THE eONCEPI' OF ANXIETY KIERKEGAARO'S WRITINGS, VIII THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ORIENTING DELIBERATION ON THE DOGMATIC ISSUE OF HEREDITARY SIN by S0ren Kierkegaard Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY Copyriglll 0 19'0., Pti.rcrt<ltl UNill'mi1l Pms P,,6lislld 6y P,I_""I Unillmity Pms, Ptii_1, twwJmq I" ~ Uoild Kh~; Pti"CttQfl Uni"tlSity Prm, Oridttlln, Wm s.us<'X AI1R,jp~4 "'"6Nq sfConpu C'''''CfI''I-iQ·N/bMII o"w KH'*'t-d, S#frq A.6~, fIIJ.IIH. ~tI1M«pI sf·n:My· T III1IIl.IIion rf &J1ric1 AlIFf. Bib~y;,. IndJtJn Inia. 1. $1'11, OftgiMl. 2.~, Rdft/oIu. J. AMiny. I. 'lktmlr, RdtL.,. It. AnMrHtI, AIMf, 192'. 1tI. Trtlt. 81720.KS2 19'0 2JJ'.14 19·J217 ISBN ()'691·07244-2 ISBN ()'69t.fJ20tt.6 (pWt.) E4i~1 ,""",WI sf /his ""'" IIIIf MIl MJisId 6y • gNlltfrom ""'IIm.. ~, 'fiwIr,,141 btllffo J«ifty.... 111 ~/9""1U" III ,\1iIUlNp"b'/, Mi'/ltnOf4 P'II,,«1OIl tMvmity Pms ....,., 'If prilirH Dol «i4:fm p4ptr ""I _I tht ,1IlU611tffor ptmW_ ..rJ 41U11W1i'1 sf ~ Commiu« OIl I'tH1'lIi<IH CwiMlilltJ for &.lit Lorlftlllty sf iht COIIIItll "" "''''Nq RntHIIW 18 19 20 ISlIN·IJ: 978·0·69]·0201 1·2 jpbk. ) CONTENTS HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Vll The Concept of Anxiety 1 PREFACE 7 INTRODUCTION 9 Anxiety as the Presupposition of Hereditary Sin and as Explaining Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of Its Origin 25 1. HISTORICAL INTIMATIONS REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF HEREDITARY SIN 25 2. THE CONCEPT OF THE FIRST SIN 29 3. THE CONCEPT OF THE INNOCENCE 35 4. THE CONCEPT OF THE FALL 38 5. THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY 41 6. ANXIETY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF HEREDITARY SIN AND AS EXPLAINING HEREDITARY SIN RETROGRESSIVELY IN TERMS OF ITS ORIGIN 46 II Anxiety as Explaining Hereditary Sin Progressively 52 1. OBJECTIVE ANXIETY 56 2. SUBJECTIVE ANXIETY 60 A. The Consequence of the Relationship of Generation 62 B. The Consequence of the Historical Relationship 73 VI Contents III Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which Is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin 81 l. THE ANXIETY OF spmITLESSNESS 93 2. ANXIETY DEFINED DIALECTICALLY AS FATE 96 3. ANXIETY DEFINED DIALECTICALLY AS GUILT 103 IV Anxiety of Sin or Anxiety as the Consequence of Sin in the Single Individual 111 l. ANXIETY ABOUT EVIL 113 2. ANXIETY ABOUT THE GOOD (THE DEMONIC) 118 136 I. Freedom Lost Somatically-Psychically II. 137 Freedom Lost Pneumatically V Anxiety as Saving through Faith 155 SUPPLEMENT 163 Key to References 164 Original Title Page 166 Selected Entries from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers Pertaining to The Concept of Anxiety 169 EDITORIAL ApPENDIX 215 Acknowledgments 217 Collation of in the Danish The Concept of Anxiety Editions ofKierkegaard's Collected Works 219 Notes 221 Bibliographical Note 257 INDEX 259 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Among those attending W.F.J. Schelling's series of lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation (Philosophie at the University of Berlin in der Mythologie und Offenbarung) the winter of1841-1842 were both Friedrich Engels and S0ren Kierkegaard. 1 After the second lecture Kierkegaard wrote: "I am so happy to have heard Schelling's second lecture-inde­ scribably. I have been pining and thinking mournful thoughts long enough. The embryonic child of thought leapt for joy within me, as in Elizabeth, when he mentioned the word 'ac­ tuality' in connection with the relation of philosophy to ac­ tuality. "2 Although this initial enthusiasm declined rapidly, Kierkegaard continued to attend the lectures and took copious notes. What interested him in particular was Schelling's criti­ cism of Hegel's rationalistic system, and upon his return to Copenhagen in 1842 he turned to the study of Leibniz, Des­ cartes, and Aristotle, as well as to the anti-Hegelian writings of Adolph Trendelenburg3 and portions of W. G. Tenne­ mann's history of philosophy.4 Each of these studies helped him to shape his own philosophical position and also fur­ nished him with an arsenal for his relentless battle with Hegel and speculative idealism. Leibniz's review of arguments pertaining to the problem of freedom interested Kierkegaard especially. In response to Leibniz's point in the that the connection between Theodicy 1 Paul Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," V Journal of the History of Ideas, (1944),44. 2 See p. 229, note 51. 3 Adolph Trendelenburg, (Berlin: 1840; Logische Untersuchungen ASKB (Leipzig: 1843; 842); Die logische Frage in Hegel's System. Zwei Streitschriften 846). See Niels Thulstrup, (Copenhagen: ASKB Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel Gyldendal, 1967), pp. 241, 269. 4 W. G. Tennemann, I-XII (Leipzig: 1798-1819; Geschichte der Philosophie, 815-26). See Thulstrup, pp. 241, 243, ASKB Kierkegaards Forhold. til Hegel, 245-46, 249-50. viii Historical Introduction judgment and will is not as necessary as one might think, Kierkegaard asked: "In what relationship does the will stand to the last act of the understanding ... ?"5 He agreed with Leibniz that a completely indifferent will (~quilibrium) is an absurdity and a chimera. 6 In another journal entry he noted that Leibniz mentions two difficulties that have disturbed man: the relation between freedom and necessity, and the continuity of matter and its separate parts. The first problem has engaged all men; the second, only the philosophers. 7 Sub­ sequently, Kierkegaard dealt with the problem of freedom in three of his pseudonymous works: de­ Philosophical Fragments fines the ontological ground of freedom and its realm, whereas and The Concept of Anxiety The Sickness unto Death consider the anthropological aspects of freedom. In response to Descartes's idea of freedom, Kierkegaard noted in his papers that: "In freedom I can emerge only from that into which I have entered in freedom .... IfI am going to emerge from doubt in freedom, I must enter into doubt in freedom. (Act ofWill.)"8 Therefore, Descartes, according to Kierkegaard, had inverted the relationship between thought and will: Incidentally, it is noteworthy that Descartes, who himself in one of the meditations explains the possibility of error by recalling that freedom in man is superior to thought, never­ theless has construed thought, not freedom, as the abso­ lute. Obviously this is the position of the elder Fichte-not but I act for this is something cogito ergo sum, ergo sum, cogito derived or it is identical with "I act"; either the conscious­ ness of freedom is in the action, and then it should not read or it is the subsequent consciousness. 9 cogito ergo sum, JP II 1241 IV C 39). 5 (Pap. II 1241 IV C 39); Leibniz, §§311ff., 319; 6JP (Pap. Theodiey, God. Guil. ... , ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin: 1840; 620), Leibnitii Opera philosophi(4 ASKB pp. 595-98. See alsoJP 1112361, 3340; IV 4419; V 5581-85 IV A 12, (Pap. 14-18,22,35). 7 JP III 2360 IV All). 8 JP I 777 IV B 13:21). (Pap. (Pap. 9 JP II 2338 IV ell). (Pap. IX Historical Introduction In a marginal notation Kierkegaard added: "This transition is manifestly a transition, not dialectical, for dialec­ pathos:filled tically nothing can be derived. To me this is important. A pathos-filled transition can be achieved by every man if he wills it, because the transition to the infinite, which consists in pathos, takes only courage. "10 Kierkegaard criticized the Cartesian principle of methodical doubt because it mistakenly gives more weight to reflection (thought) than it does to act (will). What skeptics should really be caught in is the ethical. Since Descartes they have all thought that during the period in which they doubted they dared not to express anything definite with regard to knowledge, but on the other hand they dared to act, because in this respect they could be satisfied with probability. What an enormous contradic­ tion! As if it were not far more dreadful to do something about which one is doubtful (thereby incurring responsibil­ ity) than to make a statement. Or was it because the ethical is in itself certain? But then there was something which doubt could not reach!l1 Descartes's apparently epistemological problem is for Kier­ kegaard an existential one; that is, the solution of doubt lies not in reflection but in resolution. 12 The remainder of Kierkegaard's studies during the fall of 1842 centered on Trendelenburg and Tennemann, and from them Kierkegaard gained insights into Aristotle's thought. References in his papers indicate that he also made use of pri­ mary sources. In a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of mo­ tion, Tennemann wrote: "Because possibility and actuality are distinguishable in all things, change, insofar as it is change, is ... The transition from pos­ the actualization of the possible . sibility to actuality is a change, Kivll<nC;. This could be ex­ pressed more precisely by saying: motion, is change, the III 2339 IV C 12). 11 I 774 IV A 72). 10 JP (Pap. JP (Pap. 11 I 776 IV B 5:13). JP (Pap. x Historical Introduction "13 This concep­ actualization of the possible asfar as it is possible. tion of change held great significance for Kierkegaard, and he made Tennemann's interpretation ofldvTJO"lC; the point of de­ parture for his own theory of transition-what in The Concept is referred to as the "qualitative leap." of Anxiety Kierkegaard found support for his conception of the qual­ itative leap in Trendelenburg's idea that the highest principles can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively). Yet he re­ proached Trendelenburg for his failure to recognize the neces­ sity of a qualitative leap in order to recognize the validity of such principles.14 Kierkegaard's primary criticism of Aristotle centers on his view that the real self resides ultimately in the thinking part of man, and that consequently the contemplative life constitutes man's highest happiness.