Frederick the Great's Invasion of Saxony, and the Prussian 'Mémoire Raisonné,' 1756 Author(s): Arthur R. Ropes Source: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 5 (1891), pp. 157-175 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal Historical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3678050 Accessed: 26-06-2016 09:46 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press, Royal Historical Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Royal Historical Society This content downloaded from 128.205.114.91 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 09:46:52 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms I57 FREDERICK THE GREAT'S INVASION OF SAXONY, AND THE PRUSSIAN 'MEMOIRE RAISONNE,' I756. By ARTHUR R. ROPES, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. IN a previous paper which I read some years ago before the Society I declared my intention of discussing the reasons for which Frederick the Great made his famous attack on Saxony in 1756-an attack which roused half Europe against him, and brought him within a hair's-breadth of ruin, but of which he never seems to have repented. Now as that invasion of Saxony was in itself a violent measure, and carried out with a harshness that approached brutality; as it was accompanied by an extreme disregard of the feelings of exalted personages and of high society gene- rally; and as it resulted in the ruin of the countries of Saxony and of Prussia by a desolating war, it must be admitted to stand in need of great justification. Such justification it was at one time generally thought that Frederick the Great possessed. Macaulay in his famous essay on Frederick gives voice to the common belief of his time, when he says that Europe recognised that though the King had been in the wrong in invading Silesia, he was only acting in self-defence in absorbing Saxony. Now since Macaulay's time, as I stated in my former paper, and need not repeat at any length here, a good deal has been found out and published that seems to bear very much the other way. There was always a current of opinion adverse to Frederick, even when the philosophers of his age were unanimous in his favour; and this opinion has found voice since in many forms. The works on different 1 2 This content downloaded from 128.205.114.91 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 09:46:52 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 58 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY. sides of the question I have already enumerated in my former paper, and need not again refer to them. I have found only a few of them of use for the present paper-chiefly ' Die Geheimnisse des Sachsischen Cabinets,' a work written by Count Vitzthum from the Saxon Archives, and published in I866-and besides this I have consulted the English state papers of the time, especially Sir Andrew Mitchell's des- patches-and, of course, Frederick's own works and the ' M6moire Raisonne' of Hertzberg. The questions which I have set myself to discuss are briefly these: What were Frederick the Great's reasons for invading Saxony, and what justification had he, if any? Now we know what reasons Frederick gave in his ' History of the Seven Years' War,' and in the ' Memoire Raisonn6 ' which he caused Hertzberg to draw up. In these works he charged the Saxon Government with being an accomplice in the plot of Austria and Russia against him, and with intriguing against him in every quarter. He had, therefore, merely forestalled an insidious foe, as he had a perfect right to do. In proof of this statement he adduced a number of passages from Saxon despatches and state papers, which he had first seen in copies made by a treacherous Saxon clerk, Menzel, and had then verified by seizing the originals at Dresden. If we accept that statement and those proofs we shall need to go no further into the question of Frederick's reason and excuse for his action. He had reason enough, evidently. Now the thesis that I am going to propound may sound paradoxical; but it has been arrived at after some study of authorities. And my conclusion is, that Frederick's diplomatic proofs will not hold water; that Saxony was neither allied against him nor doing anything of particular importance to hurt him; that the ' Memoire Raisonn6' is a series of strained inferences from doubtful texts; and, nevertheless, that Frederick had good and sufficient justification for what he did. In short, I propose in great measure to admit the statements of Frederick's enemies, while I refuse to assent to their conclusions. This content downloaded from 128.205.114.91 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 09:46:52 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms FREDERICK THE GREAT'S INVASION OF SAXONY. 159 Already in Frederick's own time doubts were expressed as to the cogency of the ' Mdmoire Raisonne.' Count Hertz- berg himself, who wrote it, speaks very doubtfully of the expediency of his master's action; and, having regard to the results of that action, we may say that if not expedient, if not necessary in fact, it was in the highest degree unjust. I may translate the passage from Hertzberg's dissertation on the reign of Frederick, read before the Berlin Academy after the King's death. ' Meanwhile' (i.e. during the campaign of 1756) ' he had the Archives at Dresden opened, and sent to his Ministry all the original despatches of that Court, from which I composed and published the famous " M6moire Raisonne," in which the eventual plans of war and partition directed against Russia were proved by the original despatches of the Austrian and Saxon Ministers. It is agreed that such plans existed; but as they were only eventual, and presupposed the condition that the King of Prussia caused a war, it will always remain doubtful whether these plans would ever have been carried out, and whether it would have been more dangerous to await than to forestall them.' It is clear from this passage that Hertz- berg himself thought that it would have been wiser to await the attack. Naturally the statement was hailed by the assailants of Frederick. ' See!' they exclaimed, 'the very man that wrote the " M6moire Raisonne " did not believe in it! His arguments are mere sophistries, his proofs are falsifications, or else passages taken out of their context and twisted to imply a falsehood.' To this the champions of Frederick had, of course, their ready reply. Hertzberg, they said, was a mere clerk, who really only lent his style to Frederick's work, and had to put into shape the materials which Frederick had found for him. And if he did not believe in the cogency of his own work it was because the work was not really his but his master's, and his boast of having composed the ' Mdmoire' was mere personal vanity. Now it seems clear, from the general tone of Hertzberg's dissertation already referred to, that he had an abundantly This content downloaded from 128.205.114.91 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 09:46:52 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 160 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY. good opinion of himself. He brought into prominence all that he had done for Frederick- such as the rather dirty bit of work involved in finding historical pretexts for the partition of Poland. It is quite possible, therefore, that Hertzberg may have claimed too great a share in the composition of the ' M6moire.' In this case, the only way is to look through the volumes of the ' Politische Correspondenz '- Frederick's Diplomatic Correspondence,still being edited for the Prussian Government-to see how the ' M6moire Raisonnd' came into existence, and whether the King himself had much part in composing it. I consulted the proper volumes, and I was constrained to believe that Hertzberg really was the author, with perhaps some help from Counts Podewils and Fincken- stein, Frederick's Ministers at Berlin. I should think that no one could account it likely that Frederick had this elaborate statement prepared before he decided to enter Saxony at all. Now after he had so decided he had certainly very little time to work at it himself. He had already seen copies of the Saxon despatches bearing on his affairs, by the treason of Menzel, a clerk in the Saxon Chancery. When Frederick left Berlin for the frontier he had with him a precis of these docu- ments, but the copies were left at Berlin in a sealed bundle. When in possession of Dresden, he had the archives opened, in spite of the resistance of the Queen of Poland, Electress of Saxony, and took out the original documents mentioned in the pr6cis. These were packed up and sent to Podewils and Finckenstein, with the pressing order to draw up a precis of them to enlighten the public, and print the despatches in full after the pricis. The original documents were to be shown to Mitchell, the English ambassador, and Valory, the French ambassador.