Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 65–77 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Journal of Eurasian Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/euras The Soviet collapse: Contradictions and neo-modernisation Richard Sakwa University of Kent, United Kingdom article info abstract Article history: Over two decades have passed since the dissolution of the communist system and the Received 18 June 2011 disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 yet there is still no consensus over the causes Accepted 31 July 2012 and consequences of these epochal (and distinct) events. As for the causes, it is easy to assume that the fall was ‘over-determined’, with an endless array of factors. It behoves the scholar to try to establish a hierarchy of causality, which is itself a methodological exercise in heuristics. However, the arbitrary prioritisation of one factor over another is equally a hermeneutic trap that needs to be avoided. Following an examination of the various ‘why’ factors, we focus on ‘what’ exactly happened at the end of the Soviet period. We examine the issue through the prism of reformulated theories of modernisation. The Soviet system was a sui generis approach to modernisation, but the great paradox was that the system did not apply this ideology to itself. By attempting to stand outside the processes which it unleashed, both society and system entered a cycle of stagnation. The idea of neo- modernisation, above all the idea that societies are challenged to come to terms with the ‘civilisation of modernity’, each in their own way, provides a key to developments. In the end the Soviet approach to this challenge failed, and the reasons for this need to be examined, but the challenge overall remains for post-communist Russia. Copyright Ó 2012, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in moniker of perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev since 1985 1991 the debate over the causes and consequences is far had achieved an astonishing self-transcendence of the from over. The nature of the phenomenon is itself con- earlier political system. In other words, by 1991 the tradi- tested. What exactly ended in 1991? We know that the tional Soviet-style communist system had already given Communist order was formally dissolved, with the banning way to something else. The organisational power of the of the Communist Party in Russia on 22 August 1991, in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had been tumultuous days following the failed coup of 18–21 August. destroyed by the abolition of the traditional branches of the Yet the dissolution of Communist power had begun much Secretariat in September 1988, in the wake of the various earlier, and in effect the reforms conducted under the reforms launched by the Nineteenth Party Conference in June–July 1988. Equally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 had already been presaged by a qualitative change in the nature of the country, reflected in continuing debates over changing the name of the new Peer-review under responsibility of Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University entity to something along the lines of a Union of Sovereign States. The ‘what collapsed’ question could be indefinitely extended to include, inter alia, long-term processes such as the collapse of empire in Russia and the exhaustion of the Production and hosting by Elsevier communist ideal in the world at large. 1879-3665/$ – see front matter Copyright Ó 2012, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2012.07.003 66 R. Sakwa / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 65–77 In examining the Soviet collapse there is a permanent developed country, collapse so precipitously? The search for an interpretative framework. While there is no answers can typically be categorised into short, medium doubt that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of its own and long-term factors, but at all levels the various factors contradictions, the nature of these contradictions needs to are contested. Let us look at some of the immediate factors. be explored, something that I will explore later. The contradictions that led to ‘1989’ (taken as the symbolic date a) There is no simple answer to the question about the for the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’ in Eastern Europe), economic viability of the Soviet order. Although by the moreover, were different from those that precipitated 1991 late 1980s there were clear signs of economic strain, (the combined dissolution of the communist system and with a long-term decline in economic growth rates and the disintegration of the Soviet state). It is now clear that stagnating standards of living, accompanied by declines the ‘meaning’ of 1989 is very different from that of ‘1991’. in economic competitiveness, productivity and rates of The ‘revolutions’ in 1989 in Eastern Europe shrugged off investment and innovation. Very few sectors or indus- Soviet power and influence (even though by then the Soviet tries were internationally competitive. Nevertheless up Union was reforming itself out of existence), the structures to 1989 growth continued at some 3 per cent. This may of communist rule, and reoriented the countries to the path well have represented a fall from what had been ach- of Western integration. The ‘return to Europe’ represented ieved earlier, but in part the decline reflected a maturing a powerful ideal, but it was a spatial rather than a philo- of the economy. The sharp fall in the price of oil, from $66 sophical programme (Judt, 2007). The meaning of 1991 is a barrel in 1980 to $20 a barrel in 1986 (in 2000 prices), as far less clear. The former Soviet republics could not share Saudi Arabia released a surplus onto a saturated market, the spatial (geopolitical) orientation of 1989, except for the provoked a severe budgetary crisis. Yegor Gaidar in his Baltic republics and possibly Moldova, and it was precisely End of Empire stresses the distorted nature of the Soviet the attempt of some other countries to shift from the economy, and in particular the catastrophically high problematic of 1991 to that of 1989 that in the end proportion of resources devoted to serve the needs of the provoked conflict, notably the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. military–industrial complex (Gaidar 2006). The Russia always considered itself to be a distinct geopolitical economy had become ‘structurally militarised’, with at pole of its own and later perpetuated ‘1991’ as a separate least 18 per cent of GDP devoted to servicing its needs. project, while the countries in the ‘new Eastern Europe’ However, Michael Ellmann and Vladimir Kontorovich along the Soviet Union’s western borders remain trapped take a more sanguine view, arguing that although under between 1989 and 1991. strain there was no terminal crisis of the Soviet economy The fundamental contradiction that precipitated the (Ellman & Kontorovich, 1998). Soviet fall was that between the attempt to create a ‘modern’ society, defined as one characterised by indus- Others refuse to contrast the Soviet and Western trialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and ration- systems as two discrete orders. The status of the Soviet alisation, and the simultaneous attempt to create an Union as an alternative was increasingly eroded. Immanuel alternative modernity. The central features of this alterna- Wallerstein notes that Western radicals after 1968 tive modernity included the abolition of the free market, ‘attacked the role of the Soviet Union, which they saw as the attempt to achieve the direct expression of popular a collusive participant in US hegemony, a feeling that had sovereignty as represented in the party-state, the inversion been growing everywhere, since at least 1956’ (Wallerstein, of typically modern forms of class hierarchy (which in the 2011: 76). Wallerstein and others argue that it was event allowed a bureaucratic class to predominate), and precisely Soviet, and even more Eastern European partici- a permanently revisionist stance in international affairs, pation in the world economic system, that provoked their defined as the aspiration to revise the existing international collapse (Gunder Frank, 1992). This would lead to the order, even though in practice the Soviet Union became in region becoming ‘third worldised’, which Frank intimated effect a status quo power. The contradiction in interna- was the purpose of Western ‘assistance’. tional affairs, as in all other aspects, was never resolved. In A different type of structural perspective argues that the the next section I briefly examine some of the immediate Soviet system was unable to make the transition from factors precipitating the fall, and then I turn to some of the a Fordist-Keynesian industrial system of mass production broader questions associated with modernisation, demo- and mass consumption to what David Harvey calls a ‘flex- cratisation and the larger phenomenon of the communist ible accumulation regime’, no longer dominated in the collapse. West by the old triad of big state, labour and capital or in the East by the monolithic planning system (Harvey, 1990; The ‘why’ question Verdery, 1996). In other words, the Soviet collapse was in part precipitated by the challenge of globalisation, At the heart of debates over 1991 is the ‘why’ question. although this could well be to confuse cause and effect: it Why did a system that had defeated the