The Meaning of Reputation in American Society Robert N. Bellaht This Comment will present a sociological perspective on the mean- ing of reputation in American society. People often speak of the reputa- tion interest1 in terms that focus on the individual. America is a culture that focuses on the individual, a culture in which "individualism" is a central value. Yet reputation by its very nature is indelibly social. Indeed, reputa- tion derives from the fundamental act of recognition in which the indi- vidual moves beyond interest and need and, in the words of George Herbert Mead, takes the role of the other.' The infant who, for the first time, takes the spoon from his mother and tries to feed her is recognizing her as a person like himself and responding to her recognition of him. Recognition may be a psychological need, but it is not only that. Recog- nition is what makes society possible. Reputation is the extension and elaboration of that recognition which lies at the basis of our social exist- ence. Thus, although we think of a person as "having" a reputation, reputation is not a property or possession of individuals-it is a relation between persons. Our tendency to think of reputation in individualistic terms is rooted in our cultural emphasis on the autonomy, independence, and achievements of individuals. In Chapter 3 of Habits of the Heart3 we describe in some detail our understanding of the life course in American middle-class culture, remembering that American culture is quintessen- tially middle-class. In this perspective life appears a search for ever greater autonomy and fulfillment of the self. In the course of this search it is necessary to leave home, often to leave the community in which one grew up and the church in which one was raised, to go away to college and then to take a job, often a series of jobs, that offers the greatest opportunity for advancement. The successful person is one who has achieved the most on his or her own. This emphasis on personal success t Ford Professor of Sociology and Comparative Studies, University of California, Berkeley. A.B. 1950, Ph.D. 1955, Harvard University. I. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1974) (White, J., concurring). 2. G. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY 141 (1934). 3. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, & S. TIPSON, HABITS OF THE HEART 55-84 (1985). CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:743 makes us forget how much we owe to others in everything we achieve. For example, an automobile dealer whom we interviewed in a New England town liked to emphasize how much he had achieved through his own hard work, failing to mention that he had inherited his business from his father. It is in the context of a career that reputation seems most like an individual possession. For in a career one's greatest asset is one's self, and what people think of one has a crucial bearing on one's success. One's skill, one's probity, one's character, are crucial resources in climb- ing the escalator of advancement in American society. Anything that would cast doubt on one's reputation in these spheres would, therefore, be directly harmful to one's life chances. It is in this context that a libel suit against a person or organization that has carelessly or maliciously injured one's reputation makes sense. The harm suffered may indeed be calculated in monetary terms, as it is in other civil suits. Yet in a recent study of some 900 libel cases between 1974 and 1984,' Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski report that of the 114 libel plain- tiffs they interviewed, only about twenty-five percent reported that they brought suit primarily to win money damages.' Most of these libel plain- tiffs were public persons, highly visible to their communities, more than half of whom had lived in their communities for more than thirty years.' These people claimed to have suffered emotional harm or damage to their political status, rather than primarily financial loss. 7 Some seventy per- cent of the nearly 900 total libel cases were brought against the media, but of these, plaintiffs won only ten percent and, if they were public offi- cials, even a smaller percentage. As Bezanson et al. make clear, the purpose of the suit for most libel plaintiffs was to vindicate the plaintiff's reputation. The outcome, including financial reparation, was secondary.9 As they put it, few plaintiffs "sue to win"; rather they "win by suing."' 0 What these facts suggest is a rather different and, partly at least, less individualistic meaning of reputation among those in public life. It is true that their career chances would be damaged by libel; yet, their chief concern is with their standing in the community, as their public effective- ness is dependent on the favorable reputation they enjoy in their 4. R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg, & J. Soloski, Libel & the Press: Setting the Record Straight (unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa) (on file with author). This study consisted of several parts, two of which are relevant here: a survey of nearly 900 reported libel cases between 1974 and 1984, and personal interviews with 114 libel plaintiffs. Id. at 4. 5. Id. at 11. 6. Id. at 6-7. 7. Id. at 10. 8. Id. at 5. 9. Id. at 25. 10. Id. at 38. 1986] REPUTATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY communities. One should not, of course, discount purely egotistical motives, among which a desire to be reelected is obviously central. Nev- ertheless, if they have any desire to carry out their public trust in an effective way, as many public officials obviously do, then favorable repu- tation is an essential resource in effective performance. Such favorable reputation is thus a public good, not merely a private possession. We all know that reputation is something shared and reflected. Something that reflects on the reputation of a parent, child, spouse, or friend reflects to some degree on us; we are protective of those reputa- tions. To a considerable degree the reputation of a community is reflected in the reputation of its representative figures. Indeed, it is the founders and heroes of a community that to a considerable extent give it its identity, and it is the memory of the sufferings and achievements of exemplary figures that constitutes a community as a community of mem- ory and keeps that community alive. For example, the founders of the American republic were very con- scious of themselves as acting in the public realm before the eyes of their fellow citizens. Washington was called the American Cincinnatus, 1 the citizen-soldier who gave up power at the end of the Revolutionary War, only to be recalled by his fellow citizens from his rural retirement in order to become our first president. For generations of Americans he summed up the very meaning of our republic. The reputations of the founders and of some subsequent leaders such as Lincoln are a public resource. This does not mean that they are above scrutiny, or should be. Some of them, particularly Jefferson and Lincoln, have suffered at the hands of revisionist historians, but the result has been public controversy. For.example, evidence of an illicit relationship betweeen Jefferson and the slave woman Sally Heming put forward by some historians has been meticulously challenged by others.12 The issue is not whether the Ameri- can heroes were above reproach-it would be a relief if they were not- but rather that their reputations are a matter of public importance. Who they were tells us who we are. Thinking of the reputation of public figures as a public good, in need of protection, seems to run head on into another requirement of a free society -that we scrutinize the actions of our public servants and hold them accountable. To some extent there is indeed an unavoidable con- flict here between two legitimate interests. But today we, and no less the 11. G. WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984); Flexner, Cincinnatus Assayed: Washington in the Revolution, in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A PROFILE 86 (J. Smith ed. 1969). 12. Arguments for the existence of a Jefferson-Heming relationship appear in F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AN INTIMATE HISTORY (1974); P. SMITH, JEFFERSON: A REVEALING BIOGRAPHY 210 (1976). CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:743 media, often forget that scrutiny and accountability are not the only con- cerns of a democracy: good reputation is also a public interest. In this regard it is worth noting what is sometimes said about medical malprac- tice: the cause of malpractice suits is malpractice. Similarly, the cause of libel suits is libel. Such suits serve the purpose of reminding the media of their obligation to respect public reputation unless they have very good reason for doing otherwise. Still, it has been argued that libel suits, even when they fail, are so enormously expensive to the media-the Westmoreland and Sharon cases are usually mentioned-that they have a "chilling effect" on free- dom of the press, that they endanger first amendment freedoms.I3 To the extent that this is so, there is every reason to seek for reforms in the judicial process and for nonjudicial alternatives which would provide swifter and more appropriate remedies for plaintiffs and less onerous bur- dens on the media. But there is also reason to consider whether the treatment of public figures by the media does not have a "chilling effect" on the decision of individuals to enter the public sphere because they fear what the relent- less scrutiny may do to them.