfessor RobertGoldstonofPrincetonUniversity,whichwillappearintheGEAreport.It hasnotyetbeensubjecttofinalreviewandrevisionforinclusionintheGlobal EnergyAssessment.Theviewsexpressedhereshouldthereforenotbeattributed totheGEA. Some topicsthatwillbecoveredinotherGEAchaptersarenotcoveredhere— orcoveredonlybriefly.Theseincludethehealthimpactsofroutinereleasesof radioactivityfromthenuclearfuelcycle. Someofthecountrystudiesthatappearhereinabbreviatedformwereauthored asfollows: • China,ProfessorSuyuanYuandDr.MingDing,TsinghuaUniversity. • India,Dr.M.V.RamanaofPrincetonUniversity. • Japan, Professor Tadahiro Katsuta, Meiji University; and Professor TatsujiroSuzuki,TokyoUniversity.* • Russia, Professor Anatoli Diakov, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology;andSusanVoss,independentconsultant. Leadauthorsonothersectionsare: • Institutionalrequirements,ProfessorMatthewBunn,HarvardUniversity. • Publicacceptance,Dr.M.V.Ramana. Dr. Charles McCombie, Executive Director of the Geneva-based Association for Regional and International Underground Storage, advised on the section on radioactivewasteaswellascommentingveryhelpfullyontheentirereport. * NowamemberofJapan’sAtomicEnergyCommission The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy iii Summary In the 1970s, nuclear energy was expected to quickly become the dominant generatorofelectricalpower.Itsfuelcostsareremarkablylowbecauseamillion timesmoreenergyisreleasedperunitweightbyfissionthanbycombustion.But itscapitalcostshaveproventobehigh.Safetyrequiresredundantcoolingand control systems, massive leak-tight containment structures, very conservative seismicdesignandextremelystringentqualitycontrol. The routine health risks and greenhouse-gas emissions from fission power are small relative to those associated with coal, but there are catastrophic risks: nuclear-weapon proliferation and the possibility of over-heated fuel releasing massivequantitiesoffissionproductstothehumanenvironment.Thepublicis sensitivetotheserisks.The1979ThreeMileIslandand1986Chernobylaccidents, along with high capital costs, ended the rapid growth of global nuclear-power capacity(Figures1and2). Today,therearehopesfora“nuclearrenaissance”butnuclearenergyinWestern Europe and North America, which together account for 63 percent of current globalcapacity,isbeingdoggedagainbyhighcapitalcostsanditisnotyetclear thatnewconstructionwilloffsettheretirementofoldcapacity.Costescalation is more contained in East Asia, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)expects42to75percentofglobalnuclearcapacityexpansionby2030to occur—mostlyinChina.China’stopnuclearsafetyregulatorhasraisedconcerns, however, about “construction quality and operational safety” [New York Times, 16 Dec. 2009] and, even for its high-nuclear-growth projection, the IAEA does notexpectnuclearpowertosignificantlyincreaseitscurrentshareofabout15 percentofglobalelectric-powergeneration. Themostimportantdangerfromfissionisthatitstechnologyormaterialsmaybe usedtomakenuclearweapons.Ofthethirty-onenationsthathavenuclearpower today,sevenarenuclear-weaponstates1andalmostalltheothershavetheirnon- weaponstatusstabilizedbyeitherbeingpartoftheEuropeanUnionandNATOor anotherclosealliancetotheUnitedStates.Suchstabilizingarrangementsdonot existforthemajorityofthecountriesthathaveexpressedaninterestinacquiring their first nuclear power plants (See Introduction, Table 2). Of these, some are suspectedofhavingmixedmotivesfortheirinterestinfissiontechnology. 1 In historical order: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India andPakistan.IsraelandNorthKoreahavenuclearweaponsbutdonothavenuclearpower plants. The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy 1 2 GWe GWe 400 200 30 25 35 10 15 50 20 25 30 35 10 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1967 1954 [IAEA-PRIS, 9January 2010]. [IAEA-PRIS, 9January 2010]. Figure 1.Figure Figure 2.Figure 1969 1957 1971 1960 1973 1963 Growth of global nuclear-power capacity (GWe) Nuclear capacity installed by year (GWe) 1975 1966 1977 1969 1979 1981 1972 1983 1975 1985 1978 1987 1981 1989 1984 1991 1993 1987 1995 1990 1997 1993 1999 1996 2001 1999 2003 2002 2005 2007 2005 2009 2008 Thedominantnuclearpowerreactortypetoday,thelight-waterreactor(LWR),is relativelyproliferationresistantwhenoperatedona“once-through”fuelcycle.It isfueledwithlow-enricheduranium(LEU),whichcannotbeusedtomakenuclear