SUPRE~.4E COU"T OF M PHII..IPPINES PIJi,UC 1HfOl'll.fA1'1oti OfF!CE 31\epublic of tbe l)bilippineg $,Uprcme QCourt Jlllanila EN BANC SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. G.R. No. 238875 PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM" AQUINO :CV, LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioners, -versus- ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR S. PANELO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x x----- -------------------------------------x PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR G.R. No. 239483 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (PCICC), LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, DR. AURORA CORAZON A. PARONG, EVELYN BALAIS- SERRANO, JOSE NOEL D. OLANO, REBECCA DESIREE E. LOZADA, ED ELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, ANALIZA T. UGAY, NIZA - CONCEPCION ARAZAS, GLORIA ESTER CATIBAYAN-GUARIN, RAY PAOLO "ARPEE" J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT TERUEL ANDRES, AND AXLE P. SIMEON, Petitioners, I Decision ' 2 G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 ::'j·' . -., . ',' : t -versus- I-••,:•:••.·,., OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO, AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR., Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x x-------------------------------------------x INTEGRATED BAR OF THE G.R. No. 240954 PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Present: PERALTA, ChiefJustice, -versus- PERLAS-BERNABE, LEONEN, CAGUIOA, GESMUNDO, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE HERNANDO, SECRETARY, REPRESENTED CARANDANG, BY HON. SALVADOR C. LAZARO-IAVIER, MEDIALDEA, THE INTING, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN ZALAMEDA, AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY LOPEZ, M., HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO DELOS SANTOS, AND THE PERMANENT GAERLAN, MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ROSARIO, and THE PHILIPPINES TO THE LOPEZ, J., JJ UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED · BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR~, Promulgated: v· Respondents. ----Mc:ircb 16, 2021 x--------------------- --------------------------------------------------------x " Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 DECISION LEONEN, J.: Treaties may effectively implement the constitutional imperative to protect human rights and consider social justice in all phases of development-but so san a statute, as Republic Act No. 9851, the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, does. The president, as primary architect of our foreign policy and as head of state, is allowed by the Constitution to make preliminary determinations on what, at any given moment, might urgently be required in order that our foreign policy may manifest our national interest. Absent a clear and convincing showing of a breach of the Constitution or a law, brought through an actual, live controversy and by a party that presents direct, material, and substantial injury as a result of such breach, this Court will stay its hand in declaring a diplomatic act as unconstitutional. On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March 17, 2018. Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines' action soon after it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of affairs correctible by this Court's finite jurisdiction. The Petitions were, therefore, moot when they were filed. 1 The International Criminal Court's subsequent consummate acceptance of the withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of this Court's insisting on a reversal of completed actions In any case, despite the withdrawal, this Court finds no lesser protection of human rights within our system of laws. Neither do we agree ) with petitioners' implied statements that without the treaty, the judiciary will not be able to fulfill its mandate to protect human rights. The Petition in GR. No. 238875 was filed on May 16, 2018; the Petition in GR. No. 293483 on June 7, 2018; and the Petition in G.R. No. 240954 on August 14, 2018. Decision • 4 G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, • and 240954 Moreover, the Senate never sought to enforce what would have been its prerogative to require its concurrence for withdrawal. To date, Resolution No. 249, which seeks to express the chamber's position on the need for concurrence, has yet to be tabled and voted on. 2 Individual senators have standing to question the constitutionality of the actions of their chamber. Yet, in this case, as shown by the Resolution which petitioners co­ authored, they acknowledged that an action by the Senate was necessary before coming to this Court. Thus, no actual conflict or constitutional impasse has yet arisen even as implied by their actions. This Court cannot compel or annul actions where the relevant incidents are moot. Neither can this Court, without due deference to the actions of a co-equal constitutional branch, act before the Senate has acted. Nonetheless, the President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or international agreement is not absolute. As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties. However, this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under the Constitution and the laws. In appropriate cases, legislative involvement is imperative. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if there is subsequent legislation which affirms and implements it. Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that is inconsistent with a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the prior statute is amended to be consistent with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty. It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and is ultimately signed into law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and legislative participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the sovereign's democratically elected representatives in the enactment of statutes. The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by circumstances attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative imprimatur impelled the president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected without concomitant legislative sanction. Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence imposes as a condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, 0 the president enjoys no unilateral authority to withdraw, and must then / secure Senate concurrence. Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in 2 Oral Arguments, TSN dated September 4, 2018, p. 14. Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 keeping with our legal system, if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute. However, the president may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty. This Court resolves consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to: (a) declare the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute as invalid or ineffective, since it was done without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Senate's members; and (b) compel the executive branch to notify the United Nations Secretary-General that it is cancelling, revoking, and withdrawing the Instrument of Withdrawal.3 Petitioners maintain that the Instrument of Withdrawal is inconsistent with the Constitution. The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal Court, where the gravest crimes under international law are prosecuted. 4 Since 1996, under Fidel V. Ramos's (President Ramos) presidency, the Philippines has participated in the court's establishment, taking an active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting Committee. 5 On December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (President Estrada), signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 6 President Estrada's act of signing the Rome Statute signified the Philippines' intent to be bound by the provisions of the treaty, subject to the domestic requirements for its validity and enforceability. 7 Particularly, Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution8 requires the concurrence by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate for a treaty to be valid, binding, effective, and enforceable. In the meantime, on July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court's ! 3 Rollo (G.R. No. 238875), p. 16, Petition. 4 Rollo (G.R. No. 239483), p. 8, Petition. 5 Rollo (G.R. No. 238875), p. 8, Petition. 6 See United Nations Treaty Collection, available at <https://treaties. un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=