Anscombe on Acting for Reasons Keshav Singh Penultimate draft – forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason Introduction* This chapter discusses some of G.E.M. Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of practical reason. In particular, it focuses on her account of what it is to act for reasons. The major work in developing this account takes place in Anscombe’s incredibly rich monograph Intention, though I will also draw on insights contained in her later writings. Anscombe’s Intention is widely considered a foundational text in contemporary philosophy of action. Frederick Stoutland writes in his introduction to a volume of essays on Intention that it “definitely established philosophy of action as a distinctive field” (2011, p. 5). Anscombe’s work has also had some influence in the philosophy of practical reason. However, it has not received nearly as much uptake there as it has in the philosophy of action. And even when Anscombe is cited in work on practical reason, it is often only in passing.1 And on the subject of acting for reasons in particular, the depth of Anscombe’s contributions are often overlooked by philosophers of practical reason.2 As I will discuss later, some of this may be due to the mistaken view that her contributions have been largely superseded by those of Donald Davidson and his followers. *I owe thanks to Ruth Chang, Jack Samuel, and Eric Wiland for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 1 For example, Dancy’s (2000) Practical Reality cites Anscombe only in passing, despite the fact that Anscombe’s views are highly congenial to Dancy’s rejection of Davidson’s view of acting for reasons. For further evidence of such a trend, see footnotes 17 and 18. Notable exceptions, however, are Vogler (2001) and Wiland (2012, ch. 7). Wiland’s chapter, in particular, is one of the few dedicated to Anscombe on reasons. 2 This is not to say that philosophers have completely overlooked Anscombe on acting for reasons. Philosophers of action – Anscombeans especially – often discuss her views thereof in the context of her overall theory of action (see, for instance, Thompson (2008), Wiseman (2016) and Ford (2017)). My concern is that work done by philosophers of practical reason that is in the first instance about acting for reasons has overlooked Anscombe. This is what I will attempt to begin to remedy, and for this reason I will not focus on reconstructions of Anscombe’s overall theory of action by philosophers of action. Thanks to Jack Samuel for suggesting I clarify this. I will not attempt to address in a single short chapter all of the rich contributions made by Anscombe (in Intention and elsewhere) to the philosophy of practical reason. Instead, I will focus on giving an opinionated introduction to what her work says about acting for reasons, and how it can inform current theorizing on the matter. As I will show, Anscombe’s views cut deeply against much of the current orthodoxy on acting for reasons, and are worth taking more seriously in the philosophy of practical reason. For Anscombe, the question ‘what is it to act for reasons?’ is intimately related to the question ‘what is it to act intentionally?’. I will begin by discussing that relationship. I will then further explicate Anscombe’s view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism (the view that reasons are a kind of efficient cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons are mental states like desires and beliefs). In the process, I will try to show that Anscombe’s rejection of these two views does not leave us with mystery, but rather sheds light on an interesting, heterodox account of acting for reasons. 1. Intentional Action and Acting for Reasons Anscombe argues in Intention that what distinguishes actions that are intentional from those that are not is that intentional actions are those “to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application.” This is the sense in which “the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (1957, p. 9).3 We can already see here the intimate connection between acting intentionally and acting for reasons. It is even tempting to assume, based on this remark, that acting intentionally and acting for reasons are just the same thing for Anscombe. But this would be a faulty assumption, for the 3 Throughout this chapter, all quotations from Anscombe are from Intention unless otherwise noted. applicability of the special sense of ‘Why?’ is broader than the set of cases where the agent acts for reasons.4 This is because Anscombe’s question ‘Why?’ applies in the relevant sense even in cases where the answer to the question is ‘no particular reason.’ As she says, “the question is not refused application because the answer to it says that there is no reason, any more than the question how much money I have in my pocket is refused application by the answer ‘None’” (p. 25). On her view, acting intentionally is necessary but not sufficient for acting for a reason. So, acting intentionally cannot be the same thing as acting for a reason.5 In what cases, then, does the question ‘Why?’ fail to apply in the relevant sense? Anscombe discusses three circumstances where it fails to apply. Since these are circumstances in which one fails to act intentionally, they are also circumstances in which one fails to act for a reason. The first circumstance is when the answer is to the effect of ‘I didn’t know I was doing that.’ To respond (sincerely) as such is to refuse application to the special sense of the question ‘Why?’. For example, imagine I am spraying grass killer on my lawn, thinking it is weed killer. You, knowing that it is grass killer, ask me “Why are you spraying grass killer on your lawn?” and I respond, “This is grass killer!?”. My response refuses application to the question ‘Why?’ because it indicates that I was not aware I was spraying grass killer on my lawn. Correspondingly, I was not intentionally spraying grass killer on my lawn. 4 If this is right, it raises questions about the relation between acting for no reason and arational action. One natural view is that if an action is done for no reason, it is thereby arational. But for Anscombe, actions done for no reason are still intentional. Moreover, insofar as the question ‘Why?’ is granted application, such actions are still in some sense intelligible. This raises the possibility that actions done for no reason are not thereby arational. While I cannot discuss this possibility at length here, it merits further explorations. Thanks for Ruth Chang for raising this possibility. 5 This may not be an uncontroversial interpretation (though, to my knowledge, there is not a lot of work that directly addresses this question). Some of the remarks in Thompson (2008) suggest that, on his interpretation of Anscombe, acting for a reason and acting intentionally are coextensive. Thanks to Jack Samuel for pointing this out. Importantly, one might know what one is doing under some descriptions but not others. If you instead ask me “why are you spraying your lawn?” I might respond, “to kill these weeds over here.” In this case, because I am aware that I am spraying my lawn, the question has application, and my response specifies a reason for my action. Correspondingly, then, I might act intentionally under some descriptions and unintentionally under others: while I am spraying my lawn intentionally, I am not spraying grass killer on my lawn intentionally.6 Although acting intentionally and acting for reasons are not the same, whether we have acted for some particular reason also seems to depend on the description of the action. It is unobjectionable to say that I sprayed my lawn for the reason that doing so would kill the weeds over there, but would strike us as quite odd to say that I sprayed grass killer on my lawn for the reason that doing so would kill the weeds over there. The latter statement makes me out to be wittingly instrumentally irrational when in reality I am just unaware of what I am doing. On the Anscombean view, the reasons for which we act stand in relation to our actions only under those descriptions under which they are intentional. The second circumstance in which the question ‘Why?’ is refused application is when, despite the agent’s awareness of what she is doing, her action is involuntary. As Anscombe notes, it is difficult to further cash out the notion of the involuntary without presupposing an account of intention. However, she writes, there is “a class of the things that fall under the concept ‘involuntary’ which it is possible to introduce without begging any questions or assuming that we understand notions of the very type I am professing to investigate” (p. 13). This is the class of bodily movements that are described in physical terms, but that one nevertheless knows without observation. Anscombe’s own 6 This raises the question of whether this is really the very same action under different descriptions, or distinct actions. For an illuminating discussion of Anscombe’s views on this matter, see Annas (1976). See also Anscombe’s own essay “Under A Description” (1979). example is “[t]he odd sort of jerk or jump that one’s whole body sometimes gives when one is falling asleep.”. This is an important category to mention because for Anscombe, intentional actions are known without observation. However, some actions that are known without observation fail to be intentional because, being involuntary, the question ‘Why?’ fails to apply to them.