NO. In the Supreme Court of the United States PAMELA GELLER AND ROBERT B. SPENCER, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Respondent. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI DAVID E LIEZER Y ERUSHALMI Counsel of Record AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER 1901 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. N.W. SUITE 201 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (646) 262-0500 [email protected] ROBERT JOSEPH MUISE AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER P.O. BOX 131098 ANN ARBOR, MI 48113 (734) 635-3756 [email protected] Counsel for Petitioners Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001 i QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioners’ application to trademark “STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA” was denied as disparaging based on the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s assessment of the viewpoint of Petitioners’ political speech generally related to Islam and not how a substantial composite of the referenced group understood the meaning of the mark itself, thereby creating a chilling effect on core political speech. 1. May the United States Patent and Trademark Office refuse a trademark registration for a mark because the Office understands the mark to be disparaging in violation of § 2(a) of the Trademark Act based upon the Office’s interpretation of the viewpoint of the trademark applicant’s political speech related tangentially to the subject of the mark? 2. Did the court of appeals err by utilizing a standard of review for the “ultimate registrability” of Petitioners’ mark that (a) conflicts with the standard utilized by the majority of circuits that have addressed this issue, and (b) is both illogical in theory and muddled in practice? ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The Petitioners are Pamela Geller and Robert B. Spencer. The Respondent is the United States Patent and Trademark Office. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED................... i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............. ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................... v OPINIONS BELOW ......................... 1 JURISDICTION ............................ 1 STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED.................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. 1 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 5 I. The Federal Circuit’s Use of the Viewpoint of an Applicant’s Political Speech to Define the Mark Violates this Court’s First Amendment Precedent and Will Chill Political Speech of Trademark Applicants Touching upon Sensitive Religious, Political, and Social Issues......... 6 II. The Federal Circuit’s Standard of Review, which Is at Odds with a Majority of the Circuits that Have Addressed the Issue, Is Ambiguous in Theory and Incoherently Applied in Practice, Rendering It Meaningless................. 14 CONCLUSION ............................ 27 APPENDIX Appendix A Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 13, 2014) ...............App. 1 iv Appendix B Decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (February 7, 2013) ...........App. 15 Appendix C S. Hrg. 110-942 The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter it (July 10, 2008) ..............App. 45 Appendix D Report of Zeyno Baran, Senior Fellow and Director of Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute .....App. 161 Appendix E Definition and News Articles...................App. 192 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int’l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) ................. 16 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987) ................ 16 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) ...................... 22 In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .............. 7 In re Blvd. Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......... 3-4, 7 Bouchikhi v. Holder, 676 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2012) ............... 25 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) ...................... 25 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ...................... 12 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) ...................... 10 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) ...................... 22 Frederick Gash, Inc. v. Mayo Clinic, 461 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ............. 15 In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .............. 7 vi Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003) ............ 9 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ................... 21, 22 Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1988) ................. 17 Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 1999) ............... 17 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) .................... 3, 11 In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210 (T.T.A.B. 2010) .......... 9 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) .............. 16 Makir-Marwil v. United States AG, 681 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2012) ............. 25 Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1985) ............... 16 In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .......... passim Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) ............... 16 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ...................... 10 vii NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) .................... 3, 10 In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............. 7 Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984) .............. 16 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ......... 25 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003) ................ 9, 16, 17, 22, 24 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ...................... 11 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) ...................... 12 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) ...................... 26 Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985) .............. 16 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) ...................... 12 Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs. Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ............. 15 viii CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES U.S. Const. amend. I.................... passim 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) ..................... passim 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) ................... 15, 16, 26 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) ........................ 7 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) ........................ 7 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................... 1 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) ............................ 6 Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)............................. 6 OTHER AUTHORITY Philip N. Howard & Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) . 21 1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals appears at App. 1-14 and is reported at 751 F.3d 1355. The opinion of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board appears at App. 15-55 and can be found at 2013 TTAB LEXIS 67 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Feb. 7, 2013). JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 13, 2013. App. 1. This petition was filed on August 11, 2014. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act provides that the United States Patent and Trademark Office may refuse an application when the trademark “[c]onsists of or comprises . matter which may disparage . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioners filed the STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA (“Mark”) Mark Registration Application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) on February 21, 2010. App. 15-16. The PTO 2 refused to register the Mark based upon its view that the meaning of the Mark “consists or includes matter which may disparage or bring into contempt persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols” in violation of § 2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). App. 16. The decision of the PTO was timely appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”). The Board upheld the PTO’s refusal to register the Mark by interpreting the viewpoint of Petitioner’s political speech indirectly related to the Mark in such a way that “Islamisation” was understood to mean all things Islamic.1 The essence of the logic of the Board is that Islamisation means all things Islamic and “Stop” in the context of services (i.e., educating the public about terrorism) related to the Mark disparages Muslims because together they suggest Islam should be “stopped” due to its connection with terrorism. App. 18-20. The Board also found that there was evidence that “Islamisation” carries a second meaning—the meaning advanced by Petitioners through the Mark.2 Petitioners have argued consistently that Islamisation has only one meaning in public discourse and in the context of the use of the Mark. Specifically, the Mark does not mean all things Islamic but rather a very 1 The Board and the parties treated “Islamisation” with the letter “s” and “Islamization” with the letter “z” as alternative spellings of the same word. App. 2. 2 The PTO and the Board considered the word “Islamize” to be the verb form of “Islamisation.” App. 18 (citing to the record located at App. 192). 3 dangerous politicization of Islam where Islamic law supplants secular constitutional law and civil liberties in political society and creates the ideological breeding ground for what is commonly referred to as “Islamic terrorism,” or what might be more accurately termed “terrorism carried out in the name of Islam.” App.