A Dual-Process Account of Moral Judgment: What Psychopaths Can Teach Us About Morality by Deirdre Kelly A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Cognitive Science Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario ©2016 Deirdre Kelly Abstract Researchers who argue that moral1 judgment is based on emotions (`emotion-backers') and those who believe that it is based on reasoning and deliberation (`reasoning- backers') have both struggled to account for the notorious moral deviance of incar- cerated psychopaths. Emotion-backers, such as Jonathan Haidt, focus on psychopaths' lack of affect, or deficiencies in particular emotions, such as sympathy. Reasoning-backers, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, focus instead on psychopaths' deficient reasoning. Both accounts offer separate descriptions of what goes wrong in the disorder, but neither can fully explain psychopathic moral deviance. The moral account that I built, bridges these accounts in an attempt to better and more fully describe the empirical data available on psychopathic moral judgment. I argue that their judgment is best explained with a dual-process account of moral judgment that incorporates a large system of moral emotions as well as integrates multiple bases of morality, such as concerns of fairness, harm, and purity. It is only by focusing on both the reasoning and emotional deficits in psychopaths that we can begin to understand psychopaths' use of utilitarian reasoning, general population psychopaths, and psychopaths' differential presence in the prison popu- lation. All of these issues are best described using a dual-process account of moral 1I will predominantly use \moral" judgment as morality pertains to a broader range of decisions than does ethical which tends to pertain to external codes of conduct. personal decisions we make are moral decisions; whereas, ethical decision-making typically refers to a realm of professional standards such as those practiced in law, medicine, and business. ii iii judgment that incorporates a larger system of moral emotions than other accounts of morality as well as a pluralistic conception of moral foundations. I used psychopaths because their moral deviance can teach us about morality more broadly. By understanding the cognitive processes implicated in the moral judgment of psychopaths, I better explain how moral judgment works in the general population more broadly. My account of moral judgment has both theoretical and practical applications. Theoretically, it offers a new dual-process paradigm for describing moral behaviour which bridges reasoning-based and emotion-based accounts. This description can explain both the moral deviance of psychopaths as well as, more broadly, moral judgment in non-psychopaths. Additionally, my theory challenges accounts of moral emotion that narrowly focus on specific emotions, such as guilt or empathy. It in- stead integrates all emotions, including disgust, fear, and sympathy, and links specific emotions to moral judgments. Practically, my paradigm of moral judgment encour- ages the development of new moral judgment measurements such as new self-report questionnaires of moral reasoning. According to my research, in order for these tools to accurately measure morality, they need to account for both emotion-based and reasoning-based judgments. iv Acknowledgements I can only begin to express the gratitude for all of the amazing people who were there for me through my scholastic journey. My thesis is a culmination of years of research and study that wouldn't have been possible without a supportive community. I cannot thank you all enough! To my husband, Andre, I want to begin by thanking you for your constant and unwavering patience, kindness, and love. You have been there for me at every turn: from attending conferences to listening to countless presentations and papers, to being there when I needed a shoulder to cry or sleep on, and to looking at me like I'm the most important person in the world. I don't think you'll ever truly understand how much of a difference you've made, but it was everything. My supervisor, Dr. Andrew Brook, has ensured that this project has made it to where it needs to be. For as long as I've known him, it was clear Dr. Brook cares about his students. In having had him as my supervisor, I can more than attest to this fact. He made me feel like my work is a valuable contribution and this has kept me going even when things were difficult. I appreciate everything he has done for me and his wisdom and compassion have inspired me in many aspects of my life in both in and out of academia. I have been fortunate to have had such engaged committee members in Dr. Jim Davies and Dr. Adelle Forth. Dr. Davies' insight into psychological models helped me to put the last piece in place on my project. His constant questions and challenges about my work have made me into a better researcher and cognitive scientist. Early in my doctoral work, I did a directed study with Dr. Forth and was blown away by her knowledge of psychopathy. Her passion for her work was infectious and by v inviting me into her lab, she made me truly feel welcomed and encouraged. My family and friends have been there through the scrapes and the wins. You mean so much to me! Things in life aren't always easy, but they are a lot easier when you know that you have your own cheering section. You have given me the strength and courage to be myself and I love you for it. Matthew and Liz, we started off this journey together. Over all of the games, ridiculous hypothetical discussions, innumerable puns, and the longest role playing game ever, you have become my best friends. I will miss being able to just wander into each other's offices to chat or just because. Always know, I'm only a call or message away. I want to thank the funding agencies that made this research possible includ- ing the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program. Additionally, I wish to thank the generosity of the Carleton sponsors of internal scholarships. Contents Abstract . ii Acknowledgements . iv 1 Introduction 1 1.0.1 Background . 3 2 Debates about morality 10 2.1 Emotion-based explanations . 10 2.1.1 Extreme emotion-backer- Haidt's social intuitionism . 13 2.1.2 Morality and empathy . 19 2.1.3 Morality and guilt . 21 2.1.4 Moral anger . 26 2.1.5 Moral fear . 27 2.1.6 Summary of emotion-backer theories . 28 2.2 Reasoning-based accounts . 29 2.2.1 Normative self-governance: A fairly extreme account . 30 2.2.2 An extreme moral reasoning-backer: Kohlberg's moral stage theory . 32 2.2.3 Care ethics . 36 vi CONTENTS vii 3 Psychopathy explained 38 3.1 Historical sketch of psychopathy . 38 3.2 Overview of psychopathy . 43 3.2.1 Diagnosing psychopathy . 47 3.2.2 Beyond Hare: Measuring psychopathy . 49 3.2.3 Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder . 51 3.2.4 Sociopathy vs. Psychopathy . 54 3.2.5 Psychopathy in women . 56 3.2.6 Summary . 57 4 Framing the cognitive moral deficits of psychopaths 58 4.1 Emotional deficits . 58 4.1.1 Empathy . 60 4.1.2 Guilt . 65 4.1.3 Fear . 69 4.1.4 Sadness . 71 4.1.5 Discussion of affective empathy, guilt, fear, and sadness . 72 4.2 Psychopathic Moral Reasoning . 73 4.2.1 Psychopaths' cognitive deficits in reasoning . 74 4.2.2 Summarizing deficits and linking the summary to the model . 76 5 Explaining psychopaths' moral judgment 79 5.1 Kantianism applied to psychopaths . 79 5.2 Utilitarianism as applied to psychopaths . 82 5.3 Kohlbergian moral reasoning interview . 83 CONTENTS viii 5.4 Turiel's Moral-Conventional (M-C) Distinction . 85 5.5 Further applications of moral reasoning and psychopaths . 90 5.6 Caring in psychopaths . 94 5.7 Personal/impersonal harm . 96 5.8 Haidt's moral foundations . 97 5.9 The failure of current accounts to explain psychopaths' moral judgments 99 6 Models of moral decision-making 101 6.1 Reasoning-based modeling . 103 6.1.1 Criticism of Rest's model . 104 6.2 Haidt's social intuitionist model . 106 6.2.1 Criticism of moral dumbfounding findings . 107 6.3 Dual-process models . 108 6.3.1 Trolley and footbridge cases . 108 6.3.2 Reynolds (2006) . 111 6.3.3 Messervey, Nelson, and Peach (manuscript in progress) . 113 6.4 Broader criticisms of dual-process models . 114 7 The Dual-process moral judgment (DPMJ) model 117 7.1 Top-down mental states . 118 7.1.1 Stress . 119 7.1.2 Emotional . 120 7.1.3 Moral foundations . 121 7.2 Imagination . 122 7.3 Empathy . 123 CONTENTS ix 7.3.1 Cognitive empathy . 123 7.3.2 Affective empathy . 124 7.3.3 Final thoughts on empathy . 124 7.4 Emotional Judgment . 125 7.5 Rule application . 126 7.6 Self-control/Akrasia . 128 7.7 Self-interest . 129 7.8 Running a trolley case through the DPMJ model . 131 7.9 Further applications of the DPMJ model . 132 7.10 Conclusions from the DPMJ model . 134 8 Accommodating successful psychopaths under the DPMJ Model of Moral Decision-Making 136 8.1 The successful psychopath . 136 8.2 The DPMJ model and the successful psychopath . 140 9 Conclusion 143 Appendices 148 A Additional information on empathy studies and moral judgment studies 149 Bibliography 159 List of Figures 6.1 Jones' (1991) synthesis of ethical decision-making models which built on Rest's . 105 6.2 Haidt's (2001) Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment .