REPORT NO. 183 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH WEST EUROPE, 1944. PART IV: FIRST CANADIAN ARMY IN THE PURSUIT (23 AUG - 30 SEP) CONTENTS PAGE THE GENERAL STRATEGIC PLAN ........................ 1 THE 2 CDN CORPS PLAN OF PURSUIT TO THE SEINE ............... 4 THE GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY WEST OF THE SEINE ................. 5 THE ENEMY'S PLIGHT ............................ 6 THE ADVANCE TO THE SEINE BY 2 CDN CORPS .................. 8 THE ADVANCE OF 1 BRIT CORPS, 17 AUG 44 ..................16 FIRST CDN ARMY PLANS FOR THE SEINE CROSSINGS ...............25 PREPARATIONS BY 2 CDN CORPS ........................27 4 CDN ARMD DIV BRIDGEHEAD, 27 - 28 AUG ..................31 3 CDN INF DIV BRIDGEHEAD, 27 - 30 AUG ...................33 CLEARING THE FORET DE LA LONDE, 4 CDN INF BDE OPERATIONS 27 - 30 AUG ...36 OPERATIONS OF 6 CDN INF BDE, 26 - 30 AUG .................45 THE GERMAN CROSSINGS OF THE SEINE .....................49 THE ADVANCE FROM THE SEINE BRIDGEHEADS ..................50 2 CDN INF DIV RETURNS TO DIEPPE, 1 SEP ..................60 THE ARRIVAL AT THE SOMME .........................62 THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE SEINE TO THE SOMME ..............66 1 REPORT NO. 183 THE THRUST FROM THE SOMME .........................68 2 CDN CORPS ARMOUR REACHES THE GHENT CANAL ................72 2 CDN INF DIV INVESTS DUNKIRK .......................77 ALLIED PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS ....................85 2 CDN CORPS TASKS, 12 SEP .........................89 2 REPORT NO. 183 CONTENTS PAGE OPERATIONS OF 1 POL ARMD DIV EAST OF THE TERNEUZEN CANAL, 11 - 22 SEP ...90 FIRST CDN ARMY'S RESPONSIBILITY - TO OPEN ANTWERP TO SHIPPING .......92 4 CDN ARMD DIV'S ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE LEOPOLD CANAL, 13 - 14 SEP .....96 THE CLEARING OPERATIONS WEST OF THE TERNEUZEN CANAL 14 - 21 SEP ......99 2 CDN INF DIV IN THE ANTWERP AREA, 16 - 20 SEP ............. 100 1 BRIT CORPS EAST OF ANTWERP, 20 - 24 SEP ................ 102 OPERATIONS OF 2 CDN INF DIV AT THE ANTWERP - TURNHOUT CANAL, 23 - 30 SEP 104 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS IN THE ANTWERP AREA AT THE END OF SEP ........ 108 THE WATCH ON THE LEOPOLD CANAL ..................... 111 THE GENERAL SITUATION, 30 SEP ...................... 112 APPENDICES "A" ORDER OF BATTLE, FIRST CDN ARMY, 17 AUG 44 "B" ORDER OF BATTLE, FIRST CDN ARMY, 3 SEP 44 "C" ORDER OF BATTLE, FIRST CDN ARMY, 30 SEP 44 "D" PRISONER OF WAR RETURNS, 16 - 31 AUG 44 "E" CASUALTIES, FIRST CDN ARMY, 19 AUG - 30 SEP 44 "F" CASUALTIES, 2 CDN INF DIV BY BRIGADES, INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 19 AUG - 2 SEP 44 "G" GASUALTIES, FORET DE LA LONDE. MAPS "A" PURSUIT TO THE SEINE BY FIRST CDN ARMY, 17 - 30 AUG 44 "B" OPERATIONS IN THE FORET DE LA LONDE AND THE SEINE CROSSINGS 26 - 30 AUG 44 "C" PURSUIT FROM THE SEINE BY FIRST CDN ARMY, SEPTEMBER 1944 "D" DUNKERQUE AREA, OPERATIONS BY 2 CDN INF DIV, 6 - 17 SEP 44 3 REPORT NO. 183 "E" DUNKERQUE - NIEUPORT AREA, OPERATIONS BY 6 CDN INF BDE, 8 - 19 SEP 44 "F" NIEUPORT - OSTENDE AEA, OPERATIONS BY 4 CDN INF BDE, 9 SEP 44 "G" ARRIVAL AT THE LEOPOLD CANAL, 4 CDN ARMD DIV, 8 - 22 SEP 44 "H" OPERATIONS EAST OF ANTWERP BY 2 CDN INF DIV AND 1 BRIT CORPS, 16 - 30 SEP 44 4 REPORT NO. 183 REPORT NO. 183 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944 Part IV: First Canadian Army in the Pursuit (23 Aug - 30 Sep) 1. This is a further report in the series covering the detailed narrative of Canadian operations in Normandy in 1944. It follows the sequence of Reports Nos. 147, 162 and 169. It relates the history of First Canadian Army in its rapid pursuit of the enemy from the Falaise débâcle to the River Seine; its crossing of that river during the last week of August; and its continuation of the chase up the Channel Coast to the Dutch - Belgian frontier and the Leopold Canal. The period dealt with extends from 23 Aug to 30 Sep 44. The story of the clearing of the Channel ports and the containing of Dunkirk - operations that were carried out within these dates - forms the subject of a separate Report - Part V in the present series. A similar narration of the operations to clear the Scheldt Estuary and free the port of Antwerp will follow. THE GENERAL STRATEGIC PLAN 5 REPORT NO. 183 2. On the morning of 22 Aug, fighting had ceased in the area of the now closed Falaise gap (See Report No. 169). Canadian formations were busy regrouping for the next stage of the campaign - the pursuit to the Seine of the fleeing remnants of the German Army. The phase of operations just concluded by the forces of 12 and 21 Army Groups had cost the enemy the battle of Normandy. With his Seventh Army destroyed as a fighting force and his Fifth Panzer Army badly mauled and in full retreat, there was every indication that he might also have lost the battle of France. Much depended upon his ability within the immediate future to reorganize his shattered resources sufficiently to make a successful stand against the impending Allied advance. 3. For with the imminent collapse of the enemy trapped in the Falaise - Mortain pocket a wider encirclement was envisaged by General Montgomery: ... Our first enveloping movement completed, I was concentrating on ensuring that the wider encirclement along the Seine should be achieved with the maximum possible speed, so as to cut off the survivors from the Falaise - Mortain pocket. (Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 133) The C.-in-C. continued: 6 REPORT NO. 183 Speed, then, was now the vital necessity in order to take advantage of the favourable circumstances presented to us: first, we had got to block the withdrawal of the enemy survivors across the Seine, and second, we were to drive quickly across the Pas de Calais to capture ports to facilitate our maintenance requirements, and the flying bomb sites in order to diminish the effect that the 'V' weapons were having on the United Kingdom. (Ibid, p. 134) 4. On the right of 21 Army Group, First and Third U.S. Armies (later to become 12 Army Group), under command of General Omar Bradley, were already in pursuit. During the operations in the Falaise - Trun - Argentan area the southern thrust by General George S. Patton's Third U.S. Army had proceeded virtually unchecked. By 20 Aug armoured formations had driven as far east as Orleans, Chartres and Dreux, and patrols had reached the Seine at Mantes- Gassicourt and Vernon. The Army's long northern flank reached from Dreux to Argentan; and midway along it a thrust was being developed towards Laigle. (AEF 45/First Cdn Army/C/F, Docket II: First Canadian Army Lectures, Brigadier Mann, The Campaign in North West Europe from the "Break Out" South of Caen, 7/8 August 1944 to 31 December 1944). On General Patton's left, part of the First U.S. Army under Lt-Gen C.H. Hodges, was thrusting eastward from Argentan while other formations held firm the southern side of the Falaise "bottle". With First Cdn Army keeping the Trun - Chambois bottleneck tightly corked, Second Brit Army was closing in from the west and north to complete 7 REPORT NO. 183 the final elimination of the Falaise - Mortain pocket. (G.O.C.-in-C./1-0, Directive, C.-in-C., 21 Army Gp, 20 Aug 44) 5. The Allied planning now foresaw the possibility of entrapping the fleeing enemy within another, and larger bag, before he should be able to make good his escape into North-eastern France. General Bradley's group of armies 1 - First and Third U.S. Armies - was to drive northwards from the general line Mantes - Dreux - Verneuil, with its right flank following the south banks of the Seine, its left directed on Bourgtheroulde. The Army Group capture that city when it was militarily sound to do so. 21 Army Group, comprising Second Brit and First Cdn Armies, was to advance rapidly to the Seine. (Ibid). Even before D Day, in early May, the Canadian Army planners had been given the particular task of studying the operation for crossing the Seine. They produced some material which proved of immense value when the time came. (Maj-Gen Sir Francis Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 370) 6. The boundary set between 12 U.S. Army Group and Second Brit Army was Argentan - Nonant - Laigle - Dreux - Mantes - Beauvais - Amiens. That between Second Brit and First Cdn Armies ran through Falaise - Vimoutiers - Orbec - Bernay - Le Neubourg - Louviers - Neufchatel - Le Tréport (AEF/First Cdn Army/C/1, Docket III(d): First Cdn Army Op Instr No. 18, 22 Aug 44). General Montgomery directed Second Army, when the enemy remaining in Normandy 1 General Bradley's command did not officially become known as "12 Army Group" until 1 Sep 44 (Report by The Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operation in Europe of the allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, p. 76). Field Marshal Montgomery, however, used the designation in his directives from 21 Jul on. (G.O.C.-in-C., 1/0, 21 Army Gp Directive, M.512, 21 Jul 44) 8 REPORT NO. 183 had been destroyed, to advance with all speed to the Seine, and cross the river, pushing on beyond the Somme into the Pas de Calais. First Cdn Army, while completing its task in the Trun - Chambois area, was simultaneously to advance its left wing (1 Brit Corps) towards Lisieux and Rouen. When its work at Trun was finished the Army would advance to the Seine, and, crossing between Louviers and the sea, operate to clear the whole Le Havre peninsula to the west of the Army boundary.