MARCH 2017 Beyond the RD-180 AUTHORS Todd Harrison Andrew Hunter Kaitlyn Johnson Evan Linck Thomas Roberts A Report of the CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT Blank MARCH 2017 Beyond the RD-180 AUTHORS Todd Harrison Andrew Hunter Kaitlyn Johnson Evan Linck Thomas Roberts A Report of the CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decision makers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 fulltime staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Acknowledgements This report is made possible by the generous support of United Launch Alliance. The authors would also like to thank the experts from government, industry, and other think thanks that participated in our working group discussions and helped inform our work. © 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 1 1. Background ....................................................................................................................................................... 2 Origins of the RD-180 and the EELV Program ......................................................................................... 2 Acquisition Strategy for the EELV Program .............................................................................................. 4 Spiraling Costs and Changes to the EELV Program ............................................................................... 5 Creation of the United Launch Alliance ..................................................................................................... 6 Entry of the Falcon 9 and Competition ..................................................................................................... 8 2. Russian Sanctions and the RD-180 .......................................................................................................... 10 U.S. Sanction on the Russian Deputy Prime Minister .......................................................................... 10 U.S. Congressional Action ............................................................................................................................ 12 3. Options to Replace the RD-180 ............................................................................................................... 15 Policy Assumptions ........................................................................................................................................ 15 Assessment of Options .................................................................................................................................. 17 Summary ........................................................................................................................................................... 23 4. Alternative Acquisition Strategies ........................................................................................................... 25 Current Challenges to the Space Launch Acquisition Strategy ...................................................... 25 Use of Public-Private Partnerships for Developing Space Launch Capability ........................... 26 The Ingredients of a National Security Space Launch Acquisition Strategy ................................ 27 Options .............................................................................................................................................................. 33 Evolving the National Security Space Launch Acquisition Strategy .............................................. 36 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................ 38 About the Authors .............................................................................................................................................. 40 | III Introduction The period spanning the late 1980s to the early 1990s was a particularly difficult era for spaceflight in the United States. After the tragic Challenger disaster in 1986 and the Titan rocket launch failures quickly thereafter, all military launches were halted for almost a year.1 The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a decline in the U.S. defense budget, which included military program consolidations. There was also a growing concern that the commercial space launch market could shift away from the United States. The United States needed a new launch vehicle that could provide assured access to space for the military and stay cost competitive over time. The National Space Transportation Policy (NSTC-4)2, signed by President Bill Clinton, designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the “improvement and evolution of the current expendable launch vehicle fleet,” which led to the creation of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. This report explores how the United States came to depend on the Russian RD-180 rocket engine as part of the EELV program, realistic options for the engine’s replacement in the coming decade, and potential space launch acquisition strategies for the future. The first section provides an overview of the history of the development and evolution of EELV, including the early origins of both the RD-180 and the EELV program, as well as the EELV acquisition strategy, the creation of the United Launch Alliance, and the entry of other private competitors to the launch market. The second section discusses the more recent controversy over the RD-180 in the United States Congress after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, including recent efforts to cap the number of Russian engines that companies within the U.S. can acquire. The third section describes five options to transition from the RD-180 that could be implemented within several years. These options include the oft-cited “drop-in replacement” option, using new engines on new launch systems, and using currently available alternative launch vehicles. The last section discusses planning for the future of space launch acquisition. This discussion includes: challenges to the current strategy, the major considerations in developing a renewed acquisition strategy, and a few specific examples of what a new national security space launch acquisition strategy could look like. While the details for how and when the RD-180 will be replaced are not yet settled, the consensus within the U.S. Congress and executive branch remains that the United States must end its reliance on the RD-180. This report explains the impetus for finding an alternative engine, explores the options that are available going forward, and describes the challenges that will placed upon the federal government and the private sector in doing so. 1 Lee Hutchinson, “Rocket’s red glare: Five spectacular (but harmless) US space launch failures”, Ars Technica, July 4, 2013, https://arstechnica.com/science/2013/07/rockets-red-glare-five-spectacular-but-harmless-us-space- launch-failures/. 2 The White House, “National Space Transportation Policy (NSTC-4),” U.S. Air Force, Washington D.C., August 1994, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nstc4.htm. | 1 1. Background Origins of the RD-180 and the EELV Program To address changing market conditions and launch needs in the early 1990s, the White House issued several national space policy directives concerning development of new government and commercial launch services. The February 1991 U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines advocated for a competitive international space market that would promote trade, private investment, and market development.3 Moreover, in July 1991 the National Space Launch Strategy (NSLS) directed DoD and NASA to work jointly on a new launch system to replace the expensive Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch vehicles. The strategy required this new system to reduce operating costs, increase system reliability, improve launch capacity, and be reliable enough for human spaceflight. Since this new launch system could have commercial benefits, the NSLS also directed agencies to explore private sector participation.4 In 1993, Congress