BULK METADATA COLLECTION: STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS PROFESSOR LAURA K. DONOHUE* INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 759 I. BULK COLLECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF FISA’S GENERAL APPROACH ............................................ 766 A. Prior Domestic Surveillance ......................... 767 1. NSA Programs ......................................... 770 a. Project MINARET ............................. 772 b. Operation SHAMROCK .................. 773 2. Broader Context ...................................... 776 B. Protections Built into FISA ........................... 782 1. Entity Targeted Prior to Acquisition .... 784 2. Probable Cause and Showing of Criminal Wrongdoing Prior to Collection ................................................. 786 3. Minimization Procedures for Acquisition and Retention ..................... 791 4. Establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review ...................................... 792 C. Subsequent Amendment .............................. 793 1. Physical Search, Pen-Trap ..................... 794 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Christine Ciambella was invaluable in obtaining research materials. My appreciation also extends to the members of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy for their edits on the final Article. Special thanks to Hope Babcock, Bill Banks, Julie Cohen, George Jameson, Allegra MacLeod, Julie O’Sullivan, Milton Regan, Tanina Rostain, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Mike Seideman, for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. In October 2013 an early version of this Article was placed online. Steve Vladeck, Laura Donohue’s Comprehensive Case Against Bulk Metadata Collection, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:32 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/23/laura- donohues-comprehensive-case-bulk-metadata-collection/, [http://perma.cc/S6G5- FMTM]; see also Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hear- ing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Laura K. Donohue, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). 758 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 2. Business Records, Tangible Goods, and Section 215 ........................................ 797 D. Broad Surveillance in Place of Particularization ............................................ 803 1. Wholesale Collection of Information ... 803 2. Absence of Prior Targeting .................... 805 3. No Higher Threshold for U.S. Persons ..................................................... 806 E. Role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ......................................... 806 1. Reliance on NSA to Ascertain Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion ....... 807 a. Failure to Report Initial Noncompliance ................................. 808 b. Further Noncompliance .................. 814 c. FISC Response .................................. 817 d. Technological Gap ............................ 821 2. Issuance of Detailed Legal Reasoning and Creation of Precedent ..................... 822 3. Judicial Design ........................................ 825 a. Appointments ................................... 825 b. Order Rate ......................................... 831 II. BULK COLLECTION AND FISA’S STATUTORY PROVISIONS ............................................................ 836 A. “Relevant to an Authorized Investigation” ................................................. 836 1. Relevance Standard ................................ 838 2. Connection to “an Authorized Investigation” .......................................... 843 a. Collection of the Information ......... 843 b. Specificity .......................................... 847 c. Future Authorized Investigations .. 848 B. Subpoena Duces Tecum ............................... 850 1. Fishing Expeditions ................................ 853 2. Specificity ................................................. 854 3. Past Crimes .............................................. 856 4. March 2009 FISC Opinion ...................... 857 C. Evisceration of Pen-Trap Provisions........... 858 D. Potential Violation of Other Provisions of Criminal Law ................................................. 860 No. 3] Bulk Metadata Collection 759 III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ................... 863 A. The Problem with Smith v. Maryland .......... 865 B. More Intrusive Technologies and Their Impact on Privacy .......................................... 871 C. Judicial Tension: Trespass and Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ............. 874 1. The Prohibition on General Warrants ................................................... 875 2. Search of Metadata and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ....... 884 D. The Proverbial Needle in the Haystack ...... 892 IV. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 897 INTRODUCTION On May 24, 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approved an FBI application for an order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861, requiring Verizon to turn over all telephony metadata to the National Security Agency.1 The Court subse- quently approved similar applications for all major U.S. tele- communication service providers. Over the next seven years, FISC issued orders renewing the bulk collection program thir- ty-four times.2 Almost all of the information obtained related to 1. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06- 05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Infor- mation Act (FOIA) litigation). Note that the specific telecommunications compa- nies from which such records were sought were redacted, as well as the remain- ing title; the government, however, also released an NSA report that provided more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, ST-06-0018, ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENT- ING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSI- NESS RECORDS, available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb% 2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/YXA7-PTT4] (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production). For purposes of a more precise citation, I draw from both sources. 2. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADA- TA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-administration-white- 760 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 the activities of law-abiding persons who were not the subjects of any investigation.3 This program remained secret until mid-2013, when a combina- tion of leaks by Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee, and Freedom of Information Act litiga- tion launched by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, forced key documents into the public domain.4 In response, the Obama Ad- ministration issued statements, fact sheets, redacted FISC opin- ions, and even a White Paper, acknowledging the existence of the program and arguing that it is both legal and constitutional.5 According to these documents, the purpose of the telephony metadata program is to collect information related to counter- terrorism efforts and foreign intelligence.6 These data include all communications routing information, including (but not limited to) session identifying information (for example, origi- nating and terminating telephone number, identity of the communications device, etc.), trunk identifier, and time and duration of the call.7 The metadata collected as part of this pro- gram does not include the substantive content of communica- paper-section-215.html, [http://perma.cc/V7VM-5MAU] [hereinafter SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER]. 3. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, at 12 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_ March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5LYL-RKAZ]. 4. Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, at 2, ¶ 1(b) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2013) (order responding to the request for records related to Section 215, i.e., orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004 to June 6, 2011, containing a significant legal interpretation of the government’s authority or use of its authority under Section 215; and responsive “significant documents, pro- cedures, or legal analyses incorporated into FISC opinions or orders and treated as binding by the Department of Justice or the National Security Agency”). 5. See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06- 05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Infor- mation Act (FOIA) litigation); SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 2. 6. See, e.g., SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3 (“The Government can- not conduct substantive queries of the bulk records for any purpose other