CHAPTER XVII FIRST GAZA ENGAGEMENT ON March 18th Chetwode, who then had his Desert Column advanced-headquarters at Sheikh Zowaiid, conferred wit11 Chauvel, Hodgson, and Dallas of the 53rd Division, and plans were completed for the attack on Gaza. The possibility of a general Turkish retirement in the event of a decisive British success at Gaza was discussed. Chetwode, in whom the cavalry instinct was always strong, emphasised the neces- sity of preparing the mounted troops for a vigorous pursuit. Arrangements were made to transfer the supply waggons, with their horse teams, from the 52nd and 53rd Divisions to the two mounted divisions in exchange for the camels of the latter, so that Chauvel and Hodgson should have all possible mobility. The Turks had withdrawn from Khan Yunis, and the village had been occupied by Anzac Mounted Division, and the water-supply developed. On March 22nd Chetwode advanced his headquarters to Rafa. Dobell was well aware that, if the Turks anticipated his attack on Gaza and concentrated the bulk of their troops in the area Gaza-Beersheba-Huj-Shellal, the position, with its exceptional natural defences, would be unassailable by the troops at his command. Day after day German pilots flew over the British camps; the superiority of their machines enabled them easily to outclimb and outpace the British air- men, a fact which made them very daring in reconnaissance. As the British force was moved forward, special care was therefore taken to avoid this vigilant observation. All marches were made by night, the troops being concealed as far as possible in the sand-dunes by day. For his operations against Gaza Dobell decided to base his advanced-force on Deir el Belah. The site was almost ideal for the purpose. Belah, a small native village, lies at the edge of the coastal sand-dunes, which, for a distance of two or three miles, are there fringed with many groups of palms. These and the pockets between the sand-hills gave good cover to horses and troops. The clean sand made a perfect camp area, particularly in the winter weather, while 262 25th Mar., 19171 FIRST GAZA ENGAGEMENT 263 the hard ground of the treeless plain to the north and east made all movement simple and rapid. Belah lies ten miles south-west of Gaza. Half-way between the two a great irregular gash is torn across the plain by the Wady Ghuzze, which, fed in the wet season by many tribu- taries from the western slope of the central range, interposes a strong barrier south-eastwards from the coast. (“ Wady ” is a comprehensive Arabic term for water-courses of every size, from a mere dry gutter to a great feature like the Ghuzze. Arabic has apparently no equivalents for our specific “ creek,” “ brook,” and “ river.”) A characteristic wady, the Ghuzze is more favoured than most of the streams of southern Palestine; in addition to its winter floods, when it rolls down in a great muddy torrent several feet deep-and between Gaza and Belah more than a hundred yards in width-it is fed in summer by a number of springs in its bed, which, although they do not maintain its flow, provide permanent water for the natives. Its floor lies some thirty or forty feet deep between rugged banks of broken, sandy clay, opening out on either side into innumerable spacious bays. In the spring of the year, with the rain diminishing, it was fordable at many places; consequently, while it offered an easy passage to Dobell’s troops, it promised, in the event of failure, an excellent basis of defence if the Turk should retaliate with a counter-attack. On March 25th a general reconnaissance of the Gaza position was made by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. Crossing the Wady Ghuzze, with supporting troops kept as well concealed as possible, a mounted screen pushed up close to the town on the south-east, and staff officers riding immediately behind were able to make a close personal survey of the ground, in view of the advance which had been decided upon for the following morning. At the same time working parties tested the water in the wady, and prepared crossings for the troops. The Turks opened long-distance fire on the screen, but appeared to have no inkling of the close proximity of the British divisions; Dobell and Chetwode were hopeful that night that their cautious advance was still unknown to the enemy, and that they would take the garrison by surprise in the morning. 264 SINAI AND PALESTINE [25th Mar., 1917 As darkness fell, Chetwode’s Desert Column troops moved to camping grounds in the Belah area. All lights and fires were forbidden. The few hours which remained before 2.30 on the morning of the 26th) when the advance was to begin, were spent in completing arrangements, and very few of the men obtained sleep. The troops, especially the infantry, had been on the move for two or three nights, and were, in conse- quence, already somewhat tired. But the weather was keen and the going sound, and all ranks were in good physical condition for forced marching and battle. Running north and south about 1,200 yards east of Gaza is a long, irregular ridge, which extends almost to the Wady Ghuzze. From the Ghuzze to a point abreast of Gaza this feature was known as the El Sire Ridge ; further north it was afterwards described as “ Anzac Ridge.” Rising from it, about 1,500 yards south-east of the town, is the knoll Ali el Muntar. Flanked on either side by intricate little fields enclosed with cactus, the Ali Muntar position, although only 300 feet above sea-level and a few acres in estent, was the key to the defence of Gaza against attack from the south and east. Troops concealed in the cactus on its flanks could effectively sweep the bare plain country to the east and soutli- west, and also cover any approach along the ridge itself from the south; while artillery observers on its summit, which was at that time marked by the large tomb of a sheikh, could direct the fire of the gunners behind with great accuracy. A few hundred yards south of Ali Muntar the enemy line turned off along the fringe of the cactus hedges towards the Mediterranean, so that Gaza was contained against the British attack in a rough right angle, with the hedges and the sand- dunes nearer the sea covering the south, and Ali Muntar ridge guarding the east. Ali Muntar and the ridge imme- diately north and south of it dominated Gaza and the Turkish line through the cactus on the south. If the knoll could be seized by the British early in the attack, the fall of the town was assured. Dobell believed that, if Ali Muntar could be taken, the rest would be easy. The latest information possessed by the British commander on the night of the 25th was that Gaza was held by only 3,000 troops under the command of Tala Bey, and that the enemy’s 25th Mar., 19171 FIRST GAZA ENGAGEMENT 265 closest support was at Hareira, ten miles to the south-east. Other Turldsli forces were known to be at Tel el Sheria, sixteen miles to the south-west ; at Khurbet el Akra, beyond Huj and twelve miles north-east of Gaza; and at Tel en Nejile, on the railway seventeen miles distant. In other words, Dobell and Chetwode believed that 4,000 troops were isolated at Gaza, with a ring of reinforcements, of which none were nearer than ten miles. But in actual fact the intervening country was a hard, rolling plain, over which the Turks, if they moved to the assistance of Gaza, could march swiftly; while in Gaza itself, and within a radius of from ten to seventeen rniles, the enemy had a total force of about 15,000 rifles. Against this force Dobell had within a few miles of the Ghuzze, on tlie night of the 25th, the 53rd and 54th Infantry Divisions, a total of about 16,000 rifles ; Anzac Mounted Division, less the 1st Light Horse Brigade, about 2,400 dismounted rifles ; the Imperial Mounted Division. less the 4th Light Horse Brigade, about 2,400 dismounted rifles ; and about I.?OO rifles in the Camel Brigade-a total force of about 22,000 effectives. And when the mobility of the mounted brigades is remembered, and also the fact that the 5th, Gth, and 22nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Brigades of the Imperial Mounted Division carried swords, and so were com- plete as cavalry, it is taking too little account of them to consider them merely as dismounted rifles. With this advantage in numbers and mobility, the prospect of successfully rushing Gaza before Turkish reinforcements could arrive appeared exceedingly good. Only one possibility threatened the enterprise with failure. Were the British misinformed as to the true strength of tlie garrison? Had the Turks, like the British, been moving at night? If they had thrown a few thousand additional troops into the town within the last few nights, and had closed in from the north and east generally towards the position, Dobell’s task was certain to be formidable. The British battle-plans were based on the assumption that the information was correct. Dobell’s scheme was simple, and was designed to allow the fullest time possible for storming the town. The attack was to be made by the Desert Column under Chetwode, but Dobell was himself active in the preparations, and he decided to retain the 54th 266 SINAI AND PALESTINE [rgth-26th Mar., 1917 Division under his direct control.