How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War A dissertation presented by Viridiana Rios Contreras to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts December, 2012 c 2012|Viridiana Rios All rights reserved. Professor Jorge I. Dom´ınguez Viridiana Rios Contreras How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War Abstract This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organi- zations behave, organize, compromise or fight one another. It is my argument that the propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal polit- ical institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those in which different levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would other- wise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal organizations are able to operate profitably without major episodes of violence, and illu- minates the causes of Mexico's large increases in drug{related violence. A formal model (Chapter 2), an analytical narrative (Chapter 3), and an empirical test (Chapter 4 and 5) show that Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their propensity to engage in injurious behavior only recently, responding to incentives set by political decentraliza- tion that inhibited Mexico's federal government from controlling the actions of its local governments, and thus from limiting trafficker's propensity to battle for turf. iii iv Chapter Outline Chapter 1: The puzzle of Mexico's drug war Chapter 2: A theory of political decentralization and criminal violence Chapter 3: Mexico's Drug War, 1950-2010 Chapter 4: Testing the role of decentralization in criminal behaviour Chapter 5: Unexpected consequences of criminal violence Conclusion References Contents Abstract iii Chapter Outline iii Detailed Chapter Outline iv List of Tables viii List of Figures ix Acknowledgmentsx 1 The Puzzle of Mexico's Drug War1 1.1 Political Decentralization and Criminal violence...............4 1.2 Mexico's Puzzle.................................9 1.3 The Goal of this Work............................. 15 1.4 Testing My Theory............................... 18 1.5 Outline of this Work.............................. 25 1.6 A Takeaway Message.............................. 28 v vi CONTENTS 2 Decentralization and Criminal Violence 31 2.1 The Effects of the Decentralization of Corruption............... 39 2.2 The Effects of Decentralization on Violence Propensity........... 51 2.3 The Effects of Decentralization on Arming.................. 59 2.4 My Model In Brief............................... 62 3 Mexico's Drug War (1950-2010) 65 3.1 Political Decentralization Explains Mexico's Drug War........... 68 3.2 The Times of Criminal Order (1950-1997).................. 74 3.2.1 Corruption Under Centralization................... 75 3.2.2 Criminal Violence-Propensity and Arming under Centralization.. 79 3.2.3 Crackdowns Without Violence..................... 81 3.3 The Times of Criminal Violence (1998-2010)................. 91 3.3.1 Corruption Under decentralization.................. 92 3.3.2 Criminal Violence-Propensity and Arming Under Decentralization. 98 3.3.3 Crackdowns With Violence....................... 107 4 Decentralization and Criminal Behavior 122 4.1 Designing a Test................................ 123 4.2 Methodology.................................. 126 4.3 Results...................................... 133 4.4 Lessons learned................................. 141 5 Unexpected consequences of criminal violence 142 CONTENTS vii 5.1 Civilians in a drug war............................. 144 5.2 Changes in Immigration Flows......................... 146 5.3 Empirical Specification............................. 149 5.4 Results...................................... 155 5.5 Mexican Migration Caused by Criminal violence............... 159 5.6 Final thoughts.................................. 168 Conclusion 171 Bibliography 186 List of Tables 3.1 A Theory of Decentralization and Criminal Violence............. 71 3.2 Number of Trucks Crossing U.S.{Mexico border (2000)........... 104 4.1 Number of Centralized Municipalities by Party and Year (1990-2010)... 128 4.2 Municipalities with Cases of Cocaine Overdoses or Hospitalizations (1990 - 2010)...................................... 130 4.3 Descriptive Statistics.............................. 133 4.4 Logit Models, Results.............................. 135 4.5 Survival..................................... 137 4.6 Matched Logit Models, Results........................ 140 5.1 Descriptive Statistics.............................. 154 5.2 Empirical Results: Drug{related Crime and Immigration Outflows..... 156 5.3 Number of Drug-violence Refugees (Selected Municipalities)........ 161 viii List of Figures 3.1 Municipalities with Coordinated Governments by Party........... 94 3.2 Number of Municipalities where Different Drug-trafficking Organizations Operate (1991 | 2010)............................. 100 3.3 Familia vs. Zetas, Confrontation in Michoac´an................ 114 3.4 Familia vs. Zetas, Confrontation in Guanajuato............... 116 3.5 Bentral Leyva vs. Sinaloa, Confrontation in Guerrero............ 119 3.6 Drug{related Violence and Crackdowns in Guerrero............. 120 4.1 The Geography of Centralized Governments in Mexico........... 129 4.2 The Geography of Cocaine Overdoses or Hospitalizations in Mexico.... 131 5.1 CONAPO's Mistaken Predictions....................... 150 5.2 The Geography of Violence{driven Migration................. 163 ix A mi mam´apor ense~narmea estudiar. A mi pap´apor ense~narmea emprender. A Laura por estar a mi lado. Somos t´uy yo hasta el fin del mundo. x Acknowledgments This is a project of many brains, many hopes and many efforts that I have had the pleasure and privilege to complete. Jorge I. Dominguez guided me professionally and in every aspect of my academic life at Harvard. It was he who encouraged and supported me, from the first day I sat in his office, as a young international student, to the day I left as a Ph.D. His savvy advice saved my life at the U.S.-Mexico border, kept me warm during Cambridge winters, and gave me confidence in D.C. hallways. Getting Prof. Dominguez's counsel is what coming to Harvard is about. Gary King's assertiveness, determination and go-get-it attitude is what brought this dissertation from my computer to life. He is the fresh and invigorating voice that always let me knew I could do it. Today. Now. Actually, I could have done it yesterday. His zest, passion and commitment to better understand this world are inspiring and provoking. Getting infected by Gary's energy is what coming to Harvard is about. Steve Levitsky taught me to be a political scientist. It was next to him where my curiosity turned into research and where I learned to bridge theory with empirics. It was he who met me on Skype when I was in San Diego, who took my calls when I xi was in Mexico City, and who sat next to me during winters and summers to discuss my argument, paragraph by paragraph, idea by idea. His analytical perspective, intellectual curiosity and responsible mentoring made this work possible. Getting Steve's feedback is what coming to Harvard is about. Robert Bates challenged me, stimulated me, and tested my ability to think logically and to bring my assumptions to the surface. The many times we sat in the yard to draw arguments and comprehend their consequences will remain with as the most intellectually rewarding meetings of my Ph.D. Daring to challenge Robert Bates' logic is what coming to Harvard is about. Special thanks to Michele Coscia, Gabriel Aguilera, Torben Iversen, Christopher Jencks, Todd Eisendtadt, Alejandro Poire, David Miller, James Alt, Daniel Ziblatt, Al- berto Diaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magaloni, Jesse Driscoll, Lawrence Katz, Oeindrila Dube, Daniel Mejia, David Fitzgerald, Jeffry Frieden, Adam Glynn, Peter A. Hall, Arthur Spir- ling and Dustin Tingley. Thank you also to my peer readers: Alisha Holland, Sam Barrow, Catherine Kelly, Wonbin Kang and Mauricio Duque. Thanks to those who assisted me and edited me: Mariana Tapia, Miguel Toro, Laura Kelly, Maria Montchal and Margaret Stevenson. Thank you Andrea Fernandez: you helped me most of all. Thank you for the day we created a team with me and thank you for cheering me up when I all data was lost. It was wise to go to bed when I was tired. You were right. Thank you for your commitment and hard work and, most importantly, for your company. Thanks to all those who have walked next to me in the field, teaching me to open my eyes. Your names and voices are secretly seeded in this dissertation. It is upon the shoulders of brave journalists that I have stood to construct this story. Alfredo Corchado xii is the prime motor behind this project and behind what my life over the last years. Thank you also to those who provided me with a space to sit, think and read: the National Security Council at the Office of Mexico's President, the Trans-border Institute