DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY, LEICESTER THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE IN NORWAY 1940-1945: POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES BY IAN HERRINGTON June 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract.……………………………………………………………………..i Acknowledgements.………...……………………………………………….ii Abbreviations.……..………………………………………………………. iii Maps………..…………………………………………………………..viii-xii CHAPTERS Introduction……..… ………………………………………………….1 1. The Formation of SOE and its Scandinavian Section: A New Strategic Tool and a Nordic Opportunity …………………………………….. .26 2. SOE’s Policy in Norway 1940-1945: The Combination of Short and Long-Term Aims …………………………………….……………... 55 3. SOE and the Norwegian Government and its Military Authorities 1940-1945: Control through Collaboration………….………….……84 4. SOE and the Military Resistance in Norway 1940-1945: Direction, Separation and finally Partnership…………………………………..116 5. SOE and the other New Organisations Operating in Norway 1940- 1945: A Military Alliance..………………………………………….146 6. SOE and the Regular Armed Forces Operating in Norway 1940-1945: an Unexpected Partnership…………………………………….……185 7. SOE Operations in Norway 1940-1944: The Combination of Sabotage and the Organisation of a Clandestine Army ……………………….221 8. SOE and the Liberation of Norway 1944-1945: Operations in the Shadow of Overlord....……………………………………………..257 Conclusion…………………………………………………………..289 APPENDICES Appendix A: List of SOE Staff Cryptonyms for Scandinavia and Norway…………………………..………………………………….302 Appendix B: A History of Section D’s and SOE’s Scandinavian and Norwegian Sections in London and Stockholm ……..….…..……...315 Appendix C: A History of the Shetlands Base: Autumn 1939-July 1945……………………………………….…………………….…..319 Appendix D: SOE Coup de Main Operations in Norway 1940-1944: ……………………………………………………………………….323 Appendix E: Sea-Borne Operations Instigated by or Involving SOE along the Norwegian Seaboard 1940-1945………………………….328 Appendix F: SOE Long-Term and Miscellaneous Operations in Norway 1940-1945……………………….…………. ……………..334 Bibliography:.……………………………………………………… 359 ABSTRACT Between 1940 and 1945, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) carried out sabotage and organised resistance across occupied Europe. There have, however, only been a small number of scholarly studies of SOE’s activities, and no specific examination of its involvement in occupied Norway. This thesis, therefore, is the first multi-archival, international, and academic analysis of its policy and operations in this country and the influences that shaped them. The proposition is that it was the changing contribution of both SOE and Norway within the wider strategic context in Europe that was the predominant factor behind its plans for this theatre, and other factors, although material, were of secondary importance. These included SOE’s relationship with the Norwegian government-in-exile and the resistant movements that emerged in response to the occupation, especially Milorg, which set out to form an underground army within the country. As well as collaboration with the other clandestine organisations and regular armed forces that had a military involvement in Norway. Through an examination of these contextual influences this work argues that between 1940 and 1945, in step with its original strategic role, SOE’s policy for Norway consisted of a short-term objective, which through activities such as sabotage was to help undermine German fighting strength, and a long-term objective of forming a secret army. These aims could not, however, be achieved or implemented without the co-operation of the Norwegian military authorities and Milorg, who provided most of the manpower, and the assistance of the other military agencies that often operated alongside SOE. From the beginning, therefore, SOE deliberately set out to work with all these parties, but always on the basis that any joint activity was undertaken in accordance with British and Allied interests. This meant that SOE’s operations in Norway were ultimately the result of a blend of influences. It was, however, this country’s subordinate and peripheral position in relation to the main thrust of Allied strategy in Europe that was the crucial factor. The constructive relationship that the organisation eventually had with the Norwegian authorities and Milorg was also important because it meant that SOE both received the support it required and managed to ensure Allied control over special operations in this theatre. It was, therefore, a relationship that was beneficial and rather than undermining SOE’s plans, it underpinned them and guaranteed they remained in step with strategic and military requirements. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My decision to examine SOE policy and operations in Norway was prompted by not just my interest in the history of the country during the Second World War but also by Professor Patrick Salmon at Newcastle University who took the time to reply to my correspondence and suggested that it was a topic that required and deserved attention. A large part of my time has been spent working on the extensive SOE material at Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum (the Resistance Museum) in Oslo. During that time I received unstinting support from Ivar Kraglund, Frode Færøy, Arnfinn Moland, and especially Anne Karin Sønsteby, who always with a smile responded to my requests for files and helped me locate important material. Working at the museum gave me the opportunity to meet several Norwegian resistance figures including Gunnar Sønsteby, with whom I had several enjoyable conversations. It also gave me the chance to encounter other Norwegian researchers and historians, such as Berit Nøkleby who has regularly responded to my enquiries, and kindly supplied me with some valuable material, including her excellent study of SIS. I would like to extend my thanks to all of these people and the Research Council of Norway, which provided substantial funding for my work in Oslo. Lastly, I must mention my family in Norway, who regularly helped by bringing over to Britain many of the key Norwegian publications that have been so important for my work and which are sadly unavailable in this country. I would like to thank Professor Christopher Duffy whom, over many cups of coffee at ‘Fortnum and Masons’ gave me advice and encouragement in the early stages of my work. It was also through Christopher that I was able to get in touch with Mark Seaman, until recently the SOE historian at the Imperial War Museum. Mark’s knowledge and his willingness to answer my questions and to take the time to discuss and debate issues with me have been a great help. Duncan Stuart, who was the SOE Advisor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, also assisted by providing me with important documents and detail from SOE’s personal files, which have only just been released into the Public Records Office at Kew. My two supervisors, Dr. David Ryan and Dr. H. P. Willmott have also been a great support, not just through reading my work but by putting forward valuable thoughts and insights that have helped in its development. ii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACAS (ops) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) ACNS (H) Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Home) ACO Advisor on Combined Operations ACOS Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands AI air intelligence (London) AI 10 cover name for SOE ALFN Allied Land Forces Norway ANCC Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee AL air liaison section in SOE AT Arbeidstjenesten (The Labour Services) in Norway B.org Bedriftsorganisasjonen (The Industrial Organisation), a resistance organisation in occupied Norway BSS Bayswater security section C head of SIS CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CCO Chief of Combined Operations CEO Chief Executive Officer CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff COHQ Combined Operations headquarters COS Chiefs of Staff Committee COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) CS Sir Cambell Stuart’s propaganda department, part of the Foreign Office D sabotage section of SIS DCO Directorate of Combined Operations DDOD(I) Deputy Director, Operations Division (Irregular) at the Admiralty D/F direction finding, the action of using an aerial to determine the direction of incoming radio waves DK Distriktskommandoer (District Commanders) DKN Distriktskommando Nord (the District Commander for northern Norway) iii DKT Distrikstkommando Trøndelag (the District Commander for the county of Trøndelag) DKØ Districtskommando Øst (the District Commander for eastern Norway) DMI Director of Military Intelligence DNA Det norske arbeiderparti (the Norwegian Labour Party) DNI Director of Naval Intelligence DSIR Department for Scientific and Industrial Research DZ dropping zone EH Electra House, the propaganda department under Sir Cambell Stuart FA Forsvarsstabens krigstidsarkiv 1940-1945, Oslo (the Defence Staff war archives) FANY First Aid Nursing Yeomanry FD Forsvarsdepartementet (the Norwegian Ministry of Defence) FD/E Forsvarsdepartementet Etterretningskontor (the Norwegian Ministry of Defence Intelligence Office) FFK Flyvåpnenes Felleskommando (the Royal Norwegian Air Force Joint Command) FO Foreign Office FO Forsvarets Overkommando, (The Norwegian Defence High Command) FO II The Norwegian Defence High Command Intelligence Department FO IV The Norwegian Defence High Command, Department no. IV FO-H The Norwegian Defence High Command, Home Front Office FO, Rapport report on the Norwegian