IRAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REVOLUTION’S SOUL 5 August 2002 ICG Middle East Report N°5 Amman/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. IRAN’S POLITICAL STRUCTURE: RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND REFORM ................................................................................................................................. 3 A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CENTRES OF POWER ..........................................................................3 1. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution.....................................................................3 2. The President .............................................................................................................5 3. The Constitutional Assemblies..................................................................................5 B. SECURITY AND PARASTATAL FORCES ...................................................................................7 1. Revolutionary Foundations........................................................................................7 2. The Law Enforcement Forces....................................................................................8 3. The Basij Militia........................................................................................................8 4. The Revolutionary Guards.........................................................................................8 5. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security .................................................................9 6. The Special Clerical Court.........................................................................................9 III. A FRACTURED LANDSCAPE: CONSERVATISM AND REFORM .................. 10 A. THE CONSERVATIVES..........................................................................................................11 B. THE REFORMERS.................................................................................................................12 1. The Modernist Right/Technocrats ...........................................................................12 2. The Islamic Left.......................................................................................................13 3. The Technocrat-Islamic Left Coalition....................................................................13 IV. INTELLECTUAL AND ISLAMIC DISSENT .......................................................... 15 A. THE IRANIAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS FORCES .....................15 B. THE INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENTS..........................................................................................15 C. THE CLERICAL DISSIDENTS.................................................................................................16 1. Factions of Clerical Dissent.....................................................................................17 D. ISLAMIC STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS.......................................................................................19 V. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND POLICY .................................................................... 20 A. THE FIGHT FOR REFORM SINCE 1997..................................................................................20 B. EVENTS SINCE 2000............................................................................................................22 C. A RISING TIDE OF DISSATISFACTION ..................................................................................24 VI. SPLITS OVER FOREIGN POLICY.......................................................................... 27 A. REGIONAL NEIGHBOURS AND THE WEST..............................................................................27 B. THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN...............................................................................................29 C. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT........................................................................30 VII. CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD ................................................................... 31 A. THE INTERNAL BALANCE....................................................................................................31 B. THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE...................................................................32 CHARTS 1. IRAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER STRUCTURE ....................................................................37 2. IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONS WITHIN THE POWER APPARATUS ..................................................39 3. LAY LEADERS OF THE NON-VIOLENT DISSIDENT REFORMERS ............................................40 4. REPRESENTATIVE GRAND AYATOLLAHS OF THE ISLAMIC CLERICAL DISSIDENTS ...............41 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAN......................................................................................................................42 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.......................................................................43 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ................................................................................44 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................48 ICG Middle East Report N°5 5 August 2002 IRAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE REVOLUTION’S SOUL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Iran is at a crossroads. More than two decades after full religious credentials to neutralise the rival the revolution that swept Supreme Leader Ayatollah clerical camps. As a result, he has to work much Ruhollah Khomeini into power, its people and more actively to maintain a conservative coalition leaders are deeply torn about the country’s future. that supports his over-arching role in Iranian society. The outcome of the struggle for the revolution’s soul will resonate across the Middle East and have At the same time, driven by economic dissatisfaction, major implications both strategically and for a thirst for greater political representation and a ongoing efforts to curb violence, including decline in revolutionary passion, increasing numbers terrorism, in the region. The internal struggle is of Iranians are pushing for broad social and fluid and unstable. While the notion of a clear-cut economic change. Forms of democracy unknown to battle pitting conservatives against reformers is most of the Middle East region have appeared, and appealing, it does not do justice to the reality. There the once all-powerful conservative clerical elite must are divisions within both camps and connections contend with competing actors and institutions, as between them; indeed, some actors may be well as with an increasingly young and restive “conservative” on certain issues and “reformers” on population that demands wholesale political, social others. Likewise, the idea that Iran’s rulers can be and economic reform. President Mohammad dismissed en bloc as obstacles to reform overlooks Khatami, a liberal cleric elected in 1997 and re- the genuine differences that exist regarding the elected in 2001 by wide margins, has become the proper role of religion, democracy, social norms, symbol of Iran’s reform movement. Pro-reform economics and foreign policy. The complexity of candidates have consistently won roughly 70 percent Iran’s domestic situation makes it all the more of the vote in parliamentary and local elections. As a difficult – but also imperative – for the international result, a disparate group of reformers has taken over community to exercise caution, properly fine-tune all the country’s elective offices, though its actions and anticipate their impact. conservatives still control key non-elective positions, including that of the Supreme Leader, and the Powerful conservative clerics and security officials principal levers of power. do maintain significant control over many key centres of power, including the military, intelligence The composition of the reform movement is services and the judiciary, and use covert means to symptomatic of its growing appeal. Today, it is a circumvent their rivals’ nominal control of the coalition of the modernist (technocrat) right and foreign policy apparatus. Supreme Leader Ayatollah the Islamic left – a remarkable evolution from only Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor, a decade ago, when the Islamic left, which had stands at the head of this loose coalition. Although directed the take-over of the U.S. embassy in Khamenei still wields tremendous power, it is far November 1979, still advocated hard-line, radical less than that enjoyed by Khomeini, whose authority positions. At the same time, a strong internal from 1979 to 1989 was undisputed, restricted by movement of Islamic and intellectual dissent is neither constitution nor parliament. In contrast, appealing to sections of public opinion. Khamenei does not possess the personal authority or Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution´s Soul ICG Middle East Report N°5, 5 August 2002 Page ii The power struggle between conservatives and popular movement of Iranians who support reformers has largely resulted in deadlock in democracy. domestic and foreign policies alike. Forced to engage in a perpetual balancing act to sustain The international debate about how best to deal reform momentum without provoking a backlash, with Iran reflects genuine uncertainty about how and unable to control vast areas of internal and certain actions will play out