ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: FRAME PROBLEMS, FODOR‟S CHALLENGE, AND PRACTICAL REASON Erich C. Deise, Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Dissertation directed by: Professor Peter Carruthers Department of Philosophy By bringing the frame problem to bear on psychology, Fodor argues that the interesting activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling. Following exegesis of the frame problem and Fodor‟s claims, I argue that underlying Fodor‟s argument is an unsatisfiable normative principle of rationality that in turn commits him to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our minds. I argue that the descriptive claim is false and that we should reject the normative principle in favor of one that is at least in principle satisfiable. From this it follows, I argue, that we have no reason for thinking the activities of our minds to be, as a matter of principle, unmodelable. Drawing upon Baars‟ Global Workspace theory, I next outline an alternative framework that provides a means by which the set of engineering challenges raised by Fodor might be met. Having sketched this alternative, I turn next to consider some of the frame problems arising in practical reason and decision-making. Following discussion of the nature of emotion and its influence on practical reason and decision- making, I argue that consideration of emotion provides one means by which we might contend with some of the frame problem instances that arise in that domain. FRAME PROBLEMS, FODOR‟S CHALLENGE, AND PRACTICAL REASON By Erich C. Deise Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2008 Advisory Committee: Professor Peter Carruthers, Chair Professor Christopher Cherniak Professor Michael Dougherty Professor Jeff Horty Professor Paul Pietroski © Copyright Erich C. Deise 2008 DEDICATION For my family, old and new. To my parents Jerry and Sue, wife Alexis, and son Rainer. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am particularly indebted to Peter Carruthers, whose insights, mentoring and advice have been invariably helpful and whose patience, support and encouragement have been nothing less than supererogatory. I have profited immensely from our many discussions and from the detailed comments provided by him throughout the process. Over the years, Chris Cherniak has been a source of much insight and guidance, as well. I have both enjoyed and benefitted greatly from our many discussions and thank him for, so long ago, setting me down the path that led to this essay. Both are owed special thanks for all that they have done. I am also grateful to Jeff Horty both for helping me to better understand the formal intricacies of the planning problem and for his commentary on Chapter 1. Likewise, I would like to thank Paul Pietroski for helping me to better understand a particular facet of Fodor‟s argument and for his willingness to serve, on short notice, as a member of the examining committee. Thanks as well to William Gasarch of the University of Maryland Department of Computer Science both for helping me to understand some of the finer points of computational complexity theory and for assisting me in locating a version of the problem within the complexity hierarchy. I am also grateful to Georges Rey for providing extensive commentary on a number of chapters. While he endorses few, if any, of my conclusions, his suggestions and objections were invaluable in helping me to better structure the project. I also wish to thank Patricia Greenspan both for her guidance early on and for her comments on several early draft chapters. I have benefitted from a number of discussions with other philosophers, computer scientists and cognitive neuroscientists. Among these, I would like to thank Michael Morreau, Scott James and Sotiros Kotsanis, of the University of Maryland philosophy department, David Poeppel of the NACS program, Ernie Davis of the Department of Computer Science at New York University as well as audiences at the University of Maryland. Philip Ryan deserves thanks for taking on the onerous and arduous task of proofreading the submission draft. Finally, I am, in every way, indebted to my parents Jerry and Sue and my wife Alexis for everything else. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication …………………………………………………………………………………… ii Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………... iii Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 1: Introducing the frame problem ……………………………………………... 9 Chapter 2: Fodor‟s challenge, frame problems & computational psychology ……… 40 Chapter 3: Rational systems and Fodor‟s pessimism ………………………………….. 64 Chapter 4: On (the very idea) of bringing emotional affect to bear ………………….. 115 Chapter 5: Emotion and some frame problem instances ……………………………… 161 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………….. 242 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………... 249 iv INTRODUCTION Drawing upon the frame problem of A.I., Fodor argues, quite famously, that the “interesting” activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling. I will argue that we have no reason for thinking Fodor to have made the case for his pessimistic conclusion with respect to the unmodelability of our minds. Furthermore, I suggest that there are plausible alternatives available that once explicated and brought to bear might provide a means by which at least some of the “interesting” operations of mind might come to be modeled in computationally feasible terms. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the frame problem. Both the original formal incarnation of problem that arose in artificial intelligence and various philosophical interpretations or variants of the problem are reviewed. I next set out the underlying structure of the puzzle, arguing that “the” frame problem is not one problem but is instead a constellation of related problem instances. In Chapter 2, I consider in greater detail Fodor‟s version of the frame problem as well as his application of it to computational psychology. In presenting Fodor‟s argument for his pessimistic conclusion - that the interesting activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling – I disentangle a number of distinct argument strains. In so doing, I argue that Fodor‟s argument relies, at base, upon a particular normative principle of rationality. This normative claim, I argue in turn, commits Fodor to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our cognitive processes. In Chapter 3, I focus on assessing Fodor‟s argument. Briefly, Fodor argues that our cognitive processes are unmodelable because we at least sometimes arrive at conclusions rationally. Since anything that arrives at conclusions rationally, he continues, must be capable of solving the frame problem and no system that solves that 1 problem can be modeled, it follows, he concludes, that our cognitive processes are not amenable to modeling. I argue that the normative principle of rationality undergirding Fodor‟s argument is untenable because it is in principle unsatisfiable. I next argue that the descriptive claim – that we ever arrive at conclusions rationally (in Fodor‟s sense) – is false. Taken together, I conclude that it is more reasonable to think that we should reject Fodor‟s normative rationality principle as overly demanding in favor of one that is, at least in principle, satisfiable by the likes of us. Any weakening of the demands of this rationality principle, I argue, effectively undermines Fodor‟s argument for the pessimistic conclusion. Specifically, by weakening the demands of the normative rationality principle, I argue that Fodor‟s arguments against the feasibility of the massive modularity of mind and heuristics approaches to modeling are no longer compelling. And so, I conclude that since we have no reasons for rejecting these approaches tout court, as Fodor suggests due to their “irrationality,” we have no reason of principle for thinking the operations of mind not amenable to modeling. There are, however, a number of in practice (as opposed to in principle) challenges raised by Fodor with which any proposed strategy for modeling the operations of mind must contend. To this end, I will consider an alternative model – namely Baars‟ Global Workspace framework. I will start by setting out Baars‟ account and turn next to considering how bringing this approach to bear might help in contending with some of the particular engineering challenges (e.g., the input routing and heuristic selection problems) raised by Fodor. By way of further fleshing out Baars‟ proposal, I will consider both Gigerenzer‟s “fast and frugal” heuristic approach and Barrett‟s discussion of modules as metaphorical enzymatic systems. When these 2 accounts are integrated into Global Workspace theory, a picture begins to emerge as to how a computationally modelable system might contend with the input routing and heuristic selections problems without the need for a central (and thus frame-problem- infected) executive to be posited. And so, when fleshed out, I suggest that Global Workspace theory might provide a plausible account, and an alternative unconsidered by Fodor, of how at least some of the “interesting” activities of mind might come to be modeled. In Chapters 4 and 5, I consider in greater detail some instances of the frame problem that arise in practical reason and decision-making, ultimately suggesting that emotion might be one means by which we contend with some of the problems arising in this domain. I begin this discussion, however, by