Nuclear Power in France Systemic Issues Influencing Costs Mycle Schneider International Consultant on Energy and Nuclear Policy NPEC- Radio Free Europe - Prague, 17 March 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 1. Electricity, Primary Energy, Final Energy and the Oil Myth 2. Overcapacities and the Peak Load Trap 3. Electricity Trade 4. Plutonium Glut 5. Public Opinion Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Nuclear IPFM 2008 France , ” • 58 PWR • 1 FBR • ca. 260 Facilities with eprocessing in France R SQs of Nuclear Material “ WISE-Paris), ( arignac M Source: M.Schneider, Y. Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Nuclear Power in the World by Share of Nuclear Power in Electricity Production (in 2006) Sources: IAEA-PRIS 2007, BP 2006-07, WNA 2007, MSC 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 The Role of Nuclear Power in the Final Energy Supply of the Six Largest Nuclear Electricity Producers (Status 2006 for France, Germany, South Korea, 2002 for Japan, USA, Russia) Country Nuclear Share in Final Energy (in %) France 18.4 South Korea 6.8 Germany 6.6 Japan 6.4 USA 3.9 Russia 3.1 Sources: various; France MINEFI 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Source: French Ministry of Economics, Finances and Industry, Bilan Energie 2006, 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Source: MINEFI 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 French Energy Independence: From 50% to 6% Level of Energy Mtoe Independence Nuclear Primary Energy Generation 117.7 50.0% a) Electricity exports 60.3 TWh - 5.2 - 2.4% b) Auto-consumption - 2.2 - 1.0% ca. 25 TWh c) Equivalence adjustment ? ? Primary Energy Independence 39.1 46.6% d) Final energy share - 28.6 22.2% e) Uranium imports 39.1 -16.2% Final Energy Source: Independence - 28.6 6% MSC 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 CO2 Emissions by Sector in France from 1970 to 2004 (million tons of carbon) Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Electricity Generating Capacity in France in 2007 Source: RTE, 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 French Electricity Trade 2001-2007 Source: RTE, 2008 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 French Electricity Exports 2003-2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 French Electricity Imports 2003-2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 EDF Restarts 30-Year Old Oil Fired Power Plants Oil Plant Capacity Original Mothballed Restart Start-up Porcheville-1 600 MW 1968 1995 2008 Porcheville-2 600 MW 1973 1998 2006 Cordemais-3 700 MW 1976 ? 2007 Aramon-1 700 MW ? 1995 2008 Total 2600 MW EDF operates its oil fired power plants between 200 h et 1500 h per year. Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Sources: COGEMA 2002, ASN Annual Reports, MSC Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Sources: COGEMA, ASN, WISE-Paris, MSC Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Sources : EDF, MINEFI, COGEMA, WISE-Paris, IAEA 2006 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Public Opinion on Nuclear Power in the EU Gallup, Attitudes on issues related to EU Energy Policy, European Commission, DG TREN, April 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 “The European public is still strongly opposed to the use of nuclear power; those who are worried about climate change are even more fiercely opposed.” Gallup, Attitudes on issues related to EU Energy Policy, European Commission, DG TREN, April 2007 Mycle Schneider Consulting Prague, 17 March 2008 Nuclear Power in France Systemic Issues Influencing Costs Draft By Mycle Schneider International Consultant on Energy and Nuclear Policy Commissioned by The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington D.C. Paris, March 2008 Contacts Mycle Schneider Consulting Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 45, Allée des deux cèdres 1718 M Street, NW Suite 244 91210 Draveil (Paris) Washington, DC 20036 France USA Skype: mycleschneider Phone: +1-202-466-4406 Phone: +33-1-69 83 23 79 Web: www.npec-web.org Fax: +33-1-69 40 98 75 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Mycle Schneider for NPEC – Nuclear Power in France – March 2008 2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 4 A BIT OF HISTORY – CIVIL-MILITARY CONNECTIONS 5 Decision Making 6 Access to Information 7 Civil – Military Cross Subsidizing 8 The Plutonium Industry 9 International Safeguards Arrangements 11 Research & Development 13 OF OIL, ENERGY DEPENDENCE AND NUCLEAR POWER 13 Electric Heat and Power Exports – Wasting Energy and Euros 14 What if…? Optimized Equipment and Economic Evaluation 19 Energy Independence – From 50% to 6% 21 Electricity Prices – Low, Lower, the Lowest? 23 Limited Risk Insurances 24 Decommissioning and Waste Management Cost Assessment and Fund Management 25 Between Productivity and Nuclear Safety – A Fragile Balance 26 EPR – European Problem Reactor? 28 Competence Erosion and Workforce Concerns 29 Public Opinion 30 CONCLUSIONS 33 GENERAL REFERENCES 35 APPENDIX 1 36 Introduction A few weeks ago, my 16-year-old son came home from school with a “fact sheet” on nuclear power, provided as basis for an exercise in physical sciences. It explains that after the 1973 oil shock, nuclear power grew rapidly in France from providing 8% to 78% of the country’s electricity. The political will to “withdraw the country from external hydrocarbon supply uncertainties and, at the same time, to reduce the cost of energy” has led to an ambitious nuclear program. Today France has the second largest reactor fleet behind the USA and “the lowest kWh price in Europe”. At the same time “France’s energy independence, higher than 50%, has more than doubled” over the last 25 years. Chernobyl has nevertheless illustrated that “the nuclear industry, like all industry, involves risks”. But the “debate is complex and cannot be reduced to the disadvantages of nuclear power”, the plants having “contributed significantly to curb greenhouse gas emissions into the environment”. The text perfectly sums up what not only school children but the French public as a whole has been told over the past 35 years of nuclear development in France. Reality is remarkably different, if you shed some light on facts and figures. The present paper looks in particular at some of the many factors that impact on the economic conditions of nuclear power development, from the historic links between civil and military applications to the power system structure and hidden costs or biased cost representation. The exercise is not necessarily quantitative in nature but rather attempts to identify the areas that have had an influence on costs. It would be a fascinating exercise to add a comprehensive quantitative assessment to each of the chapters in order to provide an entirely new cost evaluation but that would be well beyond the scope of the present paper. Mycle Schneider for NPEC – Nuclear Power in France – March 2008 4 A Bit of History – Civil-Military Connections In 1946 the French Government nationalized “the production, the transport, the distribution, the import and the export” of electricity and natural gas and created Electricité de France (EDF) and Gaz de France (GDF) as state energy monopolies.1 The legislation stipulated that 1% of the companies’ turnover go to the “Central Fund for Social Activities”2, a fund to be managed by a board composed of representatives from the different trade unions according to the previous union election outcome. Since the CGT, close to the French communist party, won the absolute majority votes every single time from the start, CGT was in a position to manage a huge budget, about €450 million in 2006, in principle on a large number of social and associated issues (vacation facilities, restaurants, child care centers…). The CCAS employs over 5,600 people. It has been suspected for a long time to constitute a convenient and abundant source for subsidizing the French communist party. In a 2006 confidential report the French Court of Auditors accuses the Fund of “total lack of transparency on resources and employment (…) and insufficient internal control”.3 However, more importantly, the arrangement constituted a long-term guarantee for “social peace”. The extraordinary advantages for EDF employees funded by the CCAS were and are complemented by preferential power tariffs. No surprise that EDF has been hit significantly less by strikes than many other French companies (including public ones) and only on rare occasions union activities led to power cuts. In addition to the average preferential electricity tariff for each EDF employee, during the project planning and construction phases, EDF practiced lower tariffs in the vicinity of nuclear power plant sites. The practice has been declared illegal on the grounds that it violates the principle of equal treatment. However, the court case, initiated by consumer and environmental protection organizations, took over five years, time enough for the construction sites to get into advanced stage. Incitement to acceptance had done the job prior to the method being declared illegal because it was obviously violating the equality principle. The relationship between trade unions and nuclear sector has been instrumental to the implementation of the various phases of the nuclear program. While EDF had been “pacified” by the historical “social fund” deal, the history of the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) was slightly different. After what was later termed the “reactor line war” (la guèrre des filières) the CEA remained responsible for the implementation of the nuclear fuel chain. The CEA had lost the “war” at the beginning of the 1970s. Its own gas-graphite reactor line was abandoned in favor of the Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor. Until 1972, nine gas-graphite reactors were started up, of which eight were producing power and at least four of them have been used systematically to generate plutonium for the French nuclear weapons program.