BRUNEL UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ARCHIVE Article Post Print This article is a version after peer-review, with revisions having been made. In terms of appearance only this might not be the same as the published article. Author(s) Title Original Citation This version is available at: Access to and use of the material held within the Brunel University Research Archives, is based on your acceptance of the BURA End User Licence Agreement (EULA) Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology Peter Lunt Publisher: The British Psychological Society Citation: Lunt, P. (2005) Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology. History and Philosophy of Psychology, 7(1), 12-22. Abstract Virtue ethics has emerged as an alternative to deontological and utilitarian theory in recent moral philosophy. The basic notion of virtue ethics is to reassert the importance of virtuous character in ethical judgement in contrast to the emphasis on principles and consequences. Since questions of virtue have been largely neglected in modern moral theory, there has been a return to Aristotle’s account of virtue as character. This in turn has been questioned as the basis of virtue ethics and there has been a search for alternative accounts of moral agency. One aspect of this critical reflection on virtue ethics is an engagement with social psychology as a source of criticism of the Aristotelian conception of character and as a more plausible alternative foundation for a theory of moral character with contemporary relevance. This paper aims to introduce this area of moral theory to a psychological audience and reflect on the interpretation of social psychological theory and evidence in criticisms of virtuous character, focusing on the use of Milgram’s (1974) experiments on obedience to authority as an argument for situationism. A number of questions emerge concerning the interpretation and use of social psychological theory and evidence in debates within moral philosophy. 1 Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology 2 Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology Introduction In moral philosophy there has been a recent revival of interest in questions of moral agency. After many years of relative neglect and scepticism towards psychological aspects of ethical conduct, virtue ethics is experiencing a renaissance. Virtue ethics focuses on, and treats as basic, questions of character in contrast to moral judgements of action (deontological ethics) and judgements of consequences (utilitarianism). Modern moral philosophy has been dominated by deontological theory and utilitarianism and the emergence of a new alternative is arousing considerable interest. However, virtue ethics is not new; it has its origins in the classical writings of Homer, Plato and Aristotle, so the renewed interest in virtue recovers relatively neglected texts and traditions. There are a number of excellent monographs and collections of readings devoted to the topic, which I will draw on here and which the reader interested in finding out more can consult (Darwell, 2003; Dent, 1984; Hursthouse, 1999; Statman, 1997). The revival of interest in moral agency in philosophy also involves confronting the historical scepticism towards philosophy of psychology. These developments have potential interest for psychologists and the first aim of this paper is to introduce virtue ethics to a psychological audience. However, there is a more specific reason for psychologists to be interested in these developments. Some philosophers who are broadly sympathetic to a focus on agency in moral questions are nevertheless critical of the psychological assumptions in Aristotelian concepts of virtue. Writers such as Doris (2002) and Harman (1999), in particular, criticise the use of indigenous psychology as a source of concepts for virtue ethics. They argue that Aristotle’s assumptions are both anachronous and problematic. Interestingly, they 3 Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology base their critique upon a reading of examples from contemporary experimental social psychology. The second aim of this paper is to examine the way that social psychological research is interpreted in these philosophical writings. I am not attempting here to contribute to debates in virtue ethics as a domain in philosophy, where there are disagreements about the implications of empirical findings from social psychology for virtue ethics. These range from the view that the results of social psychology experiments require a radical reformulation of the presuppositions about character made in virtue ethics (e.g. Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002) through the idea that such findings are irrelevant to philosophical discourse (e.g. Hursthouse, 1999; Sreenivasan, 1997). Nor is my concern to arbitrate between these different views but rather to examine the ways in which moral philosophers interpret empirical social psychology. In this paper I will focus on the interpretation given to Milgram in the work of Doris (2002) and Harman (1999) in particular, for two reasons. First, because they argue that social psychology provides a substantive critique of virtue as character because it demonstrates the dependency of human conduct on social situational determinants. Second, because they both draw on social psychological research and theory in developing positive proposals for virtue ethics, arguing that empirical social psychology is a potentially better source of normative assumptions for an ethical theory based on character than are the speculative reflections on virtue in writers from Aristotle to the present day. Again, my focus is not on the validity of these arguments per se or on evaluating their place in philosophical debates over virtue ethics but on the interpretation of social psychological theory. As a social psychologist I am interested in these developments for several reasons. One is the novelty of philosophers paying attention to social psychology 4 Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology compared with the greater engagement with cognitive and physiological psychology to be found in writings in the philosophy of mind (see Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 1996, for a review). While there has been a productive and valuable interchange between philosophers and psychologists over questions of consciousness, experience and representation, there has been little direct interplay over social psychological questions and theory. In the face of this lack of interest, social psychologists concerned with philosophical questions have tended to engage with continental philosophy and social theory rather than analytic philosophy. The deployment of evidence and arguments from social psychology in analytic moral philosophy therefore arouses curiosity. Several questions immediately suggest themselves: Which social psychology have moral philosophers been reading? How do they interpret the findings of social psychology? What notice do they take of the theories of social psychologists? How do they deploy their reflections on social psychology in their own debates? But before addressing these points I will introduce virtue ethics. Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics has a long history and a short past. Although its origins can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, for many years moral philosophers have eschewed discussion of virtuous character in favour of questions of duty. Initially the idea of a reconsideration of questions of virtue was the subject of the occasional piece, notably those by Anscombe (1958) and Foot (1978); questions of virtue were also at the centre of MacIntyre’s (1981) influential work After Virtue. More recently there has been an explosion of interest in virtue ethics. Statman (1997) documents the rapid rise of virtue ethics as a response to growing dissatisfaction with the entrenched opposition between utilitarianism and deontology, and to the desire for an alternative approach to ethical theory. This was partly given impetus by the development of 5 Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology practical questions in medical or legal ethics that were complex and contextual, amenable neither to the categorical imperative nor to the analysis of utility. Questions of choice in medicine and the law often seem to turn on the qualities displayed by moral agents in their role as patients or doctors, clients and lawyers in complex social institutional contexts. Such observations appeared to be anomalies for traditional accounts, inviting a radical shift in moral theory. In his book After Virtue MacIntyre (1981) started from a scepticism concerning accounts of morality based on duty and sought to address the imperative to find an alternative foundation for ethics in the contemporary age. He notes that scepticism towards abstract moral principles is widespread in contemporary culture and argues that this scepticism has led to the rise of emotivism in moral theory and in ethical practice. Emotivism argues that it is a ‘mistake’ to think that foundations for moral theories, and consequently ethical judgments, are possible at all in principle; instead, moral statements should be read as attempts to persuade. MacIntyre partially accepts and partially rejects this position. He suggests that many contemporary moral dilemmas (e.g. abortion, the dependency of justice on equality, and the use of military power in international relations) are widely debated and contested even though there appears to be little chance of agreement, consensus or resolution of such dilemmas and that attempts to resolve them seem to make matters worse by producing increasingly polarised and entrenched positions.
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