IN PURSUIT OF A PHANTOM QUOTATION GADAMER AND PIETIST HERMENEUTICS In an essay titled “Philosophie und LASZLO KISBALI tone of his remarks is justified. Philologie”, the philosopher Hans- Does a philology moving in the Georg Gadamer pays homage to hermeutic circle really stand so the great classical scholar Ulrich “Pass no judgment about a book high above traditional philology Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.1 The if you have not read it” that it can look down upon the leitmotif, as it were, of this essay Christian Thomasius latter with a patronizing smile? Is is a certain “intrinsic affinity” naive philology incapable of rais- between the Greek words for philosophy and philolo- ing any questions which would, after all, seem to call gy. As one might expect, Gadamer envisages the syn- for an answer? What if, in the midst of the battle of thesis between these two forms of knowledge to be intepretations, the disparaged philologist suddenly attainable with the guidance of sophos. To be sure, the raised his voice and said: But there is nothing written philosopher cannot dispense with philology, yet this is in that part of the text; the passage that you are inter- so only because of the finitude of the human spirit. preting (in one way or another) is not to be found in On account of this finitude, we cannot know “what the text at all? It may be thought that this hypothesis we are supposed to come to know” without a linguis- is implausible to the point of absurdity. After all, who tically mediated tradition (the logos). The philosopher would try to interpret a non-existent passage? Yes, must rely on philology, yet he is also supposed to you’ve guessed right, esteemed reader: Gadamer transcend the latter by virtue of the “exertion of con- himself has attempted this absurdity. What is more, cept”. In contrast to the philologist, the philosopher is he not only attempted it, he has also earned success not primarily interested in the verbatim form of the by doing so—tremendous success. text. Gadamer ties philology to the concept of tradi- Surveys, reviews, and reference works written on tion; yet, precisely by observing the primacy of philos- the subject of hermeneutics after the Sixties seldom ophy within the relation between philosophy and fail to point out that Pietism inaugurated a new chap- philology, he reiterates the premises of this philologi- ter in the history of hermeneutics. The novelty intro- cal tradition. And hence the eloquent laudation to the duced by Pietism is generally supposed to be the tri- philologist boils down to a fairly straightforward mes- partite division of hermeneutics, according to which sage—to wit, that there is good philology and bad the theory of interpretatio and explicatio is followed by a philology, and to decide what counts as good philolo- third part, namely, the theory of applicatio. Again and gy is, of course, up to philosophy. again, and almost exclusively, the only example Philosophy in its turn begins, according to Gadamer, with the recognition that “interpretation is ■ The Hungarian version of this article appeared in Holmi, a central form of our accessing the world [Weltzu- 1998/9, pp. 1275–1289. gang]”.2 The same could be said about good philolo- 1 ■ Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 6 (Griechische Philosophie II). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul gy, which is informed by an awareness that the text Siebeck), 1985. pp. 271–277. can only be accessed by way of tradition and inter- 2 ■ Ibid., p. 273. pretation and that any talk of “the simple apprehen- 3 ■ Ibid., p. 276. 4 ■ This strategy is followed by Ineichen’s reference work for sion of an unproblematically given text” is vacuous. philosophers (Hans Ineichen, Philosophische Hermeneutik Mindful of “the risk of interpretation, we have to [Handbuch Philosophie], Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl smile when someone says ‘but this stands written in Alberg, 1991. p. 186) as well as one of the latest and best ref- erence works in theology (Henning Schröder: “Hermeneutik text’ (Aber das steht doch da). To be sure, that is a IV,” Theologische Realenzyklopädie. Band XV. Berlin/New very significant fact. What we want to understand, York: W. de Gruyter, 1986. p. 150) however—and that is indeed what we must under- 5 ■ Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Transl. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London: Sheed & Ward, stand—is what stands written in the text. Yet can we 1993. p. 307. know what stands written in the text before under- 6 ■ In the 18th century original, the text reads “caussis” [my standing it? This is the famous hermeneutic circle.”3 note, L. K.]. 7 ■ “Klassische und philosophische Hermeneutik,” Gesam- Thus Gadamer ridicules the kind of philology which melte Werke, Vol. 2 (Hermeneutik II: Wahrheit und Methode, ignores the notorious circulus. Indeed, he may well be Ergänzungen). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986. right in his discontent with uncritically naive philolo- p. 97. This is an extended version from 1968 of the ency- gy. Still, we must ask whether the condescending clopaedia article, reprinted in Gadamer’s collected works. BUDAPEST REVIEW OF BOOKS 1998 51 adduced to substantiate this claim is a work entitled was misconstrued as a consequence of the method- Institutiones hermeneuticae sacrae variis observationibus ological ideal of the Enlightenment.” copiosissimisque exemplis biblicis illustratae, written by an Now it doesn’t take a highly advanced knowledge author named Rambach.4 Another feature of such sur- of Latin to realize that the footnote does not in the veys is the curious fact that Rambach, the ostensible least support what is said in the main text. What is prototype of Pietism, is never quoted otherwise than said in the citation is neither more nor less than the by way of Gadamer. The only exception to this rule is following: We attribute the “subtlety” (or in common the entry on hermeneutics in the Historisches Wörter- parlance, the “solidity”) of interpretation to him who buch der Philosophie, an outstanding reference work in is capable of reasonably and accurately interpreting the history of philosophy, in which the author refers and explicate something—where, by the way, “expli- directly to Rambach cation” is to be under- rather than to the quota- stood more along the tion in Gadamer’s Truth lines of exposition. Sub- and Method. Too bad tilitas, in its turn, is prob- that this summary, which ably best translated as has played such a pivotal “refined skill”. If we role in the dissemination recall the context, we of the history of remember that this cita- hermeneutic application, tion was supposed to was written by Gadamer illustrate (at the very himself. To sum up, least) the thesis that the there is no royal road to Pietists distinguished Rambach by which we between three sorts of could bypass Gadamer. “subtlety”. However, the We might as well take footnote seems to pro- a look at the much-cited vide no more than two passages in Truth and kinds of subtlety. Even Method. The main text more important, the suggests that hermeneu- concept of application tics has an “earlier” tra- does not appear in any dition, which “was com- form whatsoever in the pletely invisible to histor- citation. What is absent ical self-consciousness” from the passage is the after Romanticism and very element that would in which the concept of justify Gadamer’s com- application, so crucial ments on the text that he for Gadamer, still “had chooses to quote. its systematic place. Although the thesis Hermeneutics was sub- about Pietist hermeneu- divided as follows: there tics is of extraordinary was a distinction bet- importance in Gada- ween subtilitas intelligendi mer’s argument, the only (understanding) and sub- passage in which he tilitas explicandi (inter- means to justify it is the pretation); and pietism added a third element, subtili- one just discussed. For instance, in the reference work tas applicandi (application), as in J. J. Rambach. The that I already mentioned, Gadamer emphatically reit- process of understanding was regarded as having erates his claims as well as his reference to Rambach’s these three elements. It is notable that all three are Institutiones, and he adds a remark whose precarious- called subtilitas—i.e., they are considered less as ness will, I hope, become apparent very quickly: “The methods that we have at our disposal than as talents expression subtilitas (refinement), which presumably requiring particular finesse of mind”.5 And it is at this derives from the humanist attitude of competition, juncture that we come across the ominous footnote elegantly suggests that the ‘methodology’ (Methodik) Nr. 235/206, which includes a quotation without of interpretation (Auslegung)—just like any applica- translation: “Rambach’s Institutiones hermeneuticae tion of rules in general—requires the faculty of judg- sacrae (1723) are known to me in the compilation by ment (Urteilskraft), which in turn cannot be secured Morus. There we read: ‘Solemus autem intelligendi through rules”. The text continues: “Moreover, as an explicandique subtilitatem (soliditatem volgo vocant) auxiliary discipline of theology, hermeneutics contin- tribuere ei, qui cum causis6 et accurate [.....] intelligibit ues to seek reconciliation with dogmatic interests (for atque explicat’. (Morus 8) Here the humanist subtilitas example, in Ernesti and Semler)”.7 In other words, 52 BUDAPEST REVIEW OF BOOKS 1998 Gadamer suggests that Pietist hermeneutics, led by A. in Truth and Method, he presents his claims as H. Francke and Rambach, engaged in a fight with his- responses to questions articulated in the course of torical Bible criticism (and its most influential represen- the history of hermeneutics. Thirdly, Gadamer tatives, Ernesti and Semler) and “its negative, enlight- attributes a restorative function to his own theory.