Desertion, Control and Collective Action in Civil Wars Theodore McLauchlin Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal June 2012 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy © Theodore McLauchlin, 2012 Abstract This dissertation develops and tests a new theoretical synthesis for understanding how armed groups keep their combatants fighting rather than deserting or defecting. It examines two basic methods of limiting desertion: keeping coercive control over combatants, and fostering norms of mutual cooperation among them. It argues that the effectiveness of each approach is conditioned by the degree to which combatants value the common aim of the success of the armed group. Norms of cooperation require a commitment to this common aim to be effective. Control can be effective even when combatants are uncommitted, but loses effectiveness with severe disagreements among combatants. This approach provides an advance on past work on the requirements for armed groups in civil wars. Some assume, unrealistically, that common aims drive individual behaviour directly. Others focus exclusively either on individual rewards and punishments or on norms of cooperation. This dissertation, in contrast, sees each as important and as contingent upon the prior consideration of whether combatants share a common aim. A qualitative analysis of armed groups in the Spanish Civil War examines micro-level evidence about common aims, the provision of control, and the emergence of norms of cooperation. The dissertation then tests its major hypotheses statistically using two original datasets of soldiers from that war, based on the author’s archival research. It conducts further statistical tests against a new dataset of defection from government armies in 28 civil wars during the 1990s. It concludes with a discussion of new directions. i Résumé Cette thèse élabore et met à l’essai une nouvelle synthèse théorique permettant de comprendre comment les groupes armés arrivent à faire en sorte que leurs membres continuent de se battre au front plutôt que de déserter ou de faire défection. Elle examine deux méthodes traditionnelles permettant de limiter la désertion, soit l’exercice continu d’un contrôle coercitif sur les combattants et l’encouragement de normes de coopération mutuelle entre eux. Elle soutient que l’efficacité individuelle de ces approches est déterminée selon l’importance accordée par les combattants à l’objectif commun de la réussite du groupe armé. Les normes de coopération nécessitent un engagement envers cet objectif commun afin de pouvoir être efficaces. Si le contrôle peut être utile même lorsque les combattants ne sont pas engagés, son efficacité est réduite lorsqu’il y a des désaccords profonds entre ces derniers. Cette approche présente une avancée sur des travaux antérieurs portant sur la présence nécessaire de groupes armés dans un contexte de guerre civile. Certains savants croient à tort que ce sont les objectifs communs qui influencent directement les comportements individuels alors que d’autres ne pensent qu’aux récompenses et punitions individuelles, ou alors aux normes de coopération. Quant à elle, cette thèse reconnaît l’importance individuelle de ces deux méthodes et considère qu’elles sont liées à la considération antérieure cherchant à savoir si les combattants partagent un objectif commun. Une analyse qualitative des groupes armés de la guerre civile espagnole traite de données détaillées en lien avec les objectifs communs, la disposition de contrôle ainsi que l’émergence des normes de coopération. La thèse met ensuite ses hypothèses principales à l’essai sur le plan ii statistique à travers l’usage de deux bases de données originales de soldats tirés de cette guerre, basés des recherches d’archives de l’auteur. Elle réalise des tests statistiques additionnels à partir d’un nouvel ensemble de données sur la défection d’armées gouvernementales dans 28 guerres civiles au cours des années 1990. Pour conclure, elle ouvre un dialogue portant sur de nouvelles directions. iii iv Table of Contents Abstract i Résumé ii Table of Contents v Acknowledgements ix List of Tables xiii List of Figures xiv List of Abbreviations xv Chapter 1. Introduction: Explaining Desertion in Civil Wars 1 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. Defining Desertion 4 1.3. Theoretical Approach: Common Aims, Control and Cooperation 6 1.3.1. Common Aims 6 1.3.2. Control 12 1.3.3. Cooperation 16 1.3.4. Summary and Micro-Level Implications 26 1.3.5. Macro Implications of This Approach 27 1.4. Alternative Approaches 28 1.4.1. The Cause 29 1.4.2. Complex Motivations and Control 31 1.4.3. The Collective Action Problem and Selective Incentives 36 1.4.4. Social Homogeneity and the Collective Action Problem 41 1.4.5. Alternative Approaches: Summary 48 1.5. What Is to Come 49 Chapter 2. Background to the Spanish Civil War 54 2.1. Introduction 54 2.2. The Roots of War 57 2.3. The Collapse of Central Authority in the Republic 63 2.4. The Process of Reform in the Republic 70 2.5. Nationalist Spain 75 2.6. Conclusion 82 v Chapter 3. Common Aims: Recruitment and Factionalism 86 3.1. Introduction 86 3.2. Voluntarism and Opportunism in the Militias 88 3.3. Voluntary Recruitment in Nationalist Units 107 3.4. Conscription and the Expansion of Motivations 112 3.5. Factionalism in Republican and Nationalist Spain 115 3.6. Conclusion 119 Chapter 4. Control and Desertion 121 4.1. Introduction 121 4.2. Control in the Republican Militias 123 4.3. The Evolution of Control in the Republic 132 4.4. Nationalist Spain: Control in the Rearguard and the Front Line 150 4.5. Conclusion 160 Chapter 5. Desertion, Collective Action, and Norms of Cooperation 163 5.1. Introduction 163 5.2. Collective Action and the Republic’s Militias 164 5.3. Collective Action in the Popular Army 180 5.4. Collective Action in Nationalist Spain 187 5.5. Conclusion 190 Chapter 6. Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Santander Province 193 6.1. Introduction 193 6.2. Desertion, Control, and Hometowns 195 6.3. The Setting: Santander Province, Spain 199 6.4. Hypotheses and Control Variables 202 6.5. Potential Biases from Case Selection 207 6.6. Data and Method 211 6.7. Results 223 6.8. Qualitative Evidence from Santander 228 6.9. Conclusion 232 Chapter 7. Collective Action and Desertion in Santander 236 7.1. Introduction 236 7.2. Group Influences and Desertion in Civil Wars 238 7.3. Military Units in Santander 241 7.4. Hypotheses 252 7.5. Method 255 7.6. Results 257 vi 7.7. Qualitative Evidence 263 7.8. Conclusion 269 7.9. Appendix 271 7.9.1. Robustness Checks 271 7.9.2. Discrepancies between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 276 Chapter 8. Defection in Civil Wars, 1990-1994 280 8.1. Introduction 280 8.2. From Micro to Macro 281 8.3. State Capabilities and External Support 284 8.4. Militias, Agency, and Control 292 8.5. Motivations and Factionalism: Conscription and Coup Attempts 298 8.6. Empirical Analysis 304 8.7. Results 306 8.8. Potential Control Variables: Economics and Institutions 313 8.9. Conclusion: States and Civil Wars 316 Chapter 9. Conclusion: Desertion and the Dynamics of Civil Wars 321 9.1. Introduction 321 9.2. Testable Hypotheses 324 9.2.1. Initiation of Civil Wars 325 9.2.2. Civil War Dynamics: Strategy and Tactics Selection 326 9.2.3. Civil War Outcomes 329 9.3. Improving the Theory 331 9.3.1. Voice, Not Just Exit and Loyalty 332 9.3.2. Types of Desertion 333 9.3.3. Bilateral Interactions 335 9.4. Implications of Contingent Control and Cooperation 339 9.4.1. A New Synthesis 339 9.4.2. The Diversity of Civil Wars 342 9.4.3. State Building 344 9.4.4. The International Context 348 9.5. Conclusion 353 Bibliography 355 vii viii Acknowledgements I must first thank Hudson Meadwell, my supervisor, for all his help in travelling this long road. His constant and perceptive critiques, demand for sharp analysis, and continuous encouragement improved this dissertation immensely and made writing it much easier than it would otherwise have been. In Spain, Juan Díez Medrano at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals was extremely generous in providing me a home base and in advice and encouragement in the archives. The late Gabriel Cardona graciously shared his unparalleled insight into the military history of the Spanish Civil War. Laia Balcells helped me get oriented to studying the Spanish Civil War. Joan R. Roses helped me navigate historical Spanish economic and wage data. Édouard Sill and I swapped thought-provoking ideas about desertion in the Spanish Civil War. Robert, Katie, and Elsie Kissack gave me considerable moral support in Spain whenever I needed it. They, and David Convery, Pat Cullen, Diego Funes, Rosy Rickett, Niall Smith, Pere Soler, and Nehir Sönmez, enriched my life and work in Spain immensely. The staff were consistently helpful at the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, Salamanca, the branches of the Archivo General Militar in Ávila, Madrid, and Segovia, the Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, the Biblioteca Municipal de Santander, the Biblioteca Provincial de Cantabria, and the libraries at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the Universitat de Barcelona, and the Universidad de Cantabria. Miguel Solla Gutiérrez graciously provided me a copy of his Ph.D. thesis work, and conversations with Enrique Menéndez Criado helped with the politics of Santander during the war. ix Juan Andrés Blanco Rodríguez at the Universidad de Salamanca put me in touch with my research assistants in the archives. Assistance in coding the data in Spain was generously provided by Juan Carlos García, Braulio Pareja, Daniel Blanco, Patricia García, and Manuel Talaván.