KREMLIN WATCH REPORT COMPARING LESSONS LEARNED FROM COUNTERING RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN GEORGIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC Kremlin Watch Program 2019 EUROPEAN VALUES CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY European Values Center for Security Policy is a non-governmental, non-partisan institute defending freedom and sovereignty. We protect liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the transatlantic alliance of the Czech Republic. We help defend Europe especially from the malign influences of Russia, China, and Islamic extremists. We envision a free, safe, and prosperous Czechia within a vibrant Central Europe that is an integral part of the transatlantic community and is based on a firm alliance with the USA. Our work is based on individual donors. Use the form at: http://www.europeanvalues.net/o-nas/support- us/, or send your donation directly to our transparent account: CZ69 2010 0000 0022 0125 8162. www.europeanvalues.net [email protected] www.facebook.com/Evropskehodnoty KREMLIN WATCH PROGRAM Kremlin Watch is a strategic program of the European Values Center for Security Policy which aims to expose and confront instruments of Russian influence and disinformation operations focused against Western democracies. Author Mariam Tsitsikashvili, Non-resident Fellow at the Kremlin Watch Program, Research Fellow at Georgia’s Reforms Associates (GRASS) The list of the respondents interviewed for the study: Jan Marian – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Common Foreign and Security Policy Department; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Czech Security Policy Department; Jakub Janda – European Values Center for Security Policy Radko Hokovsky - European Values Center for Security Policy Jonas Syrovatka – Prague Security Studies Institute Jakub Kalensky – Atlantic Council, Eurasia Center Adriana Cerna – People in Need Alexandr Mitrofanov – political columnist Rostislav Valvoda – Prague Civil Society Center Image Copyright: Page 14: Radler59 [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)] This publication was written during Mariam Tsitsikashvili’s one-year Prague fellowship with the Transition Promotion Program, “Bringing best practices and lessons learnt in exposing foreign malign influence and disinformation from the Czech Republic to Georgia”. 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Georgia Czech Republic Political • Overall political consensus is pro-Western. • Overall national consensus is pro- Dimension Only one political party with clearly pro- Western. However, the Kremlin Kremlin leanings is visible in Georgian legitimizing political groups and parliament. The political parties explicitly individuals are represented in the Czech do not legitimize Russia’s revisionist foreign parliament. policy, something that can be found in the • Far left and far right political groups Czech politics. igniting Euroscepticism and anti- • Most of the Kremlin sympathizing Westernism have more effectively politicians shelter behind a pro-Georgian moved to the mainstream than in façade. Georgia. Media • Only directly Kremlin funded media outlet • Only directly Kremlin funded media Dimension operating in Georgia is Sputnik, outlet operating in the Czech Republic functioning as an online platform. is Sputnik. • The most active disinformers are Georgian • Czech fringe media outlets appear to be fringe media outlets. more active in disseminating • Explicitly anti-Western mainstream TV disinformation than openly Russian outlet (“TV Obiektivi”) is visible in Georgia media (e.g. Sputnik) • Facebook is the major channel for • No major mainstream TV outlet that is disseminating anti-Western disinformation explicitly anti-Western is represented in in Georgia. the Czech media sphere. • The grand narrative of the disinformation • Facebook also appears to be the major outlets includes attacking European values social network used as a channel of and indirectly supporting Kremlin’s image dissemination for the disinformation of “defender of traditional values” community. • Different from Georgia, chain emails are used as means of disinformation • Anti-Western narratives put an emphasis dissemination in the Czech Republic, on “orthodox unity” with Russia in that mainly targets older generation. contrast to “immoral” West. • The disinformation in the Czech Republic is mostly focused on attacking Brussel’s and Washington’s “dictate” that “limit Czech sovereignty”. • Part of the disinformation also puts an emphasis on “Slavic unity” with Russia Societal • Extremist groups and public movements • Extremist groups in the Czech Republic Dimension are the major contributors to the Kremlin are not as influential as in Georgia; disinformation; • Para-military groups feeding Kremlin • Orthodox Church, that enjoys the highest disinformation are visible in the Czech public support and trust, is a usual society but their influence on the public disseminator of the anti-Western agenda is much limited. messages, mainly on the issues related to identity (LGBTQ) 3 INTRODUCTION Awakening moments, such as Russia's meddling in the Georgia still needs to deploy relevant and effective European and the US elections, attempts to influence countermeasures against the threat. Brexit in the UK or the Dutch Referendum on Ukraine's This paper aims to analyze the Czech experience of Association Agreement, aggressive disinformation countering disinformation on both governmental and attacks targeting Ukraine, etc. have offered enough non-governmental levels. The reason for choosing the evidence to ruminate about the seriousness of the threat Czech Republic is twofold: firstly, the historical emanating from the disinformation and fake news commonalities as well as current similarities in terms of sourced with nefarious use of technology. Even though the praxis of the disinformation in the Czech case make such disinformation is the most illustrative tip of the it worth examining for Georgia; and secondly, with iceberg of the malign influence projected by certain comparison to other European countries, the Czech authoritarian countries, it has not been properly Republic led with a major policy shift on the topic on acknowledged and addressed by the relevant Russian disinformation and thus provides some useful stakeholders. lessons. As malign disinformation capitalizes on the structural The paper analyzes the hostile disinformation in the vulnerabilities of the targeted societies, the countries Czech Republic and Georgia. The footprint of Russia’s with inherently more internal fractures offer more malign influence in both countries is examined in 3 cracks for exploitation. In that regard, countries like dimensions: political, media, and societal. The paper Georgia have long offered a fertile ground to the analyzes the countermeasures that are deployed in the Kremlin’s malign activities. Georgia has been a testing Czech Republic and provides recommendations for the ground for Russia and its disinformation machine has relevant stakeholders in Georgia. The methods propelled long before the issue formally became a part employed during the analysis are qualitative character. of Russia’s strategic documents or before the term The desk research and in-depth interviews with relevant advanced in the global lexis, facing a massive Czech stakeholders were used for data collection and propaganda campaign in 2005-2009 and particularly subsequent analysis. during the 2008 war in Georgia. Despite being exposed to the Kremlin’s malign disinformation for decades, 4 As malign disinformation capitalizes on the structural vulnerabilities of the targeted societies, the countries with inherently more internal fractures offer more cracks for l it ti 5 DISINFORMATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC The Czech Republic, along with other Central and Political dimension Eastern European countries, represents one of the In the Czech political system, the overall national priority targets of the Russian disinformation. Even consensus is pro-Western. However, this consensus is though the Kremlin’s malign activities have long gone challenged not only by the fringe groups but also some beyond the boundaries of its former allies, still these mainstream parties and politicians through an embrace countries remain in Moscow’s primary spotlight. In of anti-Western ideologies. There are currently nine Czech Republic or elsewhere, the “disinformers are akin political parties in the Chamber of Deputies of the to an evil doctor, making a precise diagnosis of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, one of which is the maladies afflicting their ‘patients’ – but then trying to explicitly Eurosceptic and far-right populist Freedom make their weaknesses and illnesses worse.”1The and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) with 22 seats in the ultimate goal of Russia’s disinformation, along with parliament. Another champion of these views is the other “active measures”, aspires to peel away the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, (KSČM) Republic from the European and Euro-Atlantic bond which gained a real influence for the first time since and bring it back to its influence. In the short run, the 1989 after conducting a deal to that help the prime Kremlin perfectly understands enchanting the Czech minister win a confidence vote in 2018.3 The discontent public overnight is an illusory goal. However, confusing with the EU and NATO and anti-liberal populism are and instilling doubts about democratic rule of visible in the Czech Republic and extensively exploited governance and the Western institutions in the Czech by Russian sympathizers. Some analysts state that anti- society does not