Russia's First "Orient": Characterizing the Crimea in 1787 Sara Dickinson Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 3, Number 1, Winter 2002 (New Series), pp. 3-25 (Article) Published by Slavica Publishers DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/kri.2002.0005 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/18724 [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] Articles Russia’s First “Orient”: Characterizing the Crimea in 1787 Sara Dickinson Russian culture discovered its first “Orient” in the late 18th century when Catherine II extended the boundaries of her empire to Southern Ukraine and the Crimea. While Russians had interacted for centuries with their Asiatic neighbors, they had not systematically characterized them as Oriental “others” until Catherine’s reign.1 The 1783 conquest of new territory on the shores of the Black Sea, which coincided with the rising popularity of Oriental fashions in West European literature and culture, provided an opportunity to do so. Ac- cordingly, these southern borderlands were the first landscapes in the empire to be elaborately imagined according to the Western parameters of Oriental styliza- tion.2 An especially powerful stimulus to representations of the Crimea as an “Eastern” or “Oriental” territory was Catherine II’s trip to the Crimea in 1787. Commentary on the journey, written by the empress herself, members of her entourage, and her various correspondents, illustrates the initiatory formulation of an exotic Crimean imaginary – a year before Byron’s birth and 12 years before Pushkin’s. This was not yet the full-fledged Orientalism of Said’s classic model.3 A concerted institutional effort at the political and cultural control of colonial terri- tories would develop only in the 19th century, largely in response to the Russian empire’s conflicts further south and east with the peoples of the Caucasus.4 1 For a historical overview of Russia’s relationship with Asia and the East, see Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples (Stanford: Hoover Institu- tion Press, 1972). 2 Russia annexed these lands fairly peaceably after compelling the Tatar khan of the Crimea, a Turkish vassal, to abdicate his throne. For details, see Elena Ioasafovna Druzhinina, Severnoe prichernomor′e v 1775–1800 gg. (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1959), 92–146; Alan W. Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772–83 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 3 According to Said, West European “modern Orientalism” began in the last third of the 18th century. The more “free-floating Orient” that characterized various cultural vogues in the late 18th and early 19th century was “severely curtailed” by this more academic approach (Orientalism [New York: Vintage, 1979], 22, 118–19). On the development of Russian institutions for the study of the Orient, see Richard N. Frye, “Oriental Studies in Russia,” Russia and Asia, 30–51. 4 Accordingly, most discussions of Orientalism in Russian literature focus on somewhat later texts addressing the Caucasus. See, for example, Peter Scotto, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Ideologies of Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 3(1): 3–25, Winter 2002. 4SARA DICKINSON While there is a direct link between Catherinian descriptions of the Crimea and later Orientalist characterizations of the Caucasus, Russia’s encounter with the Crimea is better described as a preliminary process of “otherization”: the produc- tion and circulation of images and stereotypes that expressed the region’s “other- ness” or ontological difference from the norms of the dominant culture, in this case those of Western Europe. In order to promulgate such distinctions, of course, Russia needed to claim West European cultural standards as its own. Not surprisingly, initial forays into Orientalist literary discourse were complicated by the fact that Catherine’s empire was hardly a typical Western power at all: geo- graphically, politically, and culturally defined by its position on Europe’s periph- ery, Russia itself had often been cast in the role of the West’s Oriental other.5 The annexation of the Crimea provided a welcome opportunity for Russia to more assertively claim the status of a Western-style empire.6 By adopting West- ern techniques of “otherization,” Russia was able to describe itself as Imperialism in Lermontov’s ‘Bela’,” PMLA 107: 2 (1992), 246–60; Katya Hokanson, “Literary Imperialism, Narodnost′ and Pushkin’s Invention of the Caucasus,” Russian Review 53: 3 (1994), 336–52; Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ian M. Helfant, “Sculpting a Persona: The Path from Pushkin’s Caucasian Journal to Puteshestvie v Arzrum,” Russian Review 56 (July 1997), 366–82. A rich and less geographically specific treatment of Russian Orientalism may be found in Monika Greenleaf, Pushkin and Romantic Fashion: Fragment, Elegy, Orient, Irony (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 108–55. Several studies of Pushkin’s work have ad- dressed the significance of the Crimean setting. See Stephanie Sandler, Distant Pleasures: Alexander Pushkin and the Writing of Exile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 163–85, and Katya Hokanson, “Pushkin’s Captive Crimea: Imperialism in The Fountain of Bakhchisarai,” in Russian Subjects: Empire, Nation, and the Culture of the Golden Age, ed. Monika Greenleaf and Stephen Moeller-Sally (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 123–48. On the 18th-century roots of Russian Orientalism, see Boris Stepanovich Vinogradov, “Nachalo kavkazkoi temy v russkoi literature,” in Russkaia literatura i Kavkaz, ed. Veniamin Mikhailovich Tamakhin, et al. (Stavropol: Ministerstvo Prosveshcheniia RSFSR [Stavropol′skii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Institut], 1974), 3–25; Harsha Ram, “Russian Poetry and the Imperial Sublime,” in Russian Sub- jects, 21–49. 5 See Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlighten- ment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). Wolff points out that the Crimea represented “Eastern Europe at its most Oriental” for the West (66); for his analysis of Catherine’s trip in this context, see 126–41. 6 Explicit interest in following a Western model in this regard dates back to the reign of Peter I (1689–1725), the first Russian sovereign “who, in his dealings with the Orient, behaved wholly as a West European monarch” (Frye, “Oriental Studies,” 34). On Russia’s self-positioning as a Western nation with respect to its eastern and southern neighbors, see also Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “Asia Through Russian Eyes,” Russia and Asia, 3–29, and Mark Bassin, “Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space,” Slavic Review 50: 1 (Spring 1991), 1–17. RUSSIA’S FIRST “ORIENT”5 comparatively “more European” than peoples such as Ottoman Turks and Crimean Tatars. The three-way dynamic between Russia, the South, and the West might be described as one of “triangulation.” This term, taken from popular psychology, refers to interpersonal relationships in which an absent third party conditions the interaction between two others. René Girard’s elaboration of “triangular desire” is relevant here as well: his analysis of Don Quixote illustrates how the would-be knight’s admiration for the legendary Amadis of Gaul (the absent third party) defines his own projects and desires much as Western Europe determined those of Russia.7 Another important dynamic appears in these texts as well: descrip- tions of Catherine’s trip do not simply emphasize local exoticism in order to in- dicate that the Crimea was essentially different from European Russia, but also frequently combine an interest in Oriental detail with what might be called “Occidentalism,” or the attempt to imagine this territory in ways that forged more direct (rather than triangular) links with the West. In particular, the travel- ers underlined a connection between the Crimea and ancient Greece, the very source of Western civilization. Thus, the rhetorical construction of Russia’s first Orient was to provide compelling evidence of Russia’s Western pedigree. If Western Europe’s supposedly “Oriental” colonies were located as far south as east of the imperial capitals in London and Paris, Russian geopolitics transposed the opposition between “West” and “East” onto a strictly north-south axis: the Crimea and Black Sea coast lay due south of St. Petersburg; parts of the area were 7 René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 1–52. These dynamics resemble those found in contemporary Serbia and former Yugoslavia and described by Milica Bakiç -Hayden and Robert Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics, Slavic Review 51: 1 (Spring 1992), 1–15; Milica Bakiç-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54: 4 (Winter 1995), 917–31; and Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). The idea of triangulation differs from the related concept of “nesting Orientalisms” described by Bakiç -Hayden in that it emphasizes the continued importance of a West European standard and audience for Russia’s descriptions of subaltern others. This general triangular scheme was subject to local