Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1991-09 Indian surface combatants: sea power for the 1990s Pilling, Evan R. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26591 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey , California THESIS INDIAN SURFACE COMBATANTS: SEA POWER FOR THE 1990s by Evan R. Pilling September 1991 Thesis Advisor: R. Mitchell Brown, III Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Unclassified Security Classification of this page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE la Report Security Classification UNCLASSIFIED lb Restrictive Markings 2a Security Classification Authority 3 Distribution Availability of Report 2 b Declassification/Downgrading Schedule Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 4 Performing Organization Report Number(s) S Monitoring Organization Report Number(s) 6a Name of Performing Organization 6b Office Symbol 7a Name of Monitoring Organization Naval Postgraduate School (If Applicable) Naval Postgraduate School 38 6 c Address (city, slate, and ZIP code) 7 b Address (city, stale, and ZIP code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 8a Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization 8b Office Symbol 9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number (If Applicable) 8 c Address (city, state, and ZIP code) 1 Source of Funding Numbers Program Element Number Project No Task No Work Unit Accession No ii me (include Security Classification) INDIAN SURFACE COMBATANTS: SEA POWER FOR THE 1990s 1 2 Personal Author(s) Evan R. Pilling 3 a Type of Report 1 3 b Time Covered 1 4 Date of Report (year, month, day) 1 5 Page Count Master's Thesis From To 1991, September 157 1 6 Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 1 7 Cosati Codes 1 8 Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Field Group Subgroup Indian Navy; Indian Ocean; Indian surface combatants; Third World navies 1 9 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number This thesis examines the developing capabilities of the Indian surface combatant force. The emergence of a powerful Indian Navy is of concern to the United States in view of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region and its potentially related effects on Western Pacific maritime security. This study examines the history, current and future capabilities of, and the political and industrial support for the Indian surface combatant fleet. Current and future Indian naval strategy is examined and intelligence indicators are presented to assist in determining the intent behind India's naval expansion. Finally, the implications of a capable Indian surface force for U.S. policy are examined and policy recommendations postulated. 20 Distribution/Availability of Abstract 2 1 Abstract Security Classification |X unclassified/unlimited same as report DTIC users Unclassified | 22a Name of Responsible Individual 22b Telephone (Include Area code) 22c Office Symbol R. Brown (408)646-2521 NS/Br DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted security classification of this page All other editions are obsolete Unclassified Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. INDIAN SURFACE COMBATANTS: SEA POWER FOR THE 1990s Evan R. Pilling Lieutenant, United States Navy B.E., University of Mississippi, 1984 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the Naval Postgraduate School September 1991 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the developing capabilities of the Indian surface combatant force. The emergence of a powerful Indian Navy is of interest to the United States in view of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region and its potentially related effects on Western Pacific maritime security. This study examines the history, current and future capabilities of, and the political and industrial support for the Indian surface combatant fleet. Current and future Indian naval strategy is examined and intelligence indicators are presented to assist in determining the intent behind India's naval expansion. Finally, the implications of a capable Indian surface force for U.S. policy are examined and policy recommendations postulated. in 2 I tests TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. BACKGROUND 1 B. -. „ PURPOSE ? 4 C. ORGANIZATION L.._ 4 D. METHODOLOGY „ „ „ „...5 II. INDIAN SURFACE FORCE DEVELOPMENT 7 A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT. 7 B. FORCE DEVELOPMENT (1972-91) 12 1 . Budgetary Trends „ 1 2 Surface Combatant Development 13 3. Naval Aviation Development 15 4 Amphibious Force Development 17 5. Logistic Support .. 19 6. Ship Design and Weapons Trends 20 III. CURRENT AND PROJECTED INDIAN SURFACE FORCE COMPOSITION 71 A. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 22 2 Hermes Class. „ „ „ „ „ 24 3. Future Developments 26 B. DESTROYERS™ 27 1. KashinllClass 27 2 Future Developments 29 C. FRIGATES - 1_ 30 1. Godavari Class 30 2 British Leander Class. 30 3. Soviet Petya II Class. 33 4 British Whitby Class 5 33 5. British Leopard Class - 33 6. Future Developments 37 IV 1 M OOfc D. CORVETTES „ 37 1. Khukri Class „ „ „ ...„ 37 2 Soviet Pauk II Class 39 3. Tarantul I Class - I 39 4 Soviet Nanuchka II Class 39 5. Future Development...- 40 E AMPHIBIOUS FORCES 41 1. Soviet Polnochny Class LSMs 41 2 Magar Class LST „...„ 41 3. Vasoo da Gama Class LCU. 42 4 Future Development ~ 42 F. LOGISTIC FORCES ~ _ 43 1. Deepak Class Oiler 43 2 Poshak Class Support Tankers 44 3. Pradhyak Class Support Tankers 44 4 Future Developments : 45 G. SUMMARY-.™ „..„ „ I 45 IV. INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT FOR INDIAN SURFACE FORCE DFVFT OPMFNT 4 7 A. SHIPYARDS „ 47 1. Mazagon Docks, Ltd.- „ 48 2 Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engine ers 49 3. Goa Shipyard limited „ 50 4 Hindustan Shipyard „ - 50 B. BASES _ „„ „...„ 51 C. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 54 D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY 56 V. EVALUATION OF INDIAN SURFACE FO*C ES 60 A. NORMAL CONDITIONS _ - 60 1. Readiness 60 3. Intelligence gathering and surveillance 65 5. Constabulary Duties - — 67 B. LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS „ „ ..„ „.„.68 1. Demonstrations of Right „ „ „..68 2 Demonstration of Resolve ... „..68 3. Amphibious Landing by Invitation 69 4 Evacuation of Nationals 70 5. Protection of Offshore Installations 70 C. HIGHER LEVEL OPERATIONS 71 1. Passage of Shipping against Opposition 71 2 Amphibious Landing 75 3. Shore Bombardment 75 4 Denial of Passage j 76 5. Denial of Sea Areas - 77 D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INDIAN SURFACE FORCE „ 79 1. Strengths. :.._._ - 80 2 Weaknesses ._._ ........80 VI. ROLE OF INDIAN SURFACE FORCE IN CURRENT AND PROJECTED NAVAL STRATEGY 82 W A. CURRENT INDIAN NAVAL STRATEG 82 1. Sea Control in Specified Areas 82 2 Freedom of Navigation and SLOC Securi y 84 3. Safeguard EEZ and Island Territories - 84 4 Maintenance of Limited Power Projf ction Capability 85 5. Deterrence and Monitoring of Extra-reg'.onal Navies 86 B. FUTURE INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY 86 1. Political Support for Naval Developmer. L 87 2 Naval Views of Future Naval Strategy 88 C. INDICATORS OF THE NATURE OF FUTURE INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY „ 90 1. Indicators of Offensive Naval Strategy.- — —90 2 Indications of a Defensive Naval Strategy- 97 VII. REGIONAL REACTIONS TO INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION F OR THE U.S 102 A. REGIONAL REACTIONS - 102 VI B. IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NAVAL EJCPANSION FOR THE 1. Capabilities of Indian Surface Force in Adversarial Role 104 2 Capabilities of Indian Surface Fleet in an Allied Role 112 3. Recommendations 116 \ APPENDIX A. INDIAN SHIPBORNE AIRCR/ FT 123 APPENDIX B. INDIAN SURFACE COMBATANT AND SUPPORT FORCES 126 APPENDIX C. MAJOR INDIAN NAVAL BAS iS AND ESTABLISHMENTS 129 APPENDIX D. INDIAN NAVAL ORGANIZATION 130 APPENDIX E. MAJOR INDIAN DEFENSE R&D ESTABLISHMENTS AND LABORATORIES 131 APPENDIX F. PRINCIPAL INDIAN DEFENSE MANUFACTURERS. 134 RFFFRFNCFS 137 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 144 x vn 29 LIST OF TABLES , TABLE I. INDIAN NAVAL BUDGET AS % OF DEFENSE BUDGET 1 TABLE II. REGIONAL SURFACE COMBAV^NT TONNAGE 15 TABLE III. PROJECT 15 DESTROYER ..„ 29 TABLE IV. PAUK II CLASS CORVETTE 3 TABLE V. TARANTUL I CLASS CORVETTE 40 TABLE VI. NANUCHKA II CLASS CORVETTT 40 TABLE VII. POLNOCHNY CLASS LSM 42 TABLE VIII. MAGAR CLASS LST 42 TABLE IX. VASCO DA GAMA CLASS LCU 43 TABLE XI. POSHAK CLASS SUPPORT TANKER 44 TABLE XII. PRADHYAK CLASS SUPPORT TANKER 45 TABLE XIII. RAJABA GAN PALAN CLASS AOR 46 TABLE XIV. INDIAN SURFACE FORCE TLENDS: NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN PRIMARY WARFARE AREAS (1971- TABLEXV. REGIONAL PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS.... ~ 61 TABLE XVI. CAPABILITIES OF THE INDIAN SURFACE FORCE 79 vui LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Indian Ocean Region „.. 2 Figure 2. Majestic Class Aircraft Carrier 23 Figure 3. Hermes Qass Aircraft Carrier 25 Figure 4. Kashin II Qass Destroyer 28 Figure 5. Godavari Class Frigate ...... J. 31 Figure 6. Leander Class Frigate 32 Figure 7. Petya II Class Frigate „ _ 34 Figure 8. Whitby Class Frigate.- — 35 Figure 9. Leopard Class Frigate '. 36 Figure 1 0. Khukri Class Corvette 38 Figure 11. Major Indian Industrial and Port Locations 48 Figure 12. Indian Naval C-in-C Command Organization 65 rx EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Indian Ocean is of vital strategic importance to the United States.. 28 percent of U.S. oil imports traverse regional SLOCs, as do significantly larger percentages of the imports of allies, with whom the U.S. is economically interdependent. The development of U.S regional bases, establishment of the RDJTF and DESERT STORM operations, and continuing NCA-mandated forward presence of U.S. military forces, primarily naval forces, are all indicative of the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region for the U.S. The expansion of the Indian Navy in general, and surface force in particular, should be viewed with interest by the U.S. government. The Indian surface fleet has evolved from a coastal defense force to a blue-water fleet with developing power projection capabilities.