This is a repository copy of Prioritizing practice in the study of religion: normative and descriptive orientations. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/117844/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Burley, M orcid.org/0000-0002-7446-3564 (2018) Prioritizing practice in the study of religion: normative and descriptive orientations. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 79 (4). pp. 437-450. ISSN 2169-2327 https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2017.1344135 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Prioritizing practice in the study of religion: normative and descriptive orientations Mikel Burley School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK [email protected] ABSTRACT Calls to prioritize practice in the study of religion typically claim that attention to lived practices rather than merely to ‘belief’ is needed if a given religious tradition or instance of religiosity is to be understood. Within that broad ambit, certain empirical researchers, as well as some Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers of religion, investigate the diversity of religious practices without passing judgement, whereas certain other philosophers foreground a narrower selection of examples while deploying moral criteria to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable religion. Characterizing this methodological divergence in terms of descriptive versus normative orientations, the present article argues that while attention to practice is indeed vital, the imposition of normative evaluation is liable to inhibit an appreciation of the radical plurality of religious phenomena. KEYWORDS practice; praxis; lived religion; John Cottingham; Pierre Hadot; humane philosophy of religion 1 Though it is surely the case that no single key unlocks the door to lived religion, one term—“practice”—does have particular importance. (David D. Hall)1 [A]ny true understanding of the place of religion in human life [has] to acknowledge what might be called the primacy of praxis … (John Cottingham)2 Introduction Affirmations of the primacy of practice (or praxis) have a vital place in the contemporary study of religion, yet what such affirmations amount to varies enormously. At the most basic level they affirm the need for attention to embodied activities, as opposed to an exclusive fixation on ‘beliefs’ abstracted from their lived contexts, if religious forms of life are to be well comprehended. Beyond this basic level, however, divergences emerge. Certain philosophers of religion, inspired in part by the work of Pierre Hadot, have emphasized the centrality of particular practices—‘spiritual exercises’—both in early western philosophy and in various religions, with Christianity being a paradigm case. These philosophers of religion have not merely proposed, as a descriptive claim, that practice takes priority over theory in matters of religion, but have contended that the conception of philosophy as an activity of spiritual improvement ought to be revived. In this spirit some maintain that philosophy of religion should be reformulated as ‘religious philosophy’—a confessional endeavour that reflects on religion from an explicit faith perspective.3 Others have been less forthright and polemical, arguing merely that there are aspects of religion that can best be understood, or perhaps only be understood, ‘in an involved and experiential way’—by entering into the form of religious life in question.4 Even from this ostensibly more moderate perspective, however, disinterested contemplation of religion is viewed as insufficient: a deep understanding comes, allegedly, only from committed participation. But not any religious path will do: in 2 establishing which path to pursue, it is claimed, one must consult one’s moral ‘intuitions’ and ensure that the path displays ‘some discernible link with goodness’.5 There is thus a decidedly normative, evaluative, dimension to this approach: religious practices are deemed better or worse—more or less ‘spiritual’—by reference to moral criteria. Meanwhile, in other disciplines involved in the study of religion, such as the history, sociology and anthropology of religion, the turn towards practice has taken a different form. Here, although engaging in religious activities as a participant observer is often integral to the methodology, one is not expected to determine which practices to observe by examining one’s moral intuitions. Rather, in these social and historical disciplines, but also in certain strands of philosophy influenced by Wittgenstein, the emphasis is on developing an increasingly nuanced understanding of a wide variety of religious phenomena by carefully observing what goes on in the lives of practitioners. By attending to the ‘densely textured level of everyday practice’,6 the researcher aims to elucidate ‘what it means to be “religious”’ in ways that are alert to the interconnections between religion and ‘the other practices of everyday life’,7 but without any expectation of appropriating the religious activities or values for oneself or advocating them to anyone else. My principal purpose in this article is to elaborate the distinction I have just briefly sketched between, broadly speaking, normative and descriptive orientations to the prioritizing of practice in the study of religion. While it would be unrealistic to suppose that normative and descriptive vocabularies can be sharply demarcated, it nevertheless remains important not to conflate the two orientations I have identified; to do so would risk misunderstanding not only the orientations themselves but also much about contemporary religion. I shall argue that the tendency of the normative approach, especially as typified in John Cottingham’s ‘humane’ or ‘humanistic’ model of philosophy, to portray itself as primarily an exercise in understanding religion has potentially distorting implications, since the approach is operating 3 with a particular set of normative assumptions about what religion ought to be. Those assumptions generate an unduly sanitized picture of religion that foregrounds examples of religious life of which it morally approves while downplaying or ignoring modes of religiosity that do not conform to its normative ideal. Part of my argument will involve analysing a different criticism of the normative approach from the one for which I am principally arguing. That other criticism accuses both Hadot and Cottingham of detaching the spiritual practices of which they approve from their original religious or philosophical contexts and thereby depriving the practices of the very meaning and efficacy they would have had for the practitioners who devised them. While concurring that neither Hadot nor Cottingham has done enough to show how the practices at issue can be transposed into novel modern-day conceptual environments, I am doubtful whether the criticism usefully targets what is most problematic about Cottingham’s position in particular, namely the propensity to privilege only those varieties and facets of religion that conform to his own moral predilections. If a less one-sided account of religious possibilities is desired, then it is to more disinterested modes of inquiry, with their deliberately descriptive orientation, that we must look. Normative visions of praxis in the philosophy of religion The phrases ‘primacy of praxis’ and ‘priority of practice’ have been conspicuous in work by John Cottingham since 2003.8 Although he has a penchant for ‘praxis’, with its Greek pedigree, Cottingham uses the terms ‘praxis’ and ‘practice’ interchangeably to denote the aspect both of religious and of philosophical life that complements, but is distinguishable from, theory, doctrine or belief. There is, Cottingham acknowledges, an ambiguity in ‘the notion of the primacy, or priority, of praxis’.9 The phrase might, for instance, denote mere ‘causal or temporal priority’, indicating that for most religious practitioners induction into the 4 practical observances of the religion precedes rational appraisal of its doctrines. What Cottingham wishes to propose, however, is the stronger thesis that, more than being merely chronologically prior to intellectual evaluation, practical participation in religious life is what typically gives rise to religious understanding.10 Causing concern for Cottingham is what he perceives as a cognitive bias in the philosophical study of religion and moreover within contemporary philosophy more generally. It is a bias that exaggerates the role of theorizing in human life and fails to do justice to the practical life-transformative impulse that lies behind not only religion but also philosophy, at least as it was conceived in the ancient and Hellenistic periods of European cultural history. A source of inspiration, both for Cottingham and for others who share his dissatisfaction with the direction