Case 1:10-cv-00184-CKK Document 18 Filed 09/12/11 Page 1 of 134 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EUEL L. MASON, DONOVAN L. BENTON, and MABLE A. GAINES, Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 09-00462 (CKK) TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Defendant. EUEL L. MASON, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-00184 (CKK) TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Defendant. MABLE A. GAINES, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 10-00683 (CKK) v. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (September 12, 2011) Case 1:10-cv-00184-CKK Document 18 Filed 09/12/11 Page 2 of 134 In the three above-captioned actions,1 Plaintiffs Mable Gaines (“Gaines”), Euel Mason (“Mason”), and Donovan Benton (“Benton”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), each a former employee of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), bring suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq. (“Title VII”) against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Secretary”). There are currently two motions before the Court: (1) the Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) the Secretary’s Motion for Sanctions. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall grant the Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment, deny the Secretary’s Motion for Sanctions, and dismiss all three actions in their entirety.2 I. BACKGROUND On August 14, 2003, Plaintiffs, along with other African American employees at the IRS, brought suit against the Secretary alleging that they had been discriminated against on the basis of race in connection with a variety of employment actions (the “2003 Litigation”). See Compl., Mason v. Snow, Civil Action No. 03-1730 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2003). On May 1, 2006, the action was dismissed with prejudice when the parties reached an agreement to settle their dispute 1 The three actions have been consolidated only for the briefing of the pending motions. 2 While the Court renders its decision today on the record as a whole, its consideration has focused on the following documents, listed in chronological order of their filing: Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s MSJ Mem.”); Def.’s Stmt. of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“Def.’s Stmt.”); Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n”); Pls.’ Stmt. of Material Facts in Genuine Dispute (“Pls.’ Stmt.”); Def.’s Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”); Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Stmt. of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“Def.’s Resp.”); Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Sanctions; Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions; Def.’s Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions. 2 Case 1:10-cv-00184-CKK Document 18 Filed 09/12/11 Page 3 of 134 (the “2006 Settlement”).3 See Stip. & Compromise Settlement & Dismissal With Prejudice, Mason v. Snow, Civil Action No. 03-1730 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 1, 2006). In the actions now before the Court, Plaintiffs claim that they were retaliated against for their participation in the 2003 Litigation, including the 2006 Settlement. See Fourth Am. Compl. (Civil Action No. 09- 462) ¶¶ 21, 23, 25; Compl. (Civil Action No. 10-184) ¶ 12; Compl. (Civil Action No. 10-683) ¶ 12. A. Factual Background Relating to Plaintiff Mable Gaines In 1981, Mable Gaines began working at IRS Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as a clerk-typist. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 1. Around ten years later, she became an Inventory Management Specialist in the Distribution Division of the IRS’s Media and Publications (“M&P”) Organization, a position that she held until her prolonged absence from work that began on December 21, 2004, and lasted until June 4, 2007. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 2. 1. Gaines’s Physical Altercation with a Co-Worker Gaines alleges that on the morning of December 21, 2004, a former co-worker entered her cubicle and—without saying a word—struck her on the right arm with such force that it could be 3 The parties’ written settlement agreement contains a broad release of claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs agreed to waive any and all claims that they might have raised at the time of their execution of the agreement. See Stip. & Compromise Settlement & Dismissal With Prejudice ¶ 4, Mason v. Snow, Civil Action No. 03-1730 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 1, 2006). In the actions now before the Court, Plaintiffs occasionally raise allegations relating to events pre- dating their execution of the Settlement Agreement. For example, Gaines alleges that she was involved in a physical altercation with a co-worker on December 21, 2004, long before she executed the settlement agreement on March 21, 2006. See Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n at 46-47. Because the Secretary has not argued that the settlement agreement bars Plaintiffs from pursuing relief in connection with allegations pre-dating their execution of the agreement, the Court has considered those allegations in the course of resolving the merits of the pending motions. Nonetheless, it is not altogether clear how these allegations remain viable in light of the 2006 Settlement. 3 Case 1:10-cv-00184-CKK Document 18 Filed 09/12/11 Page 4 of 134 heard across the room and caused a nerve in her shoulder to “pop.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 3; Dep. of Mable A. Gaines (“Gaines Dep.”) at 72-78. During this incident, the co-worker was laughing and told Gaines that she was just “playing.” Gaines Dep. at 78. Thereafter, Gaines—in what she describes as an attempt to “diffuse the situation”—responded by shoving the co-worker across the walkway and into an adjacent cubicle, “slamm[ing]” the co-worker against a file cabinet, and “cursing a whole lot.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 5; Gaines Dep. at 87, 90-91. Gaines has consistently claimed that the only reason the co-worker struck her was because Gaines refused to attend a breakfast outing earlier that morning. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 5-6; Gaines Dep. at 106. 2. Gaines’s Prolonged Absence from Work Following the alleged assault, Gaines claimed that she was totally incapacitated as a result of the injuries she sustained and was unable to work.4 Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 7. She did not return to work at the IRS until June 4, 2007—an absence of approximately two-and-a-half years. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 7. In the weeks following her departure in December 2004, Gaines’s supervisors maintained contact with her and they honored her request to be reassigned from the Distribution Division 4 Because Gaines is not pursuing a claim for disability discrimination, the question of whether she was or was not “totally incapacitated” or “disabled” is largely immaterial. However, the Court observes that when Gaines avers that, “[d]espite [the Secretary’s] innuendo to the contrary, there is ample evidence to support [her] status as disabled,” Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 7 (citing Pls.’ Ex. 2 (Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s First Set of Interrogs. (hereinafter, “Pls.’ Interrog. Resps.”) No. 11); Pls.’ Ex. 58 (Ltr. from R. Swick to S. Becker dated July 21, 2009)), the only direct “medical evidence” specifically cited concerns Gaines’s medical condition in June 2009—several years after the alleged assault—and does not describe her condition in the period from December 21, 2004, to June 4, 2007. 4 Case 1:10-cv-00184-CKK Document 18 Filed 09/12/11 Page 5 of 134 within the M&P Organization to the Tax Forms and Publications Division.5 Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 8; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 8. During her extended absence, Gaines’s application to receive annual leave donations through the IRS’s Leave Transfer Program, which allows IRS employees to transfer accrued annual leave to an approved recipient for a medical emergency, was approved and a memorandum soliciting donations was distributed on her behalf.6 Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 9; Def.’s Ex. A (Mem. from G. Plater to All Employees dated Apr. 19, 2005); Def.’s Ex. C (Frequently Asked Questions about the Leave Sharing Program) at 2. On June 9, 2005, Gaines was examined by a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who concluded that she was able to return to work full-time so long as she was not required to lift more than ten pounds.7 Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 10; Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 10. On August 19, 2005, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) within the Department of Labor (“DOL”) notified the IRS that Gaines was fit to return to work with the stated lifting limitation. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; 5 In responding to the Secretary’s proffered factual statement, Gaines first concedes that the statement is admitted, but then proceeds to allege that she “did not request to be reassigned to the Tax Forms and Publications Division during her time of total disability” and that the decision was made to “minimize the seriousness of the unprovoked assault.” Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 8. Because these extraneous factual allegations are unaccompanied by “references to the parts of the record relied on [for] support,” LCVR 7(h)(1), the Court will disregard them. 6 In responding to the Secretary’s proffered factual statement, Gaines first concedes that the statement is admitted, but then proceeds to claim that the facts are “mischaracterized.” Pls.’ Stmt.