Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland Revising Nuclear Deterrence Alexei Arbatov Vladimir Dvorkin Research and technical support: Vladimir Evseev November 2005 CISSM School of Public Policy 4113 Van Munching Hall University of Maryland This paper was prepared as part of the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, with Phone: 301-405-7601 generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The Fax: 301-403-8107 views expressed in this paper are the authors’ own. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Acknowledgements The authors of this paper are grateful to the Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) at the University of Maryland for initiating this study on the past, present and future of nuclear deterrence, and to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for supporting the work. Our special thanks go to John Steinbruner, who provided valuable intellectual guidance and comments on the subject of the paper, and to Nancy Gallagher for organizing our efficient interaction during the whole research period. We also greatly appreciate the organizational help and support of CISSM and Carnegie Moscow Center staff, as well as the comments and advice of all Russian and American experts who have read all or parts of the paper, or discussed with us its various details. At the same time, the authors bear full responsibility for the assumptions, theoretical analysis and practical proposals of the study. About the Authors Alexei Arbatov – Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. Prof. Sc. (History); Director of the Center for International Security, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Russian Academy of Sciences; Scholar in Residence, Carnegie Moscow Center; former (1993-2003) deputy chair of the defense committee of Russian Parliament (State Duma), former member of Soviet delegation at START I talks (1990). Vladimir Dvorkin – Major Gen. (Ret.) Strategic Rocket Forces; Dr. Prof. Sc. (Technical Sciences); Senior researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security; former Director of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Vladimir Evseev – Lt. Col. (Ret.) Strategic Rocket Forces; Dr. Sc. (Technical Sciences); Senior researcher at the IMEMO Center for International Security; former Chief of meteorological service of ICBM division. 3 List of Acronyms AAD anti-aircraft defense ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty) ALCM air-launched cruise missile BMEWS ballistic missile attack warning system BMD ballistic missile defense (system) C3 command, control, communications C3I command, control, communications and intelligence CMC Carnegie Moscow Center CFE Conventional Armed Forces Reduction in Europe (Treaty) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CST Collective Security Treaty (of CIS states) CTBT Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty CTR co-operative threat reduction DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) EU European Union EWR early warning radar FMCT Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty FMT Fissile Materials Treaty FY fiscal year HB heavy bomber HDBT hard and deeply buried target HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty) 4 IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile JDEC Joint Data Exchange Center LEU low-enriched uranium LOW launch (strike) on warning LUA launch (strike) under attack MIRV multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle MNEPR multilateral nuclear and ecological programs in the Russian Federation MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFU non-first use (of nuclear weapons) NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NW nuclear weapons 3D NWS third nuclear weapon states NWS nuclear weapon states OPSU onboard power supply unit P-5 five permanent members of the UN Security Council PAL permissive-action-links PR public relations PRC People’s Republic of China RF Russian Federation RML road-mobile launcher RMML rail-mobile missile launcher RNEP robust nuclear earth penetrator RV re-entry vehicle SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SDM self-contained dispensing mechanism 5 SIOP single integrated operations plan SNF strategic nuclear forces SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SORT Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty SSBN nuclear ballistic missile submarine SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System TNW tactical nuclear weapons UN United Nations US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WH (nuclear) warhead WMD weapon(s) of mass destruction WWI World War I WWII World War II 6 Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................................................................................2 ABOUT THE AUTHORS .........................................................................................................2 LIST OF ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................3 1. Introduction........................................................................................................................7 2. Controversial Nuclear Deterrence....................................................................................13 2.1. The Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence ..........................................................................16 2.2. The Rationality of Nuclear Deterrence.........................................................................27 2.3. Mutual Deterrence — the Rule or the Exception?........................................................31 2.4. What Prevented a Nuclear War?...................................................................................35 2.5. Nuclear Deterrence and Terrorism................................................................................36 3. Nuclear Programs of the Big Five ...................................................................................40 3.1. Russian Federation........................................................................................................40 3.2. United States of America..............................................................................................43 3.3. Great Britain..................................................................................................................48 3.4. France............................................................................................................................50 3.5. People’s Republic of China (PRC) ...............................................................................53 4. Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control After the Cold War ............................................58 4.1. Self-Generating Dynamics of the Nuclear Equation ....................................................58 4.2. Is Arms Control Relevant Anymore? ...........................................................................59 4.3. Global Partnership and Nuclear Deadlock....................................................................61 4.4. Unlocking the Trap of Nuclear Deterrence...................................................................64 5. Transforming the US-Russian Deterrence Relationship..................................................66 5.1. Verifiable Ban on Launch-On-Warning Concepts .......................................................67 5.2. Verifiable De-Alerting of Strategic Forces...................................................................69 5.3. Deactivation Techniques...............................................................................................71 5.4. Inspection Procedures for Different Techniques of Deactivation.................................75 5.5. Possible Phases of Reducing Readiness Level .............................................................78 6. Doing Away with Nuclear Deterrence.............................................................................86 6.1. Integrating Early Warning and Surveillance Systems ..................................................87 6.2. Cooperative Development and Deployment of Defensive Systems.............................91 6.3. Multilateral Control and Stabilization of Nuclear Arms...............................................94 7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................98 8. Appendix 1: Assumptions in the Model Demonstrated by Figures 6, 7, and 8 .............103 9. Appendix 2: A Tentative Sequence of Practical Bilateral and Multilateral Steps in Revising Nuclear Deterrence .........................................................................................105 7 1. Introduction The goal of the present project is to elaborate on proposals that could help promote transformation of the continuing state of mutual nuclear deterrence, foremost between the biggest nuclear powers — Russia and the United States — into a new mode of relationship based on mutual management of nuclear weapon (NW) interaction and impact on international security. Transformation of this kind, beginning in a bilateral format, will at some future point have to embrace multilateral strategic relations among the five principal nuclear powers and new nuclear weapon states (NWS), as well as some aspects of conventional forces development, deployment