This article was downloaded by: [ University of Iceland ] On: 17 July 2015, At: 04:03 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG Scandinavian Journal of History Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/shis20 THE COD AND THE COLD WAR GuÐmundur J. GuÐmundsson Published online: 22 Aug 2006. To cite this article: GuÐmundur J. GuÐmundsson (2006) THE COD AND THE COLD WAR, Scandinavian Journal of History, 31:2, 97-118, DOI: 10.1080/03468750600604184 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03468750600604184 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions Guðmundur J. Guðmundsson THE COD AND THE COLD WAR This paper is an overview of the Anglo-Icelandic fishery disputes from 1952–1976. Its main emphasis is on the negotiations between the British and the Icelandic governments but it also addresses other aspects of the disputes, such as the effects they had on Iceland’s relations with NATO and the United States and the effect on the balance of power between the Eastern and Western bloc in the North-Atlantic. Introduction The Cod War is the popular term for the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries disputes in the 20th century.1 Each of these disputes had its distinctive features. In the 4-mile conflict of 1952–1956 there were no serious clashes in the fishing grounds but the British fishing industry resorted to an embargo on Icelandic fish in the UK in its attempt to force Iceland to allow British trawlers to continue their fishing inside the 4-mile limit. In the 12-mile dispute from 1958–1961 Britain sent naval vessels to protect its trawlers in Icelandic waters, and although there were no serious clashes between the frigates and the Coastguard vessels, commonly known as the gunboats, the situation was at times very tense. In the 50-mile dispute 1972–1973 and the 200-mile dispute 1975–1976 the Icelandic coast guard vessels used trawl-wire cutters to harass the trawlers and British frigates, and Icelandic gun boats collided again and again, suffering serious damage but luckily without casualties. In the 200-mile dispute, Iceland broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. That was the only time two NATO countries broke off diplomatic relations during the Cold War. All four conflicts ended Downloaded by [ University of Iceland ] at 04:03 17 July 2015 in what can be called an Icelandic victory and in the end the United Kingdom gave way at the negotiating table. When examining the Cod Wars several interesting problems rise. The first one is of cause – how did the disputes affect NATO and relations within the alliance? Why did a conflict between two NATO allies become so intense in the middle of the Cold War and why were both parties so unyielding? What hindered NATO from reacting and using its authority to settle the 12-mile, 50-mile and 200-mile disputes? Why did the United States keep such a low profile in all the disputes? What did the Soviet government make of all this and why did it not use the opportunity in the 200-mile conflict to drive a wedge between the NATO countries? These and many other questions will be considered in the following paper. Scandinavian Journal of History Vol. 31, No. 2. June 2006, pp. 97–118 ISSN 0346-8755 print/ISSN 1502-7716 online ß 2006 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/03468750600604184 98 SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY The 4-mile dispute 1952–1956 Icelandic fishermen almost exclusively exploited the fishing grounds off Iceland, during World War II. The only exceptions were fishing vessels from the Faeroe Islands and an occasional British trawler, heroically defying German U-boats and mines. Soon after the war, foreign trawlers resumed their fishing off Iceland and as time went on the fishing fleets were renovated and more powerful vessels gradually replaced the pre-war fleet. After a few years it became clear that some of the most important fish stocks around Iceland were threatened by over-fishing. The Icelandic government reacted; first by passing the 1948 law on the Scientific Preservation of the Continental Shelf and then in 1952 with the extension of the fishing limit to four miles. These actions were based on the Truman Declaration of 1945 and the 1951 ruling of the International Court at The Hague in the Anglo-Norwegian fishery dispute. According to that ruling, it was not contrary to international law to preserve fish stocks in fjords and bays by extending the fishing limit. The British, Belgian, French and Dutch governments protested against the extension but officially there was very little they could do, since Iceland’s action was according to international law. In Britain, on the other hand, the fishing industry put an embargo on Icelandic fresh fish.2 This was not a government action but many believe it was endorsed by it.3 At least it is certain the government did nothing to stop the embargo. The Icelanders pointed out that the embargo contravened several treaties and international obligations of the British government, but to no avail.4 The goal seems to have been to force the Icelanders into a bilateral agreement that would have allowed British trawlers to continue fishing inside the 4-mile limit, in spite of the International Court ruling. The Icelanders reacted by searching for new markets. Markets for salted cod in Italy and Portugal opened in 1952 and export of frozen fish fillets to the United States expanded, but most important in 1953, Iceland, first of the NATO-aligned nations, signed a long term trade agreement with the Soviet Union, and very soon it had become one of Iceland’s most important trading partners and continued to be so until it was dissolved.5 There is good reason to consider the motive Soviet Union in establishing trade with Iceland. The trade agreement was signed at a time when trade and cultural Downloaded by [ University of Iceland ] at 04:03 17 July 2015 relations between the Eastern and Western block was on the rise after Stalin’s death. The Soviet government was very interested in Iceland’s fishing products and wanted to sell all kinds of goods which the Icelanders were interested in; oil, machinery, timber and cars. The Icelandic trade negotiators all agreed that the Soviets’ primary motive in the talks was trade6 but it is easy to imagine the Soviet government sensing the possibility of using the strained political and economical relations between Iceland and Britain arising from the embargo in its political manoeuvring. In a memorandum from 1950 the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrej Vyshinski stated that trade relations with Iceland should encourage positive trends in the Icelandic economy and give support to the Socialist Party.7 Apart from the question whether this was the objective or not in 1953, Soviet-Icelandic trade was to the advantage of both governments and caused prolonged irritation in the Pentagon and NATO headquarters. Even though the Icelanders came out victorious, the Icelandic Prime Minister, O´ lafur Thors, on his own initiative continued to discuss the embargo with the British THE COD AND THE COLD WAR 99 government. His family had owned one of the largest trawler companies in Iceland and he was a confirmed Anglophile. He tried both flattery and thinly veiled threats. He reminded the British representatives that both states belonged to NATO, mentioned Iceland’s expanding trade with the Soviet Union and the fact that the pro- Soviet Socialist Party had an electoral base of 20%; nevertheless the British remained as unyielding as ever and he did not succeed.8 After prolonged negotiations at the initiative of the OEEC the embargo was finally lifted in 1956.9 The long time that lapsed between the extension of the fishery limit and the lifting of the embargo indicates that the British were immune to the line of argument that their behaviour would damage NATO. There are no indications that NATO put official pressure on the British to reach an agreement, although pressure might have been applied behind the scenes.10 The US government showed concern over the embargo and Iceland’s trade with the Soviet Union but they did not react actively, except by facilitating Iceland’s frozen fish imports to the United States. In his book on the Anglo-Icelandic fishery disputes, former Minister for Fisheries, Lu´ðvı´kJo´sepsson, considered Thors’s motives in his private negotiations with the British, why he continued to pursue them long after Iceland had in fact won the dispute.