LIGHT AT THE END OF THEIR TUNNELS? HAMAS & THE ARAB UPRISINGS Middle East Report N°129 – 14 August 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. TWO SIDES OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS .................................................................... 1 A. A WEDDING IN CAIRO.................................................................................................................. 2 B. A FUNERAL IN DAMASCUS ........................................................................................................... 5 1. Balancing ..................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Mediation ..................................................................................................................................... 6 3. Confrontation ............................................................................................................................... 7 4. The crossfire................................................................................................................................. 8 5. Competing alliances ................................................................................................................... 10 C. WHAT IMPACT ON HAMAS? ....................................................................................................... 13 III. INSIDE HAMAS ............................................................................................................. 15 A. SHIFTING LINES ......................................................................................................................... 15 B. RECONCILIATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS ................................................................................... 18 C. WHAT LIES BEHIND THE DISCORD? ........................................................................................... 25 1. What to make of the Arab uprisings? ......................................................................................... 26 2. The costs and benefits of reconciliation ..................................................................................... 29 3. Where you sit determines where you stand: the weight of parochial interests .......................... 33 IV. CONCLUSION: HAMAS’S FUTURE .......................................................................... 35 A. LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................................................... 37 B. WESTERN POLICY ...................................................................................................................... 38 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ISRAEL AND WEST BANK/GAZA ......................................................................................... 42 B. MAP OF GAZA STRIP ........................................................................................................................ 43 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 44 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2009 ... 45 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 47 Middle East Report N°129 14 August 2012 LIGHT AT THE END OF THEIR TUNNELS? HAMAS & THE ARAB UPRISINGS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hamas never has faced such large challenges and oppor- The Arab revolts seemed to change all that. Positive de- tunities as presented by the Arab uprisings. It abandoned velopments came from across the region: the toppling of its headquarters in Damascus, at much cost to ties with its Fatah’s strong Arab ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mu- largest state supporter, Iran, while improving those with barak; the rise in Egypt of Hamas’s closest supporter and such U.S. allies as Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. Asked to pick mother movement, the Muslim Brotherhood; the opening sides in an escalating regional contest, it has sought to of the Gaza-Sinai crossing at Rafah, control of which the choose neither. Internal tensions are at new heights, cen- former Egyptian regime had used to pressure, constrict and tring on how to respond to regional changes in the short impoverish what it perceived to be Gaza’s illegitimate run. Leaders in the West Bank and exile tend to believe rulers; the empowerment of Islamist parties in other coun- that with the rise to power of the Egyptian Muslim Brother- tries; growing instability in states with large Islamist oppo- hood in particular and the West’s rapprochement with sitions; and the promise of a new, more democratic region- Islamists in general, it is time for bolder steps toward Pal- al order reflecting widespread aversion to Israel and its estinian unity, thereby facilitating Hamas’s regional and allies and popular affinity with Hamas. As Hamas saw it, wider international integration. The Gaza leadership by these and other events promised to profoundly affect the contrast is wary of large strategic steps amid a still uncer- advancement of each of its primary goals: governing Gaza; tain regional future. These new dynamics – Islamists’ re- weakening Fatah’s grip over the West Bank; spreading gional ascent; shifting U.S. and EU postures toward them; Islamic values through society; ending its diplomatic iso- vacillation within their Palestinian offshoot – offer both lation; and strengthening regional alliances in opposition Hamas and the West opportunities. But seizing them will to Israel. take far greater pragmatism and realism than either has yet shown. Yet, regional changes also have come at a cost. Above all, the uprising in Syria, where its political bureau had The Arab uprisings hardly could have caused a more stark been based for more than a decade, presented the move- reversal of Hamas’s fortunes. In the stagnant years pre- ment with one of the greatest challenges it has faced, tear- ceding them, it had been at an impasse: isolated diplomat- ing it between competing demands. On the one hand, the ically; caged in economically by Egypt and Israel; crushed movement had to weigh the gratitude felt to a regime that by Israeli and Palestinian Authority security forces in the had supported it when nearly all other Arab countries had West Bank; warily managing an unstable ceasefire with a shunned it; the cost of breaking relations with a regime far more powerful adversary; incapable of fulfilling popu- still clinging to power; and the risks entailed in alienating lar demands for reconciliation with Fatah; and more or Iran, its largest supporter and supplier of money, weapons less treading water in Gaza, where some supporters saw it and training. On the other hand, Hamas considered its con- as having sullied itself with the contradictions of being an nection to the Muslim Brotherhood and to Sunni Arabs Islamist movement constricted by secular governance and more generally, as well as its indebtedness to the Syrian a resistance movement actively opposing Gaza-based people, who had long stood with the movement. Hovering attacks against Israel. over these were its obligations to Syria’s hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, who could pay with Facing reduced popularity since the 2006 Palestinian leg- their homes and lives for the decisions made by some of islative elections that brought it to power, Hamas had to their political leaders. contend with criticism from without and within, the latter accompanied by defections from a small but important Difficult as the external balancing act has been, the Arab group of militants who left to join groups more commit- uprisings also have forced upon the movement a no less ted to upholding Islamic law and to engaging in attacks trying challenge by bringing to the surface and exacerbat- against Israel. All in all, the movement could take comfort ing internal contradictions and rifts among its varied con- in little other than that Fatah was doing no better. stituencies. The impasse at which Hamas had been stuck Light at the End of their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab Uprisings Crisis Group Middle East Report N°129, 14 August 2012 Page ii before the Arab upheavals allowed the movement to keep ing relations with the West, crave stability and are signal- its many differences largely beneath the surface; with few ling they do not wish to make the Israeli-Palestinian issue significant opportunities before it, no contest among visions a priority; second, the intense internal debates taking place needed take place. But once Hamas found itself in a dra- within Hamas over the movement’s direction. matically altered environment with novel challenges and possibilities, longstanding tensions came to the fore and Even if Hamas is susceptible to influence by third parties, new forms of friction emerged. Broadly speaking, these the West should not overreach or exaggerate its influence. reflect several interrelated factors: the group’s geographic The Islamist movement is uncertain and in flux but not dispersion and its leadership’s varied calculations, caused about to abandon fundamental positions; getting it to accept by differing circumstances (in Gaza, prisons, the West Bank the Quartet conditions as such is out of the question. In- or outside); ideological distinctions, particularly