View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by DSpace at Waseda University Negotiations over French Indochina between France and Japan during the Second World War Part Two: Political, Diplomatic and Military Issues Negotiations over French Indochina between France and Japan during the Second World War Shiu Wen-Tang Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan Introduction Concerning the history of World War II, the existing literature on Japanese diplomatic relations with France has not been fully analyzed. Many events are still left opaque. This paper analyzes the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and France during the war with a fo- cus on three issues: (1) French reactions to the Japanese demand at the outbreak of the Sino‒Japanese War to blockade arms and other supplies through Vietnam, one of China’s very few survival routes to the outside world; (2) the military agreement of September 22, 1940 between French Indochina and Japan that allowed Japan to station its garrisons in northern Indochina; (3) the Mutual Defense Treaty of July 22, 1941, signed by François Darlan, Prime Minister of the Vichy government, and Kato So- tomatsu 加藤外松，Japanese Ambassador to France, that allowed the stationing of Japanese troops in southern Indochina.1 Most of the above cited studies have relied on the First Edition of Significant ROC Historical Series: War Against Japan, published by the History Archive Committee of the Kuomintang Party, as well as the documents in the Archives of the Presidential Office and the President Chiang Kai-shek Archives. 1 There are only a few studies by scholars in Taiwan that deal with Sino‒French negotiations prior to June 20, 1940 (the day when France closed the supply route between Vietnam and China): such as “Sino‒French Relations During the War in Viet- nam”〈抗戰期間中法在越南的關係〉， by Chiang Yung-ching 蔣永敬，《 中國現代史專題研究報告》（台北：中華民國史料研究 中心，1971）， 第 1 輯，頁 159‒179; “Sino‒French Relations Relating to Transportation via Vietnam During the War”〈從假道 越南運輸問題看抗日時期的中法關係〉，by Wu Chun Yi 吳圳義，《近代中國》， 期 40（1994 年 4 月 ）， 頁 113‒119; “Research on Sino‒French Relations at the Initial Phase of the War”〈抗戰初期中法交涉初探〉， by Chen San-ching 陳三井，中央研究院 近代史研究所編，《 抗戰建國史研討會論文集》（ 台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1985），冊上，頁 317‒332; “Sino‒French Relations During the War”〈抗戰時期的中法關係〉， by Chen San-ching 陳三井，《近代中國》， 期 152（2002 年 12 月 ）， 頁 166‒184; and “Conflicts and Negotiations among China, Japan, and France During World War II”〈第二次大戰時期中，日， 法在越南的衝突與交涉〉， by Shiu Wen-Tang 許文堂，《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》， 第 44 期（2004 年 6 月 ）， 頁 63‒101. 南京第二歷史檔案館藏之 Yang Jie’s Personal Archives《楊杰個人檔案》in The National Archives 2 of Nanjing have been edit- ed by Kong Qingtai 孔慶泰 in his “Collection of Yang Jie’s Secret Correspondence with Russia on Aid to China”〈 抗戰初期楊 杰等和蘇聯磋商援華事項秘密函電選〉， in《民國檔案》， 1995 年第 1 期；Yang Jie’s correspondence is also compiled in Yang Bin’s 楊斌 “Yang Jie’s Correspondence with Kung Hsiang-hsi and Other Related Correspondence to Seek French Military Aid at the Outbreak of Sino‒Japanese War”〈 抗戰初期楊杰等赴法尋求軍援與孔祥熙等來往文電選〉（上）（中）（下），in《民國檔案》 1998 年第 4 期，1999 年第 1 期，1999 年第 2 期．Chen Jinwen 陳晉文 wrote a brief history of French aid in his “The French Military Advisory Group in Sino‒French Relations During the Initial Phase of the Sino‒Japanese War”〈法國軍事顧問團來華 與抗戰前期中法關係〉， in《民國檔案》，（ 1998 年第 2 期，頁 77‒82. ̶ 37 ̶ Shiu Wen-Tang However, both Japanese and French data are utilized to present different perspectives from those of the Chinese. Among the most important archives in Japan are “Aspects of the World War and Japan’s Southern Strategy”《 大 戦 の諸相と対南方施策》，and Book II of “Japan and The Second World War in Europe”《 第 二次欧州大戦と日 本 》， which is a collection of WWII files edited by the Department of Diplomatic Historical Documents, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.2 Thanks to the abundant historical materials, Japa- nese scholars have produced a considerable amount of research on wartime Japan‒France diplomatic relations. In his “True Aspect of Japan’s Plan and its ‘Colonization’ of Indochina”《日本の対インドシ ナ 『植民地』化プランとその 実態》and” “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Strategy for Food Acquisition in Indochina”《『大東亜共栄圏』とインドシ ナ ―食糧獲得のための戦 略 》， Tabuchi Yukichi- ka 田淵幸親 studies Japan’s strategies to procure rice from Indochina. Shiraishi Masaya’s 白石昌也 “Ja- pan’s Economic Policy in Indochina during World War II”《第二次大戦期の日本の対インドシ ナ 経済政 策》focuses on Japan’s economic policies concerning Indochina. Yoshizawa Minami 吉澤南 refers to many official documents in his《戦争拡大の構図：日本軍の「仏印進駐」》to argue that the occupa- tion of Indochina was an inevitable result of Japan’s determination to expand the war. Tachikawa Kyoi- chi 立川京一 deals with Japanese interference with the transportation of supplies for Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and the subsequent cooperation between Japan and French Indochina. Namba Chizuru’s 難波 ちずる Français et Japonais en Indochine explores beyond the political and military aspects to see how the cultural propaganda conducted by both France and Japan affected colonial Indochina. In France, archives like Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères and Archives de la France d’Outre-mer, plus numerous memoirs by key participants, have facilitated outstanding studies. Indo- chine (1940‒1945)̶Français contre Japonais, by Jacques Vallete, offers a general overview. Vichy face à Chiang Kai-Shek, by Fabienne Mercier, examines the foreign policies of France and China, and their interaction. And Claude Hesse d’Alzon’s La présence militaire japonais en Indochine, 1940‒1945, as the title suggests, discusses the military perspective.3 This paper hopes to present diverse perspectives to further clarify certain significant points regard- ing to diplomatic negotiations between France and Japan. In addition to Taiwan’s Academia Historica as a major source of reference, the paper also utilizes documents in the Nanjing Second Historical Ar- chives, the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry archives, and the files in the archives of the French Min- istries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 2 田淵幸親〈日本の対インドシ ナ 『植民地』化プランとその 実態〉in《東南アジア―歴史と文化―》9 号 (1980)〈『大東亜共栄圏』と インドシ ナ ―食糧獲得のための戦略〉in《東南アジア―歴史と文化―》10 号 (1981) ﹔白石昌也 (Shiraishi Masaya)〈第二次大戦 期の日本の対インドシ ナ 経済政策〉in《東南アジア－歴史と文化》Vol. 1986 (1986) No. 15, pp. 28‒62. 吉沢南 (Yoshizawa Mina- mi)，《戦争拡大の構図：日本軍の「仏印進駐」》，( 東京都：青木書店，1986), 253 p. 立川京一 (Tachikawa Kyoichi)《第二次 世界大戦とフランス 領インドシ ナ ―「日仏協力」の研究》，（東京都：彩流社，2000）， 380 p. Namba Chizuru, Français et Japonais en Indochine (1940‒1945), (Paris: Karthala, 2012) 279 p.; Masaya Shiraishi ed. Indochina, Thailand, Japan and France during World War II: Overview of Existing Literature and Related Documents for the Future Development of Research, (Tokyo: Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2015) 434 p. 3 François Guillemot, “Knowledge in France of Japan and Indochina (1940‒1945): Academic Work, Narratives, and Archives,” in Masaya Shiraishi edit. op. cit., pp. 265‒322. ̶ 38 ̶ Negotiations over French Indochina between France and Japan during the Second World War 1. A blockade of Chiang Kai-shek’s routes of survival Japan imposed a coastal blockade against China in August 1937, shortly after the July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident.4 Thus Hong Kong, Vietnam and Burma became the few remaining survival routes for Chiang Kai-shek, who was highly dependent on foreign military supplies. Therefore, Japan found it es- sential to negotiate with French Indochina to cut off Chiang’s foreign supplies and trade. Negotiations began by the end of September. China did not declare war on Japan. While China hoped to reach a truce agreement with Japan, it sought support from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia in the hope of their imposing sanc- tions on Japan and providing loans and military aid. However, the transportation of supplies became an immediate problem. One of the safest shipping routes was through Hong Kong to Canton. Two oth- ers were the route from Hải Phòng via the Yunnan‒Vietnam Railway to Kunming, and the route from Hải Phòng via South Gate Road to Guangxi; either route required French cooperation. Moreover, in August 1937, after the conclusion of the Sino‒Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, Chiang Kai-shek pur- chased huge quantities of Russian weapons. He also planned to buy hundreds of military aircraft from Germany, so as to maintain China’s diplomatic ties with Berlin.5 Therefore, Chiang spared no serious effort to obtain French permission to transport weapons through Vietnam.6 After the outbreak of Sino‒Japanese war in 1937, V. K. Wellington Koo 顧維鈞, Chinese Ambassador to France, tried in vain to confirm commitments from Britain and France. Western powers like the United States, Britain, and France were reluctant to take unilateral action against Japan.7 Though Chi- na hoped to accelerate arms shipments via the Yunnan‒Vietnam Railway, the French government re- fused on the grounds that military supplies might affect its position of neutrality. On September 27, 1937, the Japanese Embassy in Paris submitted the first note of a request for em- bargo. On October 16, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the Japanese Embassy that In- dochina would prohibit the transport of arms and ammunition. The next day, the French Cabinet con- cluded that both state- and privately-manufactured arms could be exported to China but never be transported via Vietnam, in order to avoid Japanese bombing of the railway. On October 20, Wellington Koo visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and submitted a memoran- dum stating that China’s resistance against Japan was in fact an act of maintaining world peace, securi- ty and related treaties, which Japan had violated by invading China. It reminded France of its obliga- tions in the Treaty of Paris and Nine Power Agreement, urging the French government to offer critical aid.