Lessons from Léogâne: Case Studies From Haiti On the morning of January 12th 2010, a magnitude 7.0 Mw earthquake struck the island of Hispaniola, destroying, or badly damaging, over 290,000 homes. More than 200,000 people lost their lives and a further 300,000 were injured. Many fac- tors contributed to such a large loss. Poverty, inadequate building codes, and lack of knowledge all played their part. The call to “Build Back Better” was a mantra adopted early in Haiti’s recon- struction effort. To achieve that goal requires incremental improvement through every stage of the building delivery process. This essay focuses Mark Taylor on three projects constructed in Léogâne, the epicenter of the earthquake. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Each project reveals what incremental improvements are possible. Six months after the earthquake an estimated 10,000 people were concen- trated in makeshift shelters at three locations around the town: the town’s soccer field, beside the market, and in the town square. Transitional housing, donated by the numerous aid organizations working in town, were appearing on lots that had been cleared of rubble. Some roads in downtown Léogâne had been paved prior to the earthquake, allowing a visitor to sense that order and beauty were present at some point in the town’s past. A few historic struc- tures that mixed influences of French and Haitian architectural styles, dating back as far as the 1800s, remained standing. Buildings of heavy masonry construction, either contemporary or historic, in general did not perform well. The earthquake affected every sector of the built environment: govern- ment buildings, hospitals, schools and individual homes. Within weeks after the quake temporary hospitals were established at three locations around Léogâne. The impact on local and national government was severe. The presidential palace collapsed, and the Léogâne mayoral offices were unsafe to inhabit. Presidential elections originally scheduled for February 2010 were not held until November of that year, and it was not until March of 2011 that a clear winner was announced. This uncertainty of leadership drastically affected the early stages of the recovery effort. To ensure some form of normality was restored at a local level, Haitian communities peti- tioned Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) to help rebuild schools so children would have safe places to continue their studies. Designing from Disaster Lessons from Léogâne 471 1 Access to education in Haiti has historically been difficult. State-funded institutions educate less than 10% of those attending school.1 Private International, Church-run and For-Profit schools have stepped into the huge void, to satisfy the desire Haitians have to receive an education. Unfortunately, the largest subset of for-profit education providers are “run by entrepreneurs, with little pedagogical under-standing, precarious physical facilities, few or any books, and untrained teachers and school directors.” 2 Prior to the earthquake, dozens of small schools were operating out of inad- equate buildings in the Léogâne area. Poor construction and lack of over- sight in this sector resulted in many building failures during the earthquake (see figure 1). One estimation of the number of schools destroyed in the Léogâne area, was as high as 300. 3 With little chance of receiving a state- funded school, local communities appealed to the NGO sector to provide buildings to replace what had been destroyed. Following the earthquake, All Hands, an NGO that recruits volunteers from around the world, became one of the most prolific builders of schools in the for-profit sector of education provision in the Léogâne area. TRANSITIONAL CONSTRUCTION The construction methods used by All Hands were very suitable for those with limited construction knowledge. The system was light and ductile in nature and drew on vernacular building practices, while adding struc- tural rigor. The walls of the schools were formed with 2x4” stud framing, anchored to a concrete slab with bolts. The roofs were formed from wooden trusses with large gusset plates secured to the studs with hurricane straps. Figure 1: Collapsed Private School. An innovative stucco treatment was applied to the walls. Chain-link fence 472 Subtropical Cities: DESIGN INTERVENTIONS FOR CHANGING CLIMATES 2 served as a lath. It was secured to the stud walls, before removable form- work was attached to the outside of the building. A mix of sand-cement stucco was applied to the lath by hand in a manner similar to traditional parge applications that have been applied on modest structures in Haiti for generations (see figure 2). A second finished coat applied with a trowel and float completed the inside, before the exterior formwork was removed. The 3/4” base coat provided enough of a key for a finish coat to be applied on the outside of the building (see figure 2a). Classrooms were sized to fit small lots. The spacing of studs two feet apart dictated the structural logic of the building, which typically comprised of three classrooms 20’ wide by 28’ long. Each site had unique challenges, remoteness, site topography, or the need to remove collapsed buildings, so costs varied from school to school. However, material costs for a 560- sq/ft classroom averaged approximately $4,850. With sufficient volunteer labor, rebuilding could take place relatively quickly. A construction crew of approximately ten volunteers could complete a three-classroom school in about nine weeks. Haitian construction staff were hired to help coordinate volunteers on site and apprenticeship training was offered to local volun- teers could take the principles of this light, ductile and affordable form of construction and apply it to their own building needs. Using this construction method, All Hands completed 20 schools in a 25-month period.4 The reliance on imported treated lumber to form the structure of the buildings was unavoidable, given that the country has been Figure 2 and 2a: Temporary School heavily deforested. The buildings are also considered to be transitional Constructed by Volunteer Labor. Designing from Disaster Lessons from Léogâne 473 2a structures, with an estimated lifespan of only ten to twenty years. However, routine maintenance will extend the life of these low-cost buildings. Typically located in the more remote rural areas, the schools also served as good examples of a construction method that could be adapted to address the local need for affordable housing. The technology was widely adopted by the NGO community. For example Cordaid used this form of construc- tion to supply semi-permanent houses in rural communities surrounding Léogâne. The cementitious exterior gave a similar level of security that a concrete wall would provide, but at the fraction of the cost and at greatly reduced weight. The wood framing was simple to construct, ductile to resist lateral forces, and with sufficient strapping could be engineered to resist high wind events. Homeowners were encouraged to participate in the assembly and completion of their home; this helped ensure all required details were completed as designed.5 474 Subtropical Cities: DESIGN INTERVENTIONS FOR CHANGING CLIMATES 3 PERMANENT SCHOOLS Between June 12th and 18th 2010, a team of ten architects and engineers from the US traveled to Haiti to assess eleven public schools that had been impacted by the earthquake in the Léogâne area. All but one of the eleven structures, which should have served as a community refuge, failed dur- ing the earthquake.6 During the brief six-day trip, site measurements were taken, and interviews conducted with the school principles to define class- room, offices and canteen requirements. For smaller schools, it was pos- sible to develop schematic designs and schedule return visits. Receiving feedback on floor plan arrangements while still in Haiti helped keep the design process moving forward very quickly. In the weeks following the trip, a schematic design for one of the smaller remote schools, École National Fond de Boudin was developed.7 The design was handed on to a structural engineering firm to ensure that the building could be built to satisfy the requirements of a Seismic Design Category D rating in a coastal region where 3-second gusts of 135 mph are possible. The reconstruction of the École National Fond de Boudin was funded in part by Schools for Children of the World, who appointed an American architect to project manage the first phase of the reconstruction of the eleven public schools. The second partner who financed the construction costs was the Spanish Red Cross. As the school would eventually fall under the control of the Haitian Ministry of Education, their approval also had to be granted. A preliminary set of structural drawings was produced approximately four months after the initial site visit. At that stage, the Haitian government was still receiving advice on how to formulate a building code, which up to that point in history had not recognized the seismic, and hurricane hazards pres- ent in Haiti. In April 2011, a complete set of drawings, identifying critical re- bar sizes, spacing, overlaps, and concrete performance criteria were ready for review by all parties. It took a further nine months before the Ministry of Education approved the design, and for the Spanish Red Cross to appoint Figure 3: École National Fond de Boudin the main contractor. At the time, the delays were frustrating, but in retro- under construction with oversight from spect they provided the required controls to ensure competent building American Architect and Haitian Engineer. Designing from Disaster Lessons from Léogâne 475 professionals were appointed to complete a building designed to last a mini- mum of fifty years. As part of the bidding process the Spanish Red Cross required each poten- tial contractor to perform a number of tests to ensure they could identify critical details on drawings, estimate quantities of building material, and work safely.