The North Vietnamese thought they were attacking bomb-laden F-105s. What they ran into was Robin Olds and the Wolfpack, flying Phantom F-4s. MiG Sweep n Jan. 2, 1967, with aircraft The air war in Southeast Asia, O losses in Southeast Asia on the while unique in many respects, har- rise, the United States Air Force re- kened back to earlier conflicts in sorted to an elaborate combat sting. terms of the relative missions, forces, The mission, called Operation Bolo, and equipment. As in World War II constituted an electronic Trojan and Korea, the mission of US forces Horse concealing the hard-hitting was to obtain air superiority, destroy F-4 Phantoms of USAF’s 8th Tacti- the enemy air forces, and conduct cal Fighter Wing within a radiated long-range bombing operations. The image that simulated bomb-laden mission of the enemy forces was to F-105 Thunderchiefs. defend their most important targets Despite adverse weather and a by choosing to engage the American few surprises, the “MiG Sweep” bombers on a selective basis. did what it was designed to do: trick the increasingly elusive MiG-21s of Thud, Phantom, Thud North Vietnam into engaging F-4s There were other parallels. To rigged for aerial combat. achieve the air superiority mission, Until the latter part of 1966, MiG the American fighters had to have a aircraft had not been as great a threat long-range capability and still be able to USAF strike forces as the Surface- to defeat the enemy fighters over their Col. Robin Olds came up with the strat- to-Air Missiles and anti-aircraft fire. own territory. What the Mustangs egy of luring North Vietnam’s MiG-21s Ironically enough, the introduction of and Sabres did in their wars, the F-4 into battle with F-4s that were masquer- the QRC-160 (ALQ-71) electronics Phantom II was required to do in ading as the more vulnerable F-105s. countermeasures pod on the F-105s Southeast Asia. Flights of F-4s, carry- In the painting “MiG Sweep,” at right, changed this. The QRC-160 was ing a mixed ordnance load of bombs aviation artist Keith Ferris portrayed a successful encounter in Operation effective in neutralizing the radar and missiles, would be sandwiched Bolo, as Olds and his backseater rolled controlling the SAMs and flak, and in between Thud flights at four- or out of the vertical and acquired a MiG- the resilient North Vietnamese re- five-minute intervals. If the F-105s 21 above the cloud deck. sponded by increasing their use of in front or behind were attacked, the MiG fighters to prey on vulnerable F-4s would drop their bombs and try F-105s configured for bombing. to engage. If they were not, the F-4s Operating under ground control, would drop bombs right along with and making maximum use of both the Thuds. cloud cover and the almost benevo- A final, tragic parallel is the price lent American rules of engagement, paid to execute the missions that were the enemy aircraft were adroitly often laid on for statistical rather than employed. The MiGs, especially tactical reasons. Flying Phantoms the later model MiG-21s armed or Thuds was dangerous work. As a By Walter J. Boyne with heat-seeking missiles, sought single example, by late 1967, more to attack the strike flights and make than 325 F-105s had been lost over them jettison their bomb loads prior North Vietnam, most to SAMs and to reaching the target areas. Their anti-aircraft fire. mission was fulfilled if the Thuds The North Vietnamese air force were forced to drop their bombs consisted of slow but heavily armed prematurely, but they tried to score and maneuverable MiG-17s and a kills wherever possible. handful of modern delta-wing MiG- 46 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1998 was, at least in part, because he was married not to the girl next door but to film star Ella Raines. Son of Maj. Gen. Robert Olds, one of the most influential gener- als in the Army Air Corps, the new commander of the 8th was a World War II ace. Olds would later remark that he never flew one mission over Germany that was as tough as any mission over Hanoi. Olds’ war-ace status was marred somewhat by a reputation for being a maverick. Olds had often argued forcefully against contemporary Air Force training. He was an outspoken advocate of intensive training in the arts of war he learned in Europe. Unable to wangle his way into the Korean conflict, he had continued to The MiG-21 was about half the size of the F-4 and a formidable opponent. Only 16 were estimated to be in the theater, and Operation Bolo aimed to either destroy as press for training in strafing, dive- many of them as possible or run them out of fuel. bombing, and other conventional warfare techniques at a time when US fighters were being adapted to 21s. The MiG-17s were semiobsolete and Dec. 2, 1966, became known as carry nuclear weapons and fight a but still effective in their defensive “Black Friday” when the Air Force nuclear war. His advice, though not role. (The MiG-19 did not enter lost five aircraft and the Navy three well received, was a realistic forecast service with the North Vietnamese to SAMs or anti-aircraft fire. Air of what would be required for war air force until February 1969.) Force losses included three F-4Cs, in Southeast Asia. The MiG-21 Fishbed was roughly one RF-4C, and an F-105. The Navy Olds knew he would have to prove half the size of the Phantom and was lost one F-4B and two Douglas A-4C himself to the combat-hardened vet- designed as a high-speed, limited Skyhawks. erans of the 8th as a leader in their war. all-weather interceptor. It could carry These ground-fire losses were ac- He wished to use his past beliefs in a two cannons and two Atoll infrared companied by the marked increase plan that would confirm his present homing air-to-air missiles which had in MiG activity during the last status. He had first presented his idea been developed from the US AIM-9B quarter of 1966. Because the rules for a MiG ambush to Gen. Hunter Har- Sidewinder. At altitude, the MiG-21 of engagement prohibited airfield ris Jr., Pacific Air Forces commander. could outfly the F-4 in almost all attacks, the men of the 8th Tactical Harris ignored him. Olds next went flight regimes. It had spectacular Fighter Wing were determined to to the commander of 7th Air Force, acceleration and turning capability. blunt the enemy’s efforts by luring Gen. William W. “Spike” Momyer. At lower altitudes, the F-4s used their the MiGs into air-to-air combat and It was in early December 1966, at a colossal energy in vertical maneuvers then destroying them. cocktail party in the Philippines, that that offset the MiGs’ turning capabil- The reluctance of the MiG-21s to Olds edged next to Momyer. After a ity, for they lost energy quickly in engage did not mean that the North few polite remarks, Olds said, “Sir, turns at low altitudes. The MiG-21s Vietnamese pilots were lacking in the MiGs are getting pesky” and went were operated under tight ground either courage or skill. At the time, on to describe ways to bring them control. They typically sought to stalk the US estimated that there were only to battle. Momyer’s expression of American formations from the rear, 16 MiG-21s in the theater, and the deep disinterest didn’t change. He firing a missile and then disengag- enemy had to employ them selectively moved away, leaving Olds with the ing. If engaged, however, its small to maximize their utility. uncomfortable impression that he size and tight turning ability made had blown a good opportunity. the MiG-21 a formidable opponent The New Boy in a dogfight. Brig. Gen. Robin Olds, USAF He Listened The Phantom had been intended (Ret.), recalls himself as the prover- However, Momyer had listened originally to be a fleet defense air- bial “new boy on the block” with the after all, and a week after their con- craft, but it proved to be versatile 8th TFW, as yet unproven in the jet versation, Olds was called to Saigon in many roles, including reconnais- air war of Southeast Asia. When he to discuss the concept of tricking the sance, Fast Forward Air Control, Wild arrived at Ubon RTAB, Thailand, as MiGs into combat. Momyer told Olds Weasel, bombing, and air superiority. a colonel, to assume command of the to develop a plan, one that specifically The F-4Cs were armed only with Wolfpack on Sept. 30, 1966, Olds, excluded attacks on North Vietnamese missiles, although gun pods could who was 44 and stood six feet two, airfields for political reasons. be fitted. struck some as more the Hollywood By Dec. 13, Olds was working The air war in Southeast Asia concept of a combat commander than closely with four top veterans of the had grown progressively intense, an Air Force regular officer. This 8th, striving to develop his idea. In 48 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 1998 brief, the concept called for F-4s to opportunities for engagement. The sory Group in Vietnam, suggested simulate F-105s, and Olds gave his group planned for a concerted strike the Phantoms carry the QRC-160 planners specific guidelines to work by a “west force” of seven flights of electronic countermeasures pod that by.