19s91 COMMENTS would certainly receive direct evidence of the validity of the document 25 exercising the power, since the document obviously could not be admitted to probate. Such a position was suggested in Sewall v. Wilmrer 6 where the donor provided that the trust res be disposed of as the donee "shall direct.., by... her last will and testament,.. or by a writing purporting to be her last will to be by her duly executed in the presence of... three credible witnesses. ..'27 Chief Justice Gray, writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, indicated in a dictum that probate of the writing "purporting to be her last will" would not have been required.28 And, although the dictum goes no farther, it could be read to imply that a court construing the donor's will, for the purpose of determining whether the donee's will was in compliance with its provisions, would have received evidence to determine whether the "writing purporting to be her last will and testament" was, as required by the donor's will, "executed [by the donee] in the presence of ... credible witnesses ... 2 Such a determination does not differ, under some wills statutes, from the de- termination labelled "probate." 2 The document may be a deed, McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill.425, 158 N.E. 127 (1927); or a simple note in writing, Goodloe v. Woods, 115 Va. 540, 80 S.E. 108 (1882). 26132 Mass. 131 (1882). 27 Id., at 132. 28 Id., at 137. 29 Id., at 132. RENDERING UNTO CAESAR: STATE HEALTH REGULATIONS AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION When state public health regulations have been challenged as an infringe- ment on the free exercise of religion, in violation of jQhe First and Fourteenth Amendments, they have almost uniformly been held constitutional on the basis of four Supreme Court cases which have interpreted the First Amdndment as an absolute protection of "freedom of belief" but not of "freedom of action."' The precedent value of these decisions, however, appears to have been greatly diminished by West VirginiaBoard of Education v. Barnette,2 whose impact has not been sufficiently appreciated by state courts. It is the purpose of this note to explore the effect of the change in doctrine, manifested by the Supreme Court in the Barnette case, on state power over public health. I In the first case, Reynolds v. United States,4 Reynolds, a Mormon, was con- victed of the crime of bigamy in the territory of Utah. His defense was that his I Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 2 319 U.S. 624 (1943). This case overruled Minnersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 3 See Section III infra. 4 98 U.S. 145 (1878). THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 religion made polygamy obligatory. The Court sustained his conviction on the ground that, marriage being a civil contract as well as a sacred bond, the statute was within the legislative power of Congress. In discussing the protection granted under the First Amendment, the Court made a distinction between beliefs and actions: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinions, but was left free to reach actions Which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."5 In the next case, Davis v. Beason,6 petition- ers, also Mormons, took an oath required for electors in the territory of Idaho that they were not bigamists and did not belong to any organization which taught bigamy. They were convicted of a conspiracy to pervert and obstruct the due administration of the laws of the territory. The language of the Court was similar to that in the Reynolds case, and the same policy considerations 7 were operative. Jacobson v. Massachusetts8 involved a Massachusetts statute which em- powered the board of health of a city or town to subject its inhabitants to com- pulsory vaccination against smallpox if deemed necessary for the public health. Cambridge exercised this power and Jacobson was indicted for refusing to be vaccinated. He contested the validity of the statute on the grounds: (1) that the theory of vaccination was not sound; and (2) that the statute was unreasonable in that it required vaccination for everyone even though some persons, like himself, suffered severe adverse effects therefrom. The Court upheld the statute on the ground that the state's police power includes the power to make reason- able regulations for the protection of public health and safety, and it could not be said that this regulation was unnecessary to protect the public health. Al- though this case has been cited and relied on by both state courts9 and the Supreme Court 0 for the proposition that a person cannot be exempted from compulsory vaccination for religious reasons, there was no allegation in the Jacobson case that petitioner resisted vaccination from religious motives. For example, Zucht v. King" relied on the Jacobson case to uphold a Texas city ordinance which excluded from public and private schools children who did not have a certificate of vaccination; the resistance in the Zucht case Ngas prompted by religious motives. In Cantwell v. Connecticut," Jehovah's Witnesses were selling religious litera- ture and proselytizing for their faith in a Catholic neighborhood. They were 5Id., at 164. 6133 U.S. 333 (1890). 7 "It was never intended that the amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society." Id., at 342. 8 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 'Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Sadlock v. Board of Education of Carlstadt, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948). 10Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 1 260 U.S. 174 (1922). " 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 19591 COMMENTS convicted of breaching the peace and violating a state statute prohibiting the solicitation of funds for any organization (except from members) unless the secretary of the public welfare council determined that the organization was truly charitable or religious, and issued a license for solicitation. The Court reversed the conviction, holding, first, that no breach of peace was proved and, second, that the statute was invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of re- ligion." The opinion restated the ideas expressed in the bigamy cases: The Constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. ... On the other hand it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,- freedom to believe and freedom to act.The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 14 society. Under the test then developed, it appears that legislation is unconstitutional only if it violates the "freedom to believe." Drawing the line between protected and unprotected exercises of religion on the basis of whether freedom to believe or freedom to act is involved may be criticized on several grounds. The language of the Amendment gives no hint of this distinction; 5 the word "exercise" ordinarily would not be thought re- stricted to belief. Second, if Congress and the states were "deprived of all legis- lative power over [only] mere opinions," then it must be assumed that prior to the First Amendment Congress, and before the Fourteenth Amendment the states, could effectively control belief. The usual means of control, censorship or punishment, must, however, necessarily involve only the manifestation of a belief. 6 Third, it, may be suggested that restricting the guarantee of free exercise of religion to the free exercise of religious beliefs defeats the purpose of the guarantee itself. An analogy to the free speech provision is useful here. Guaranteeing an individual the right to speak freely may serve one or more of the following purposes: (1) provide an element indispensable for his personal happiness; (2) save society from disruption and discord consequent to the stifling of individual expression; (3) provide the means whereby people may compare ideas circulating in the "markef place" and sift the true ideas from "Although the Cantwell case held a state statute invalid as a violation of the First Amend- ment, the basis of the decision was that civil authorities have no power to decide what is and what is not a religious organization. The implication is that the power to define involves the power to sanction or prohibit, to establish or disestablish. In spite of the language touching the "free exercise" clause, Cantwell seems really to have dealt with the "establishment of religion" clause. 14 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 15"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. Amend. I. 16See dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.2d 860, 867, 239 P.2d 545, 549 (1952). THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 the false.17 Guaranteeing an individual the right freely to practice his religion may also serve one or more of these objectives, with "religious practices" sub- stituted for "ideas" in the third.18 Just as these objectives could not be achieved in the free speech area if the guarantee were limited to thoughts, or inchoate speech,19 neither may they be secured in the religious area if only beliefs are protected.