Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 6 2008 Discrimination Lurking on the Brooks: Examining the Constitutionality of the Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance Vanessa Wheeler Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq Recommended Citation Vanessa Wheeler, Discrimination Lurking on the Brooks: Examining the Constitutionality of the Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance, 26 Law & Ineq. 467 (2008). Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol26/iss2/6 Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. Discrimination Lurking on the Books: Examining the Constitutionality of the Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance Vanessa Wheelert Introduction The Minneapolis lurking law section 385.80 states: "No person, in any public or private place, shall lurk, lie in wait or be concealed with intent to commit any crime or unlawful act."1 The Minneapolis community is divided over the desirability of the lurking law. Some citizens approve of the ordinance as a means of providing law enforcement officers effective crime-fighting tools, while others argue that it allows police officers too much discretion to use those tools discriminatorily.2 City Council members,3 advocacy groups,4 and criminal justice advocates5 have all criticized the law as discriminatory. "[The lurking law criminalizes] standing on a corner after ten t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, St. Olaf College. I would like to thank the editors and staff of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their efforts in bringing this Article to publication. 1. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005). Violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine of up to seven hundred dollars, imprisonment of up to ninety days, or both. Id. § 1.30. 2. See Vickie Evans Nash, Beware! Discrimination Lurking in Minneapolis, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/node/4340 (last visited June 9, 2008); Mike Mosedale, What Lurks Beneath?, CITY PAGES, Feb. 28, 2007, at 13, available at http://articles.citypages.com/2007-02-28/news/what- lurks-beneath/. 3. See Nash, supra note 2 ("Currently, city council members Gary Schiff, Betsey Hodges, Elizabeth Glidden and Cam Gordon have already expressed their intent to back the repeal [of § 385.80], with council members Diane Hofstede and Don Samuels still undecided."). 4. See More on Our "Lurking" Ordinance, http://secondward.blogspot.com /2007 03 01 archive.html (Mar. 16, 2007, 15:50 CST) [hereinafter Our Lurking Ordinance] (listing community organizations and foundations that support repeal of the lurking ordinance, including the NAACP, the African American Men Project, and the Minneapolis Urban League). This information comes from Minneapolis Second Ward City Council Member Cam Gordon's blog, which he uses as a public policy forum to discuss council activities and explain his position on various issues. Id. 5. See Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13. Law and Inequality [Vol. 26:467 o'clock at night when you're [B]lack." 6 Despite such criticisms, others in the community feel the law is justified. In response to challengers who argued that the lurking law is discriminatory, the President of the City Council argued: "[If] you're the person who is waiting for the bus and is frightened by someone who is lurking, what validity does [a claim of racial disparity] have?"7 In order to repeal the ordinance, a majority of Minneapolis City Council members must support the repeal.8 However, repeal will not come without a fight from those members of the community who feel that the law makes their neighborhoods safer.9 With the community divided over the desirability of the lurking law, it is important to step back and understand the underlying issues by analyzing section 385.80 in light of the history of vagrancy and loitering laws throughout the United States, the history of the ordinance itself, and relevant constitutional law. This Article identifies probable constitutional violations embedded in the lurking law and recommends that the City Council repeal section 385.80. Part I explores the context of section 385.80 by examining the history and relevant case law on loitering and vagrancy laws in the United States generally, and Minneapolis loitering and lurking laws specifically. Part II examines potential constitutional challenges to the "lurking law," focusing on vagueness, overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment violations. The Article concludes that, in addition to being unconstitutional, the lurking law is rendered unnecessary by section 385.50, the city's more carefully constructed and detailed loitering ordinance. ° I. Lurking, Loitering, and Vagrancy Laws: A History The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that, "[despite doubtless differences in nuance, 'lurking' is not significantly different from 'loitering.'"'" Therefore, an examination of loitering 6. Id. 7. Id. 8. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, § 9 (2005). 9. See Nash, supra note 2. 10. § 385.50 ("No person shall loiter on the streets or in a public place or in a place open to the public with intent to solicit for the purposes of prostitution, illegal narcotic sale, distribution, purchase or possession, or any other act prohibited by law."). 11. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1968). The court found the term "loitering" to be "a term of common usage with a meaning reasonably understood by persons of common intelligence," yet failed to give it a definition. Id. The court also found that, "[a] lthough 'lurking' may have a primary connotation of hiding or concealment, it equally connotes a persistent presence or a furtive 2008] DISCRIMINATION LURKING ON THE BOOKS 469 laws illustrates the likely constitutional challenges the lurking law will face. This Section begins by examining the history of loitering laws in the United States and then explains typical constitutional challenges to such laws. Finally, this Section explores Minneapolis lurking and loitering laws in detail, focusing on the enactment and enforcement history of sections 385.80 and 385.50. A. Evolution of Loitering Laws in the United States 1. An Early History American loitering laws derive from English vagrancy laws."2 The breakdown of the feudal system in England following the Black Plague led to the passage of the Statute of Labourers in 1349.13 The goal of the statute was to combat labor shortages by prohibiting labor movement and wage increases. 4 Following the collapse of the feudal system, vagrancy laws survived as a means of crime prevention, as it was thought that the unemployed supported themselves through crime." English vagrancy laws also typically included prohibitions against loitering, reflecting the overlapping nature of the "offenses" of loitering and vagrancy.16 Early in their history, the American colonies adopted loitering and vagrancy laws similar to those of England that were also founded on principles of crime prevention. 7 A typical statute defined a vagrant as "any person who wanders or strolls about in idleness, or lives in idleness, who is able to work, and has no property sufficient for his support." 8 The constitutionality of these laws went virtually unchallenged for nearly two hundred years, due in large part to the fact that poor defendants had little access to legal counsel.' 9 In the 1960s, soon after the Supreme movement in a place." Id. 12. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972). 13. See id. 14. Id. at 161. 15. See Joel D. Berg, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 461, 463 (1993). 16. See id. at 462 n.15 (explaining the nexus between vagrancy and loitering). Loitering is often defined in terms of spending time idly, while vagrancy is often understood as pertaining to an idle person without visible means of support who wanders from place to place. Id. 17. Id. at 463-64. 18. Robin Yeamans, ConstitutionalAttacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV. 782, 783 (1968) (quoting an Alabama statute no longer in force). 19. See id. 470 Law and Inequality [Vol. 26:467 Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,2 ° which guaranteed legal representation to any indigent defendant charged with a felony, challenges to vagrancy laws began to gain momentum.21 2. Evolving Attitudes After Gideon, more and more courts began hearing constitutional challenges to vagrancy and loitering laws.22 In 1972, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a vagrancy ordinance as unconstitutionally vague in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.23 The Court held that the vagrancy law at issue failed to give citizens adequate notice of what conduct was forbidden, and the law did not sufficiently limit police discretion. 4 The Court was concerned that the law did not give fair notice of the forbidden conduct to the "poor among us, the minorities, [and] the average householder .... 2 The Court also noted that the ordinance's vagueness led to discriminatory enforcement, allowing "men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of 20. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963). 21. See Berg, supra note 15, at 464. 22. See, e.g., Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (finding a Kentucky vagrancy statute unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth); United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (finding a New Jersey law, which defined a "disorderly person" as someone unable to account for his presence, unconstitutionally vague); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 204-05 (Mass. 1967) (finding a Massachusetts statute, which allowed police to arrest persons walking at night who were unable to account for themselves, unconstitutionally vague); Fenster v. Leary, 229 N.E.2d 426, 427-28 (N.Y.
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