AD-A284 554 ETTO 3 Jun 94 Master's Thesis 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94 The Role of Union Cavalry During the Atlanta Campaign MAJ Robert B. Leach, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Attn: ATZL-SWD-GD Ft. Leavenworth, Ks 66027-6900IOU Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman's cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases a-nd focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well eauipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental -part in the overall campaign. Civil War, Atlanta Campaign, Union Cavalry 146 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY DURING THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE by ROBERT BLAKE LEACH, MAJ, USA B.A., University of Kentucky, 1980 94-30144 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas g 1994 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DLU'~~ 43~2 THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY DURING THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN A thesis presented to the Faculv! ol the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colle•j in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE by ROBERT BLAKE LEACH, MAJ, USA B.A., University of Kentucky, 1980 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1994 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DT1C QUATlry IW,'...D 3 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Major Robert Blake Leach Thesis Title: The Role of Union Cavalry During the Atlanta Campaign Approved by: ~ , Thesis Committee Chairman William G. Robertson, Ph.D. •.• -I •c• Member 1J-Stephen C. Mc g-e Accepted this 3d day of June 1994 by: __ __ /__ __ _ _ _ , Director, Graduate Degree Phi Brookes, Ph.D. Programs The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY DURING THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN by MAJ Robert Blake Leach, USA, 125 pages. This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman's cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases and focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well equipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental part in the overall campaign. Anr'.A0U For 0l ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge the effort of Dr. William G. Robertson and Major Stephen C. McGeorge, of the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. With penetrating questions and commentary, they provided keen insight concerning the true value of a historical work and the importance of conducting it properly. They furnished a standard I will maintain. Finally, I thank my wife, Beth Templeton Leach, and my son, Adam Kyle Leach, for their moral support throughout the year. Their interest and encouragement provided momentum when most necessary. iv To three comrades-in-arms: Michael Patrick Mead, my brother-in-law and friend, formerly of the United States Navy. His untimely death on November 5, 1993 prevented us from completing requirements for our master's degrees at the same time as we had planned. Colonel Charles R. Leach, United States Army, my father, 1925-1975. His completion of the Master of Military Art and Science degree in 1965 gave his son a goal in 1994. Lieutenant Washington Wayne Manning, an ancestor who belonged to Company D, 7th Ohio Cavalry, and commanded the escort for General Stoneman's Cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign. Taken prisoner by the Confederates, his service represented that of Union cavalrymen who performed well but were denied success due to faulty leadership and employment. The legacy of such men was my inspiration. TABLE OF CONTENTS APPROVAL PAGE ................. .................... ii ABSTRACT ................... ..................... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........... .................. iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............ ............... vi CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE STAGE ............ ... .............. 1 2. THE STATE OF UNION CAVALRY ..... .......... 11 3. PHASE ONE: MAY 1--JULY 9, 1864 .......... 30 4. PHASE TWO: JULY 10--AUGUST 3, 1864 ...... .. 60 5. PHASE THREE: AUGUST 4--SEPTEMBER 8, 1864 . 97 6. LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLICABILITY ......... .. 115 ENDNOTES . ......................... 126 APPENDIX ................. ...................... 136 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................... .................... 141 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............ .............. 146 v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Fiue 1. ATLANTA CAMPAIGN AREA OF OPERATIONS MAP . 136 2. NORTHWEST GEORGIA MAP ..... ............ 137 3. ROUSSEAU'S RAID MAP ....... ............. 138 4. STONEMAN-McCOOK RAID MAP .... ........... 139 5. KILPATRICK'S RAID MAP ........... ............ 110 vi CHAPTER 1 SETTING THE STAGE By the end of 1863 the tide of the Civil War was clearly in favor of the Union Army. Confederate forces in the East under General Robert E. Lee had been repulsed at Gettysburg and were back in Virginia on the defensive. In the West, the siege of Knoxville ended as Lieutenant General James Longstreat retreated toward Virginia. On December 27, General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the Army of Tennessee, which had been pushed south into Georgia following the Battle of Missionary Ridge. The strategic city of Vicksburg on the Mississippi was in Union hands. On March 18, 1864, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman assumed command of the principal Union armies in the West: the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant ordered Sherman to initiate the Atlanta Campaign concurrently with his own advance into Virginia. Grant's order required Sherman to: ... move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources; if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability. 1 1 As he moved toward Atlanta, Sherman pursued a campaign plan of maneuver against Johnston. The marches and counter marches of the campaign have been likened to a dance, "a kind of gigantic waltz performed by 160,000 men who moved to the music conducted by two excellent generals."' 2 For the army on the offensive in such a campaign, such a "dance" should have been ideal for the employment of the highly mobile cavalry in a variety of roles. The Union Army had a cavalry arm which was well manned and well equipped. Yet, due to improper employment and poor senior leadership, Sherman's cavalry played an unsuccessful part in an otherwise well-executed campaign. The European Cavalry Heritage The traditional role of cavalry in Europe was to protect the army flanks and to maneuver around the enemy infantry to strike his rear. This usage began when Frederick the Great abandoned mass attacks and adopted new tactics. He made full use of his artillery to soften the enemy defenses and his infantry to hold the enemy's line and assault one of its flanks, while his cavalry moved around towards the enemy's rear. 3 In the days of Napoleon, infantry, artillery, and cavalry were in close contact and were easily controlled by the general on the battlefield. Following an artillery preparation, an army charged its opponent, who would still 2 be in shock from the barrage. With the greatest mobility, cavalry was the logical choice for this shock action charge, with a subsequent pursuit. The other roles for the -cavalry continued to be reconnaissance and security. United States Cavalry Prior to the Civil War In the early history of the United States, cavalry did not achieve any real prominence. During the French and Indian Wars, the dense woodlands in contested areas were not conducive to'cavalry operations. Unlike the Plains Indians of the following century, Indians in the eastern woodlands did not use horses, so there was no threat that required the colonists to develop cavalry forces.