S1JtJIC&z THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRANSPORT BI12( DURING THE WAR AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE, 1793-1802 by Mary Ellen Condon Thesis presented to the University of London for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts Department of History University College London September, 1968 LCNN w;i V 2 .&BSThACT During the war against revolutionary France, in order to carry out the ambitious policy of Henry Dund.as, Secretary of State for War, the King's forces were conveyed to the far distant East and. West Indies, to the Continent, the Mediterranean and. Erpt and. to the Cape of Good. Hope. For the first eighteen months the war was conducted in a sluggish and haphazard manner resulting in failure on the Continent and in an inefficient transport service. The disorganization of the Navy Office and abuses in the Royal dockyard.s, defects in the transport system which had. been revealed by a commission of naval enquiry appointed. in 1785, still existed. It became increasingly difficult to hire, inspect and fit out enough ships to be used as transports. By July 1794 the lack of success of the Continental campaigns and. the realization that war would continue caused. the ministry to make important changes in the government and in the transport system. The business of hiring vessels to be used as troopships, victuallers, and. ordnance vessels was now centered. in a Transport Board. and the competition in the engagement of shipping that before existed. between the Navy, Victualling and. Ordnance offices was eliminated.. A board. set up to deal specifically with transport affairs was able to give undivided. attention to them. Thus a more organized and efficiently run transport service was inaugurated.. Since the war against France was conducted. through a series of campaigns and. expeditions the Transport Board did. not have to maintain a large army overseas for an extended. period. of time. However, it carried out some of the greatest troop movements of the eighteenth century, particularly the Abercromby-Christian expedition of November 1795 which 3 involved the conveyance of 27,000 men, their equipment, provisions and ordnance to the West Indies, and the expedition to North Holland. in 1799 which involved the transportation of 46,000 men from England and the Baltic. The progress of the transport BerviCe in getting the expeditions out to sea, especially those going to the West Indies, was often impeded by the slowness of other departments, particularly the Ordnance, in preparing for the military enterprise and by the natural foibles of storms and. contrary winds. Throughout the war the Transport Board also had to cope with a dangerous shipping shortage, due to a vast increase in every branch of trade. This was a time of unprecedented commercial prosperity when it became more advantageous for the merchant to put his ship to a trade than to let it to the government. Hiring space on merchant vessels that traded reg.ilarly between Britain and the areas where the army was being sent was one method the Transport Board employed in an attempt to meet its tonnage requirements. Many troops and almost all officers were sent to the West Indies in this manner and a great part of the provisions sent to the British army overseas were conveyed in victuallers hired on freight. The Transport Board chartered. eighty ships at Hamburg in order to satisfy its shipping needs in 1795. However, this venture proved a great and costly disappointment. More beneficial was the Board's practice of keeping the freight rate offered. by the government to the owners of merchant vessels consistent with the high cost of provisions and stores and increased wages. The freight rate was increased by over seven shillings per ton or by two thirds over an eight-year period. Previously, it had remained almost static throughout the eighteenth century. By these wise and practical methods the Transport Board was able to meet the logis- tical requirements of Dundas' ambitious policy throughout the war. 4 CONTENTS Page List of Abbreviations 5 Foreward. 6 I The Chain of Command. in the Transport System B II The Need. for and. Establishment of a Transport Board 31 III The Taicing up of Ships as Transports 70 IV The Hiring of Ships in Hamburg, 1795 114 V The Passage on Board. a Transport during the War 146 Against Revolutionary Franoe VI The Transporting of the King's Forces: The Long 160 Haul to the West Indies, the East Indies, and. the Cape of Good. Hope VII The Transporting of the King's Forces: The Short 211 Haul to the Continent, the Mediterranean, and Erpt Vu' The Provisioning of the King's Forces during the 275 War Against Revolutionary France IX Conclusion 310 Appendix 326 Bibliography 331 5 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Add. MSS. Additional Manuscripts, British Museum GP Grey Papers NLS National Library of Scotland NM!'! National Maritime Museum NRS Navy Records Society PRO Piblic Record. Office SRO Scottish Record Office 6 FORM2RD The logistical problems confronting a government in. sending and. maintaining a sizeable army overseas is a neglected study in the field of military history. The swiftness and efficiency with which troops, their equipment and ordnance are transported to the field of battle is a very essential factor in the outcome of any military campaign and. should not be ignored. Because of the inability of the government to adequately supply and. provision forces during combat the objectives of many a military operation were never achieved. It is the purpose of this enquiry to see how efficiently and effectively the transport service was conducted during an eighteenth century world war. The choice of the war against revolutionary France as a setting for this administrative study proved specially interesting. During that war the transport system for the first time in one hundred years was radically changed by the creation of a Transport Board. The need to undertake a study of the logistical problems con- fronting the British government during the French war was first brought to my attention by Professor I. R. Christie of University College, London. From the very beginning Professor Christie showed confidence in me to pursue the subject and for that I am grateful. I am also very indebted to him for his constant and patient guidance at every step of preparation for this project. I would. like also to thank Mr. D. Syrett, a former student of Professor Christie who is now on 7 -the faculty of Queens College New York. He studied the transport system as it was administered during the American Revolution and was most helpful to me in locating documents and sorting materials. I wish to acknowledge my debt to Mr. A. Pearsall of the National Maritime Museum for his helpful guidance and advice in utilizing the papers of Admirals Sir John Jervis and Sir Je Keith. Mr. J. E. Fagg of the Department of Paleography and Diplomatic at the University of Durham was most helpful to me over the papers of the First Earl Grey which are entrusted to his care. I am also in- debted to the staffs of the National Library of Scotland and -the Scottish Record Office in making available to me -the Melville manu- scripts in their collections. The personnel of the Public Record Office and the Manuscript Department of the British Museum have also constantly and. patiently assisted me. Finally, I could never have undertaken this work but for the generosity and interest of my parents. London, 1968 M. E. Condon CHAPTER I THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM 9 I William Pitt never wanted war; and so he never prepared for it. For ten years Pitt had been improving the general adminis- trative machinery of the country but neglecting the army; when the war began the ministers had to improvise an army as soon as possible. The navy, though not as neglected as the army, was far from being in perfect condition. There was mismnagemeni in the Admiralty and. waste and. fraud in the Royal docicyards. Abuses in the Royal dock- yards and. consequently in the transport system had. been revealed by a commission of naval enquiry appointed. in 1785; but no action had been taken to eliminate them. Action would not be taken until the cabinet realised. war would continue and. that was a year and. a half after it had begun. The Prime Minister was not alone in his desire to steer England. clear of war; his most prominent supporters were the King and Lord Grenville at the Foreign Office. Once England. was at war, however, they all hoped. and. counted on ii being a short one. For a period of eighteen months after the French declaration of 3 February 1793 an indeterminate, Blow and. cumbersome war machine was employed in preventing the establishment of a new order in France. The War Office was under a nonentityGeorge Tongs, and. did. not even have cabinet rank. The Master of the Orfinazice was the Duke of Richmond 10 who after a time ceased to attend cabinet meetings. Pitt's brother Lord Chatham was at the head of the Admiralty and. would later be re- placed by the more vigorous and efficient Lord Spencer. Pitt, whose forte was not foreign or military affairs relied to a great extent on his overworked Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Henry Dundas, to formulate military policy. With these haphazard and odd arrange-- ments it is not difficult to see the reasons for failure and die- couragemerit in the early part of the war. Another very important reason for failure was the adoption by Pitt and.