A STUDY ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION & THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA BY Tughral Yamin DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE & STRATEGIC STUDIES Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad 2011 CERTIFICATE This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEFENCE STRATEGIC STUDIES. Supervisor: ___________________________ Prof. Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema Chairman: ________________________________ Prof. Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain Department of Defence Strategic Studies Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad External ____________________________ External ____________________________ Dated: _______________ DECLARATION I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree. Dated: _______________ Tughral Yamin CONTENTS CHAPTER-1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Research Framework 1 1.2 Scope of Research 1 1.3 The Review of Literature 12 1.4 The Organization of the Dissertation 52 Chapter-2 CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND OTHER NOTIONS 2.1 The Theories of International Relations 52 2.2 The Concept of Stability 59 2.3 Concept of Deterrence 74 2.4 Escalation Control 89 Chapter-3 STABILITY AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE DURING THE COLD WAR 3.1 The Genesis of the Cold War 92 3.2 The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence During the Cold War 96 3.3 The Nuclear Debate and the Strategic Community 101 3.4 Nuclear Deterrence as Part of the Security Policy 104 3.5 The Cold War Crises 109 3.6 The Beginning and the End Of Détente 131 CHAPTER-4 ARMS CONTROL & STRATEGIC STABILITY 4.1 The Cold War Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Process 148 4.2 Post Cold War US-Russia Arms Reduction 153 4.3 Global Arms Control Regime 157 4.4 From Non Proliferation to Pre-Emption and Counter 169 Proliferation CHAPTER-5 THE NATURE OF INDO PAKISTAN CONFLICT IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR ERA 5.1 The Genesis of the India Pakistan Conflict 186 5.2 The Kashmir Problem 187 5.3 The First War in Kashmir 194 5.4 International Arbitration 202 5.5 Bilateral Parleys 205 5.6 Cold War Alliances 208 5.7 The 1962 Sino Indian War and the US Nuclear Umbrella 214 5.8 The 1965 War 216 5.9 The 1971 War 222 CHAPTER-6 INDIA – PAKISTAN TENSIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 6.1 Kashmir—A Nuclear Flashpoint 231 6.2 India’s Global Aspirations 232 6.3 India’s Nuclear Programme 234 6.4 Pakistani Nuclear Programme 238 CHAPTER-7 THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF THE SOUTH ASIAN SUBCONTINENT & OTHER INFLUENCES ON STRATEGIC STABILITY 7.1 Pakistan’s Armed Forces 290 7.2 Evolution of Pakistan Army 293 7.3 Culture of Dissent 295 7.4 Conservative Traditions 298 7.5 The US Influence 301 CHAPTER-8 STATE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA & PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 8.1 Conventional Asymmetries 310 8.2 Nuclear Forces 326 8.3 Nuclear War or Strategic Stability? 337 DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my wonderful parents Safia and late Muhammad Yamin ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have a lot to be grateful for: To Allah Almighty for giving me health, time and stamina to fulfil one of my major ambitions in life; to my family, friends and colleagues for their patience, understanding and unstinted support, and to my teachers and mentors for their guidance and encouragement. I must place my thanks on record for the good humour and understanding displayed by my wife Asma, my children Muhammad and Amna and my mother by ungrudgingly letting me devote my time and energies towards a project that was so dear to my heart. I also deeply appreciate the words of cheer sent by my siblings, as I soldiered on with my research work. I was fortunate to have as my supervisor renowned scholar on nuclear affairs in South Asia Professor Dr Z.I. Cheema, former Dean of Social Sciences and Head of Department of Defence & Strategic Studies. As the pioneering PhD scholar in my field, I was extended full support by the current Chairman of the Department Professor Dr Syed Rifaat Hussain. I was fortunate enough to learn the basics of research methodology from Distinguished Professor Dr Tariq Rahman, Chairman of the National Institute of Pakistan Studies. During the course of my research, I got helpful suggestions and advice from friends, colleagues and acquaintances in Pakistan’s strategic, scientific and security community, Islamabad based think tanks, and academicians associated with the Quaid-i-Azam University and the National Defence University. The officers of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate (ACDA) of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in particular and the Pakistan Army in general were extremely helpful and forthcoming with their advice and helping me develop an understanding of the existing environment of strategic stability. I would be remiss, if I do not mention Mr Tahir Naqvi, librarian at the National Institute of Pakistan Studies for his voluntary assistance and help. i ABSTRACT The South Asian subcontinent has an unmatched geo-strategic salience. On the lateral plane it connects the Middle East with the Far East and on the longitudinal axis it is the gateway to the Indian Ocean for Russia, China and Central Asia. As a landmass, it dominates the oil routes from the Persian Gulf to the Bay of Bengal. It is also important because one fifth of the humanity resides in this region. The area has tremendous prospects for growth but its progress has been stunted because for the past six decades it has been wracked by wars and near warlike situations. It is a perennially instable region. At the heart of the conflict lies the unresolved issue of Kashmir. Since no solution seems forthcoming, this area is expected to remain turbulent in the near future. The nuclear explosions of May 1998 have impacted in various ways on the stability of the region. It has mainly created a state of mutual deterrence between India and Pakistan, which is somewhat akin to the situation that prevailed within the superpower equation during the Cold War. This form of fragile stability has its advocates and detractors. Some are of the view that due to the short warning times and sudden spikes of tension witnessed in South Asian context, the likelihood of moving quickly up the escalation ladder and crossing the nuclear Rubicon are far greater than the East West conflict. There is, however, historical evidence that during Cold War was equally dangerous. There were a number of touch and go occasions, when nuclear weapons were brandished aggressively but better sense prevailed because of the specter of the ‘mutually assured destruction.’ Nuclear deterrence in short became the guarantor of strategic stability during the East West conflict. ii Carefully calibrated the fear of mutual destruction can keep stability in South Asia too. This study is devoted to understanding the dynamics of strategic stability based on the ubiquitous use of nuclear weapons in the South Asian scenario. iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computers & Intelligence CBM Confidence Building Measures CFE Conventional Forces In Europe IA Indian Army IAF Indian Air Force ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IN Indian Navy INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IOA Instrument of Accession ISI Inter Services Intelligence LACM Land Attack Cruise Missile LIC Low Intensity Conflict MARV Manoeuvrable Re-Entry Vehicle MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MO Military Operations MSA Maritime Security Agency NSG Nuclear Security Guarantees NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group PAF Pakistan Air Force PN Pakistan Navy iv RAW Research & Analysis Wing SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SLBM Submarine Launched Missile SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile STALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction v Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK Doctoral research is an arduous intellectual exercise of monumental undertaking. It needs an appropriate agenda, terms of reference and an outline for work to reach a logical conclusion. A clear cut, coherent and consistent line of thought has to be followed. The search for answers cannot be left open ended. Limits of exploration have to be laid down and parameters identified to retain focus of the issue at hand. I must admit at the outset that a suitable scheme of research was the greatest hurdle in beginning my PhD project. Arguably an appropriate framework involves conceiving a plausible theory, concept or idea, which can be added to the existing body of knowledge. After a great deal of deliberation, I decided to study the Cold War model of nuclear deterrence, as a suitable paradigm for strategic stability in South Asia. I drew inspiration from the fact that during this period of superpower rivalry strategic balance in interstate relationship was successfully through the threat of nuclear weapons. During the course of my research I studied the concept of deterrence in general and nuclear deterrence in particular, as the primary means to provide stability in a patently unstable region. 1.2 SCOPE OF RESEARCH At the outset I made certain fundamental assumptions of geography and weapon classification, for the scope of my research. Firstly, irrespective of a number of cartographic definitions, I categorised South Asia as a zone comprising India and Pakistan. Secondly, while discussing WMD’s, I primarily considered nuclear weapons. 1 With these two definitions in mind, I certain limits for myself, within which I allowed myself to operate. 1.2.1 War and Deterrence The first question that came to my mind, as I began organising my thoughts was: Is war inevitable and is the creation of deterrence essential to prevent it? It has been argued that in an environment beset by hunger and endemic poverty, spending money in creating nuclear deterrence is grossly unfair.