SGOXXX10.1177/2158244013484734SAGE OpenAllen 484734research-article2013 SAGE Open April-June 2013: 1 –10 Passing the Dinner Table Test: © The Author(s) 2013 DOI: 10.1177/2158244013484734 Retrospective and Prospective sgo.sagepub.com Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia in Britain Chris Allen1 Abstract Through establishing the All Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia and Cross-Government Working Group on Anti- Muslim Hatred, the Coalition government has afforded significance to Islamophobia. Focusing on definition, evidence, and politics, this article considers British governmental policy approaches to tackling Islamophobia over the past 15 years. Tracing religiously based discrimination from the 1980s to the publication of the Runnymede Trust’s 1997 groundbreaking report into Islamophobia, this article explores how the New Labour government sought primarily to address Islamophobia through a broadening of the equalities framework. Against a backdrop of 9/11 and 7/7, a concurrent security and antiterror agenda had detrimental impacts. Under the Coalition, there has been a marked change. Considering recent developments and initiatives, the Coalition has seemingly rejected Islamophobia as an issue of equalities preferring approaches more akin to tackling Anti-Semitism. In conclusion, definition, evidence, and politics are revisited to offer a prospective for future British governmental policy. Keywords Islamophobia, anti-Muslim hatred, British government, discrimination, religion Since the 2010 general election, the Coalition government Given Islamophobia’s timeliness, relatively little schol- has brought the issue of Islamophobia much more firmly into arly work has been produced, which focuses on governmen- the political and policy spaces than its New Labour predeces- tal policy responses to tackling the phenomenon. sor. This can be seen in the establishing of the All Party Consequently, such a consideration is possibly somewhat Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Islamophobia, the Cross- overdue. Acknowledging this gap and the shift in Coalition Government Working Group (CGWG) on Anti-Muslim thinking, this article critically analyses British governmental Hatred (CGWG), and in a more populist fashion, in the sug- policy responses and approaches to Islamophobia over the gestion by the cochair of the Conservative Party—Baroness past two decades. Focusing on three key issues—definition, Sayeeda Warsi—that Islamophobia has passed “the dinner evidence, and political differences—this article offers a brief table test” (Guardian, 2011): that the expression of anti-Mus- overview of what Islamophobia might—and might not—be. lim and anti-Islamic sentiment has become socially accept- From here, it contextualizes the contemporary setting able through conversational civility. To what extent also is it through considering historical policy approaches including evidence that the Coalition, unlike its New Labour predeces- “race relations” and equalities agendas. Using the Runnymede sors, is happy to “do God” (Guardian, 2010)? Irrespective of report as a landmark, a critical retrospective of the policies to the drivers, Islamophobia is now firmly established on the emerge under New Labour is considered before focusing on political and policy radar; interesting given that since the recent, Coalition-led changes. In conclusion, this article publication of the Commission on British Muslims and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different policy Islamophobia’s (CBMI) report by the Runnymede Trust in approaches to highlight where future British governmental 1997 (the Runnymede report)—the first British policy docu- policy toward Islamophobia may go. As well as reflecting ment relating to Islamophobia—policy responses to the phe- nomenon have been scant, indirect, and somewhat implicit. 1University of Birmingham, England Consequently, developments and discourses emanating from Corresponding Author: the Coalition are as unexpected as they are unprecedented. Chris Allen, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, West Why then might Islamophobia be on the policy agenda now? Midlands B15 2TT, England. What has changed? Email: [email protected] Downloaded from by guest on June 4, 2016 2 SAGE Open upon a wide range of policy and academic sources, docu- widely adopted, both have been shown to be flawed. For ments from various governmental sources (including some Allen (2010), if the “closed views” equal Islamophobia, then that are unavailable in the public domain) and research notes the opposite “open views”—set out in the report as a coun- from exploring Islamophobia at British and European levels terbalance or more rational “view”—must equal Islamophilia, from the past decade are also drawn upon. itself as unwelcome and unwarranted as Islamophobia. For Acknowledging the international resonance of the phe- those seeking to refute or reject Islamophobia, such a binary nomenon, its different manifestations in different national approach offers convenience: Tackling Islamophobia neces- and international settings, and the differing approaches to sitates the imposition of an unmovable and uncritical tackling it in these same locations, this article contributes (Islamophilic) shield behind which all criticism and ques- knowledge toward understanding governmental policy tioning of Islam and Muslims, irrespective of legitimacy is approaches to tackling Islamophobia as well as Islamophobia deflected or repealed. For critics, therefore, all discussion per se. The wider body of work remains embryonic where and debate is forced into being either “Islamophobic” or the focus has been on theoretical analyses (Allen, 2010; “Islamophilic.” In doing so, the nuance and complexity that Malik, 2010; Sayyid & Vakil, 2010), media (Petley & characterizes much of what sits between the binaries is inap- Richardson, 2011; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004), applied propriately referred to in generalized terms and in largely contexts (e.g., education; Shaik, 2006), specific locations patronizing and phoney ways (Allen, 2010). This widespread (Reeves, Abbas, & Pedroso, 2009), political movements and uncritical adoption of the Runnymede definition and (Allen, 2011a), or from within specific disciplines (Sheriden, typology is therefore seen to be causal in the failure to effec- 2006). As Campling (1997) observes from research into race tively communicate not only what Islamophobia is but also relations and equalities, it is easy to be overly “introspective, to convince politicians and policy makers that a response is over-theoretical and disconnected from policy concerns” required (Allen, 2010). (p.1), something which is true of Islamophobia. Where Usage of the term Islamophobia is also problematic. research has focused on policy, most have disproportionately Shyrock (2010) suggests that the usage is oversimplified and focused on associated topics or those conflated with Islam or “impervious to nuance” (2010, p. 9), whereas for Allen Muslims rather than with Islamophobia itself. This can be (2010), it is routinely conceived and used in weak and uncon- seen in the focus on antiterrorism (Kundnani, 2009; Spalek vincing ways. Sayyid (2010) offers differentiation: & McDonald, 2010) and integration (Joppke, 2009; Analytically, Islamophobia is rendered “a nebulous and per- Mandeville, 2009; Modood, Triandafyllidou, & Zapata- petually contested category” (p. 2); polemically, it is locked Barrero, 2006; Schain, 2010; Sinno, 2008) among others. in the discourses of those with grievances, smugly pontificat- Alcock’s (2003) reflection therefore has resonance: “the rac- ing or seeking the ear of politicians. For him, usage is inef- ism that black people in Britain experience is thus not the fectual given the lack of meaning attributed to it by those same thing as reaction to ethnic differences” (p. 290). As the who use it. Similar criticisms are posited when charges of Islamophobia Muslims experience in Britain is not the same Islamophobia are made, lacking specificity, relying on con- as reaction to religious or theological differences, what jecture and accusation, therefore being open to challenge and Parekh (2006) suggests comes under the moniker the rejection (Vakil, 2010). As Vakil (2010) reflects, given such “Muslim question.” As Alcock clarifies, the focus “is thus contention, it might be easier to suspend engagement with not race, but racism” (p. 290). Here, therefore, the focus is Islamophobia linguistically and conceptually. However, as Islamophobia. he adds, this miscasts the issue as the term is established in the contemporary lexicon and has had considerable invest- Knowing Islamophobia ment from critics and advocates alike. Relevant here is the fact that the Coalition government is now openly using the Recognition of Islamophobia, let alone political recognition, term. Although as before, what matters will be what is meant spans little more than two decades (Allen, 2010; CBMI, by the Coalition’s usage of the term. 1997). Those two decades, however, have been marked by at Unsurprisingly, the government’s definition and mean- times emotive exchanges about what Islamophobia is and ings of Islamophobia remain protean. As evidence of this, the what is not. British in coinage, the Runnymede report defined APPG has prioritized the need for a working definition to Islamophobia as “a useful shorthand way of referring to the base its work program on (Allen, 2011a). So does the CGWG, dread or hatred of Islam . and, therefore, to fear or dislike noting how “the term Islamophobia