Importing Napoleon: Engineering the American Military Nation, 1814-1821 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jonathan M. Romaneski, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2017 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Mark Grimsley, Advisor Dr. John Brooke Dr. Jennifer Siegel Copyright by Jonathan Romaneski 2017 Abstract As the War of 1812 drew to a close, the American nation was economically exhausted and politically upended. The great crisis of the war loomed over the American shorelines from mid-1814 onward, when British reinforcements under a new and more aggressive British commander threatened offensive thrusts into U.S. territory at multiple points. Americans were completely unprepared to meet the British invasion attempts; the United States parried all British thrusts in 1814 almost in spite of itself. Thus, by the end of 1814, the Madison administration (with strong input from James Monroe) began to seek to reform the American military establishment to ensure a more disciplined and uniform militia system, a better-educated and “professional” officer corps, and a stout system of seacoast fortifications. The reformers looked no further than the Napoleonic military system for all their answers. In order to convince the American people and their congressional representatives that greater investment in a Napoleonic-style army was necessary, the reformers relied on a narrative of the War of 1812 that emphasized the frailty of the militia and the heroism of the regulars. Complicating the reformers’ narrative was, first, the strong antimilitary ideological traditions that Americans had held so closely since the Revolutionary era, and second, a counternarrative of the war that arose from Andrew Jackson’s victory at New Orleans. Despite the abounding case studies to which reformers could appeal in support ii of their position—most notably the regulars’ performance at the Battle of Chippewa and the militia’s apparent failure at the Battle of Bladensburg—the single case of Jackson at New Orleans carried greater emotional weight and had the additional benefit of reinforcing Americans’ pro-militia, anti-army biases. This dissertation covers the difficulties that a relatively small group of men in the executive branch of the U.S. government faced when they tried, between 1814 and 1821, to strengthen the federal apparatus by adopting Napoleonic military practices. It is a study, therefore, of top-down policy implementation and of the role of war’s memory in that process. “Importing Napoleon” proved difficult in the political arena because Andrew Jackson’s folk-heroism seemed to repudiate the need for such measures, but it was comparatively more successful within the U.S. Army itself because the military structure lent itself better to top-down change. By 1821, when Congress rejected Secretary of War John C. Calhoun’s “expansible army” concept and the army was reduced in size, it was a political setback for the reformers. Within the regular army, however, a new generation of competently-educated officers was emerging from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point—they were the agents who would engineer the United States’ path westward toward its imperial destiny. iii Dedicated with love and affection to Jessica, Adlai, Grace, and Anna. iv Acknowledgements: Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh. —Ecclesiastes 12:12 Writing a work of history is in some ways a lonely endeavor. It requires countless hours spent poring over manuscripts, books, and texts, followed by quiet reflection. The end reward for so much preparation is to cloister oneself in a quiet room somewhere and pour out one’s thoughts onto paper. Yet despite the single-mindedness of creating this project, anyone who has ever written knows that the author can never take total credit for the completed project. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the great minds and to the circumstances that have shaped this work, and to express my gratitude to those who have helped in critical material and personal ways. I most emphatically could not have done this project by myself. I first became interested in the early republican tension between “security” and “liberty” when, in 2003, I was beginning my undergraduate thesis. At the same time that I was studying the roots of the militiaman as a symbol for liberty in revolutionary America, I was also watching updates on the war in Iraq on the news. The juxtaposition between the historical America that I was visiting in my research and the America I was watching on the news created a palpable sense of irony. I devoted myself to understanding better how we as Americans had come to such a place, militarily speaking. v I arrived at Ohio State in 2012, just after the 200th anniversary of the beginning of the War of 1812. I had come to suspect that the answer to the question I had asked myself as an undergraduate about “how we got here” lay somewhere in the American experience of 1812-1815. I will always remember with fondness my first meeting with Professor Mark Grimsley to discuss these thoughts with him. I was still living in a hotel room with my pregnant wife and young son, and he met with me and got me truly excited about the project on which I was embarking. He has always been a source of sage advice and encouragement. More important in my opinion, he has challenged me to consider the complexities of academic history. I I have done half as well as he in capturing such historical complexity, I will consider it a success. While at Ohio State, there have been more friends and mentors who have helped form my thinking than I could name. I do wish to single out Professors Geoffrey Parker, Jennifer Siegel, Chris Otter, and John Brooke for special recognition. Each of them, in her or his own way, inspired and encouraged me as I formulated my project and began to commit it to action. Sam Watson at the U.S. Military Academy also played an absolutely vital role in shaping my thinking. He volunteered countless hours to reading my drafts and offering incisive comments; it is a privilege to count him as a mentor. My dear friends at Ohio State, likewise, were a crucial source of strength for me. Whether it was the camaraderie and laughter we shared, the sense of shared experience we had as PhD students, or the critical feedback I received from my peers on my different essays and chapters, it was my fellow graduate students who made my experience an actual pleasure. Sarah Douglass, William Waddell, Greg Hope, Corbin Williamson, Ian Johnson, and Zack Fry were particularly important to me in this role. vi Scholars require funding to complete their projects. I am deeply indebted to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, which the Mershon Center for International Security Studies superintends, for its generous support to my research. I also could not have completed my research without the aid of the Omar N. Bradley Historical Research Fellowship, managed through the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of History. I would be remiss if I did not devote a portion of my acknowledgements to the way that contemporary American politics has shaped this dissertation. I conceived of and began work on this project well before the candidacy of Donald J. Trump, but I completed the final chapters and refined the overall product with his voice playing in the background. Early American historians can scarce ignore the parallels between Trump’s populist appeal and that of Andrew Jackson; it is a dynamic that many far abler political historians have already articulated well. While I understand the similarities between the two men, there are also significant differences between them and I have emphatically resisted any urge to draw “lessons for today” from my research material. If anything, this dissertation has shown me how slippery “lessons” can be, but I do not doubt for a moment that my own political environment has shaped the tone of my narrative. I wish, in closing, to thank my beloved family for their support. I regret that my late grandmother, Marilyn Romaneski, could not have lived to see this dissertation completed. She always indulged, for as far back as I can remember, whatever creative energies I was willing to share with her. My parents, Mark and Karalee Romaneski, have likewise been uncompromising in their moral support to me. Thank you for your kind words. Above all, though, I must thank my immediate family. Writing this much for this long a period of time has been an emotional ride for all involved, and it is especially vii difficult to undertake a project like this with three young children. My youngest daughter, Anna, joined us right as I was completing my PhD candidacy exam, and she is still a little too young to understand what I have been doing, but I live for the moment when I come home from work to have her run and hug my leg. Grace was born on my very first day of classes at Ohio State. In fact, I had to leave my first class because she was on the way, and she has proven a pleasant interruption to my academic work ever since. Adlai, our oldest, prayed faithfully for me during bedtime that I would finish my “book” soon; my own prayer is simply that I will prove to be half as strong a “Dada Man” as he believes me to be. Finally, but without doubt foremost in my mind, is my wonderful bride Jessica.