City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2017 Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and the Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements Jesse Liss The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2343 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] TRUMP’S “AMERICA FIRST” TRADE POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS By JESSE LISS A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2017 © 2017 JESSE LISS All Rights Reserved ii Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and the Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements By Jesse Liss This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. __________________ _______________________________ Date Paul Attewell Chair of Examining Committee __________________ _______________________________ Date Philip Kasinitz Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Stephanie Luce Ming Xia Nadia Doytch THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and the Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements By Jesse Liss Advisor: Dr. Paul Attewell Previous sociological studies on U.S. trade policy institutions concluded that “free trade” political actors had durable power to determine U.S. trade policy. This conclusion was proven wrong when the Trump administration promised “a new direction” and to implement an “America First” trade policy. My dissertation serves to explain the U.S.’ political transition away from “free trade” and towards “nationalist” trade policy. I do this by examining the politics of U.S. international investment agreements, which are central to U.S. trade policy. As case studies, I use the investment agreements from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which are the first and most recent U.S. free trade agreements with developing countries, although the U.S. is no longer a member of the TPP. I use a qualitative method called “process tracing” to document their negotiations, in which competing actors became either policy-makers or policy-takers. I show how and why “free trade” political actors successfully negotiated and implemented the NAFTA, and how and why “free traders” unsuccessfully implemented the TPP in the U.S. I conclude that U.S. trade and investment iv agreements had polarizing effects in the U.S., which empowered “nationalists” and social movements to force major revisions to U.S. trade policy. v Acknowledgments I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation committee, Dr. Paul Attewell, Dr. Stephanie Luce, Dr. Ming Xia, and Dr. Nadia Doytch. All of you had tremendous patience, empathy, and support for me while my project took many twists and turns. Your expertise and diverse viewpoints are what guided me through the research and analyses. Your revisions and commentary pushed me to complete this manuscript. I need to underscore my appreciation for my dissertation committee’s patience with me throughout this process, particular my chair, Dr. Paul Attewell, I would have been lost without your guidance. vi Table of Contents I. The Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements…1 II. Historical Origins of U.S. International Investment Agreements…23 III. Negotiations of the NAFTA Investment Agreements…62 IV. U.S. Impacts of the NAFTA Investment Agreements…106 V. Negotiations of the TPP Investment Agreements…154 VI. The Direction of U.S. International Investment Agreements…235 VII. Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and Polanyi’s “Double Movement”…265 VIII. Appendices…280 IX. Annexes…289 X. References…316 vii List of Tables 1. Core provisions of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)…48 2. Differences between international trade agreements…53 3. Synthesis of U.S. objectives in the NAFTA…72 4. Core Provisions of the NAFTA Financial Services Chapter…83 5. The NAFTA opening rounds (June to September, 1991)…83 6. From fact-finding to drafting (October 1991 to January 1992)…88 7. “The Dallas Jamboree” and aftermath (February to April 1992)…93 8. Reaching an agreement (May to August 1992)…96 9. Synthesis of U.S. Objectives in the TPP…168 10. TPP 2010 negotiations formally begin while Congress attempts to pressure the USTR…175 11. TPP 2011 negotiations, USTR officially supports key business proposals…185 12. TPP 2012 negotiations, membership expands while investment chapter leaked…192 13. TPP 2013 negotiations, USTR applies pressure to conclude negotiations…201 14. TPP 2014 negotiations, the Obama administration prepares for TPA…209 15. TPP 2015 negotiations, Obama administration secures TPA and TPP concluded…215 16. Mexico, gross contingent liabilities (as percentage of total banking capital)…283 17. NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases up to January 1, 2015…284 18. NAFTA Chapter 11 Claims and Awards by Provision and Country up to January 1, 2015…284 19. NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases Filed by Investors by Nationality…285 20. Types of Regulation Challenged under NAFTA Chapter 11 up to January 1, 2015…285 viii List of Figures 1) Polanyi’s “Double Movement” as Ideal Types of U.S. Trade Policy Positions…16 2) U.S. FDI Stocks in Mexico by Sector…121 3) North America vs. East Asia, Shares of Total World Merchandise Exports…123 4) Total U.S. Manufacturing Employment by Sector…138 5) Feedbacks Between Regulatory and Income Effects of U.S. International Investment Agreements…146 6) Two Policy Positions in U.S. International Investment Law…152 & 276 7) Mexican Housing and Consumption Loans as Share of Total Loans…282 8) Banks’ Net Non-Interest Income Share of Total Income…282 9) Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during NAFTA negotiations…291 10) No correlation between U.S. trade deficit and official unemployment rate (from Hufbauer et. al. 2014)…298 11) U.S. labor force participation rate vs. trade balance…302 12) Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during TPP negotiations…303 ix Chapter One 1. Introduction 2. A sociological perspective 3. Research questions 4. The politics of U.S. international investment agreements 5. Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” and U.S. trade policy actors 6. Data and method 7. Outline of manuscript I. Introduction In a 2011 Senate Hearing just before the U.S. hosted the annual heads of state meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, ranking Senators and business leaders commiserated over declining U.S. market shares in the Asia-Pacific due to the lack of free trade agreements (FTAs) with the region in relation to U.S. competitors. Official Peter Scher represented the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the government agency that coordinates trade policy. Scher responded that domestic political conflicts constrained the USTR’s ability to make trade deals. Scher was opining the fact that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a FTA the USTR was negotiating with countries in the Asia-Pacific, was so unpopular in Congress that the Obama administration lacked Congressional mandate to negotiate the TPP, which was the first time in over thirty years that a Presidential administration negotiated a FTA without Congress’ authority. Scher revealed that domestic politics are “very relevant” to the USTR and the business 1 community, who are highly cognizant about popular concerns that “globalization [helps] some, but not the masses” (cited in Senate 2011). Five years later, reality television star Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election by promising to empower the white working class in swing states. Trump’s trade promises became a symbol for his nationalism. At Trump’s 2016 campaign rally in Ohio, while wearing a red hat with his campaign slogan “Make America Great Again,” he declared, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership is another disaster done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our country, just a continuing rape of our country. That’s what it is, too. It’s a harsh word: It’s a rape of our country.” Trump’s “nationalist” trade promises were a stark contrast to the “free trade” policy norms in Washington. Since at least 1986, when the U.S. began to negotiate the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), U.S. trade policy reflected “free trade” doctrine. “Free trade” policies refer to a set of institutions and legal norms that seek to establish a market-based governance of the global economy. Since the WTO came into force in 1995 and up until the Trump administration took office in 2016, “free trade” political actors had the institutional power to determine U.S. trade policy (Chorev 2007; Dreiling & Darves 2016). During this time, competing political actors, including “nationalists” and social movements, were marginalized from U.S. trade institutions and they had only trivial victories over the “free traders.” In that context, “free trade” proponents championed the TTP as the largest comprehensive FTA in history. However, in 2017, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal. He promised to implement an “America First” trade policy, guided by “nationalism” first and “free trade” second. If the “free traders” had such strong institutional control over U.S. trade policy, how did they lose the TPP? Why did the “nationalists” gain the political power to write U.S. trade policy? 2 II.A. A sociological perspective Studies on economic globalization are done by economists or political scientists and sociologists, and each have different methodologies and make distinct contributions to the field.