Virginia Commonwealth University VCU Scholars Compass Menorah Review VCU University Archives 1995 Menorah Review (No. 34, Spring, 1995) Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/menorah Part of the History of Religion Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons © The Author(s) Recommended Citation https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/menorah/33 This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the VCU University Archives at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Menorah Review by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ENORAREVIEW • NUMBER 34 • CENTER FOR JUDAIC STUDIES OF VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY SPRING 1995 For the Enrichment of Jewish Thought (i.e., cases of spiritual experiences involv­ ing others that one's own true character ing only God and the isolated individual arises, matures and flourishes. Thus Buber figure) do spring to mind: the burningbush speaks of even the infant in the crib as of Moses; the voice of God as heard by occupied in an aesthetic I-Thou encounter Francis of Assissi and the revelatory dreams with the wallpaper of his room, for the wall­ of, say, the Native American B.1ack Elk­ paper bespeaksthe Thou of its designer, just what could be more private than these? Still, as the designer bespeaksthe eternalThou. In Buberand Rotenstreich are correct in insist­ fact, unless a person enjoys I-Thou relations, ing on the social dimension of spiritual cul­ he can know neither his own self nor the tivation because, unlessMoses, Francis and eternal God. Black Elk had first stoodin I-Thou relations Philosophers dispute whether Descartes' with their fellows, they could hardly become pronouncement was an immediate intuition participants in an I-Thou encounter with or a logical deduction: Did he know that he God. But not just any kind of regard for the existed immediately-asone knows straight­ other will suffice. For example, Rotenstreich away that -A is A-or did he know it only Nathan_Rotenstreich has written a explains that Buber relegates empathy to a after a series of inferences? In Buber's case, thought-provoking, critical analysis of the position significantly below an I-Thou rela­ there is no question about his meaning; an 1- nature of Martin Buber's I-Thou relation. tion because the former is seen to involve a Thou encounter refers to a direct (i.e., unme­ Everyday examples abound to demonstrate lapse into a kind of estheticismthat involves diated) meeting. For him, from "the begin­ that the significance of such relationships a loss of individuality. In short, the relation­ ning" there is an incipient relation, an un­ can hardly be exaggerated. For instance, ship is asymmetrical or one-way, for the bornThou that engages the I. No ratiocina­ Buber holds that the doctor is truly a doctor empathizer excludes the concreteness of her tion precedes and sustains it. Thus, the pre­ if and only if he or she feels an identity with self fromthe absorption. Buber sees I-Thou reflective infant experiences a yeaming for his or her patient, not the alienation that relations with humans and I-Thou relations relation. We are relational creatures who marks an I-It relationship. Indeed, to be a with the divine as mutually enhancing; for carry the seed of the other within us; in member of the human family is necessarily the former are a prerequisite for the latter; in Buber'swords: "the innate Thou is realized to engage in I-Thou meetings, for as philoso­ turn, participation in the latter enriches and in the Thou we encounter." Accordingly, phers since Aristotle have argued, we are deepens participation in the former. Con­ one may challenge Rotenstreich's charac­ irreducibly social creatures. Buber main­ cerningwhich I -Thou relation-thatbetween terization of the I and Thou: "each of them tains that even the way to meet God is social the I and others or that betweenthe I and the has an independent or semi- independent sta­ (i.e., through entering into relations ofreci­ eternal Thou-is primary, Buber's dialogi­ tus." Instead, Buber's I is fundamentally procity with other persons). It follows that if cal philosophy must maintain that the two incomplete without a Thou. an individual cannot discern the divine in a are inseparable. Most basically" and persistently, finite Thou, the eternal Thou will forever Not only are I-Thou relations essential Rotenstreichasks: Is theI-Thou relation, _as elude him. Not surprisingly, Buber faulted for meeting the eternal Thou but they are Buber held, one in which there is an imme­ Soren Kierkegaard, a father of Christian essentialfor self-realization. Thus, Socrates' diate rapport between human beings? Or existentialism, because he spoke as if one's injunction to "know thyself' becomes in­ does this relation require mediation and, in meeting with the divine was necessarily a separable from "know the other." While particular, reflection or discursive thought? one-on-one encounter rather than a social Descartes posited "I think; therefore, I am," Affirming Hegel's view that we may not phenomenon. Of I-Thou meetings with oth­ Buber substitutes "I relate; therefore, I am." realize the supposedly immediate is medi­ ers, Buber said: "That the lines of these It is not as though one first cultivates an inner ated, Rotenstreich insists that relations are relations intersect in the eternal Thou is nature and then may enter into the company grounded on distance. But Buber insists that grounded in the fact that the man who says of others; rather,it is precisely by encounter- relations are not in ordinary time or space. Thou ultimately means his eternal Thou." Distance, whether spatial or psychological, Rotenstreichagrees: "The meeting between is inapplicable to such meetings. On being God and man, it can be said ... occurs in the asked about his first meeting withT.S. Eliot, coming together of human beings and not in B uber replied that when he met someone he their lonely or solitary position." Also op­ was not concerned aboutopinions but with posed to the idea that only the solitary indi­ the person. Buber criticized Socrates for vidual can enter into essential relation with overestimating the import of abstract ideas God, it might be_ observed that even indi­ as opposed to individual, concrete experi­ viduals who practice meditation or silent ences. Similarly, he faulted Hegel for sup­ prayer often like to do so in a community. planting concreteness with reason and ab­ Of course, possible counter-examples stractions, thereby leaving no roomfor trust 2 Menorah Review, Spring 1995 in his system. But Rotenstreich criticizes it does not follow that it must be so estab­ can escape conceptualization. When two Buberfor not recognizing that to even iden­ lished. Intuition may have been at work. individuals come together, each distinguishes tify a Thou requires reflection. In other After all, Buber is drawn to the risk-taking of between her respective self and the other, words, Rotenstreich accuses Buber of fail­ intuitive leaps rather than the security of but as they meet, intuition renders all dis­ ing to see that merely to acknowledge the system-building (i.e., the erecting of com­ tinctions, bifurcations, dichotomies or divi­ other presupposes intellectual. activity. prehensive, abstract systems or philoso­ sions as penultimate in face of the intact Buber's reply is that discursive thought is phies). Clear metaphysical differences are relation that surfaces. This is just to say that, not the only kind of awareness; far surpass­ apparent in that Buber regards faith as an while distinctions precede the I-Thou en­ ing it, there is a consciousness that is marked entrance into reality and Rotenstreich re­ counter and follow during any analyses of it, by a transcendent immediacy. In effect, the plies, " ...we cannot but wonder as to the they need not be constitutive of the relation ordinary rational categories of space and meaning of that entrance since the human itself with its characteristic immediacy of time are superseded by an eternal present; being is already, in reality, in his primary union. thus, Buber speaks about the "total accep­ situation and does not have to enter it." Of While Rotenstreichargues interestingly tance of the present." As with aesthetic course, Buber is positing a deeper, intuitive for his thesis that the I -Thou relation is a transport, to have the spiritual, I-Thou en­ realization in which one's primary situation mediated one, his case falls short of being counter requires disengagement from the is itself grounded. When Rotenstreich ar­ compelling. Rather, his scholarly contribu­ ordinary notions of time and space; any time gues that Buber's distancing of the I from the tion lies in the thoughtful questions he asks and any place will do. There is no special Thou necessarily entails reflection as op­ and the diverse criticisms he offers. For time and place; thus Buber remarks, "I do posed to immediacy, his reasoning can be instance, he wonders how the I-Thou orien­ not find the human being to whom I say You sketchy and unconvincing: "A looker is at a tation can be both a priori-having a formal in any Sometime and Somewhere." Any distance and, because of that, he reflects on status-and endowed with holiness (i.e., moment will suffice because any moment his position and setting." Surely lookers can concrete and not formal). One reply is that can become an eternal present in which the become immersed in their object of atten­ the relation is a priori because it is a condi­ categories of past and future do not obtain. tion, interfused with it.