JULY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 8 The High Stakes Battle for district. This created the standard and treated their presumed supporters in of small landlords farming small, the south better,5 this time there would the Future of Musa Qala well-irrigated holdings. While tribal be no mercy shown to “collaborators.” structure, economy and population alike This included executing, along with By David C. Isby have been badly damaged by decades of alleged criminals, several “spies,” which warfare, Musa Qala has a situation that included Afghans who had taken part in since its reoccupation by NATO and is more likely to yield internal stability work-for-food programs.6 Afghan forces in December 2007, the by building on what is left of traditional remote Musa Qala district of northern Afghanistan. The Alizai are also hoping to get more Helmand Province in Afghanistan from the new security situation. They has become important to the future Before the well-publicized October 2006 have requested that Kabul make Musa course of the insurgency but also to the “truce” that Alizai leaders concluded Qala a separate province.7 This proposal future of a Pashtun tribe (the Alizai), with the Taliban, Musa Qala had has been supported by current and a republic (the Islamic Republic of experienced a broad range of approaches former Helmand provincial governors. Afghanistan) and even a kingdom (the to countering the insurgency. In addition This would provide opportunities for United Kingdom). The changes that to their dissatisfaction with British patronage and give them a legally- take place at Musa Qala will influence operations in 2006, local inhabitants recognized base that competing tribal the future of all of them. Failure has the claimed that Kabul had not supported groups in the south would be unlikely potential to be a harbinger of potential them, shown by previous Afghan to match. ultimate failure for the Alizais, Kabul National Army (ANA) units operating and London alike; each needs to succeed in their area before that had been Kabul’s Challenge at Musa Qala. commanded by Dari-speaking officers Kabul’s challenge is to prove that its who often made a point of pretending policies are relevant to the future of The Alizai Heartland not to speak Pashtu, and with Dari- Musa Qala and its people in a way it was The importance of Musa Qala to the speaking soldiers who really did not unable to do in 2001-2006. For example, Alizai is not surprising. It is their tribal know any other language, plus an according to one press report, after heartland. In southern Afghanistan, Afghan National Police (ANP) presence recapturing Musa Qala the government local politics are tribal politics. In the that was active only in extracting announced that more than $60 million 1970s—the last time such data could resources from the population. Militias would be spent on “reconstruction and be collected—the Musa Qala district loyal to then-Helmand Governor Sher welfare services in the provinces in an had approximately 30,000 people in Mohammed Akhundzada also had effort to encourage the people to stop around 70 villages, 93% of them Alizais poor relations with the Alizai jirga and supporting the Taleban and cultivating from all six of the major clans, Khalozai much of the local population. This force poppy.”8 Other press reports provided (Khan Khel), Habibzai, Hasanzai, became less effective after their patron details: “a contract has been signed with 1 Shekhzai, Pirzai and Adozai. The lost power in 2006, leaving the British private companies to build two schools Alizai themselves are a sub-tribe of to inherit a security vacuum that had and a religious school…at a cost of the Noorzai, one of the Panjpai (“five been filled by the Taliban. Only the local 6,394,700 dollars. Canada will provide brothers”) tribes that makes up part of arbaki (tribal militia), with personally the funds.”9 The press reports have not, the Durrani Pashtuns. owned weapons, was regarded well.2 however, identified whether a funding The arbaki had helped turn back the stream has been identified to operate While firmly part of the tribal politics initial Taliban attempt to establish a these schools and the degree of local of southern Afghanistan, those of Musa presence in 2004. involvement with this development; Qala differed from those in Kandahar both have frequently been absent from Province or even elsewhere in Helmand By December 2006, relations between such efforts in the south. Province. Musa Qala is dominated by the Taliban and Alizai leaders had a single tribal identity, differing from soured.3 The Taliban, according to Both reconstruction and recreating most other districts in the region, Afghan press reports, were not Alizai security in Musa Qala will be difficult. including those in southern Helmand. but were mostly foreign nationals who While Kandahar Province tends to be fled to Baghran district when Musa Qala 5 For more information on the Taliban’s weak enforce- dominated by a relatively few large 4 was reoccupied. The Taliban have made ment of haircuts and schools in Musa Qala from 2006- landowners, Musa Qala has traditionally sure that the local inhabitants of Musa 07, see Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, pp. 72, had many smaller landowners, making Qala are aware that, while pre-2001 they 104. use of the extensive irrigation from reserved their more repressive policies 6 Personal interview, Afghan source, 2008. See also the Musa Qala river. In the 1970s, for Dari-speaking urban populations “Taleban Hang Afghan Teenager for ‘Spying,’” Pajhwok the district had approximately 2,300 Afghan News, January 18, 2008. landlords each with an average of 17 2 This information was drawn from a source that was in 7 “Musa Qala Should Be Upgraded to Province,” Hasht-e acres of cultivated land, with 60 canals Helmand Province during this period. Sobh [Kabul], February 17, 2008. irrigating more than a quarter of the 3 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The 8 Mohammad Amin Mirzad, “The Taleban Still Rule Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Co- Helmand Province,” The Daily Afghanistan [Kabul], Janu- 1 Pre-war information is drawn from Ludwig W. Ad- lumbia University Press, 2008), pp. 50, 211. ary 26, 2008, p. 4. amec, Historical and Political Gazeteer of Afghanistan, Kan- 4 “Terrorist Bases Should Be Eliminated,” Anis [Kabul], 9 Larghunpal, “Candle of Education is Relit in Musa dahar and South-Central Afghanistan 5 (1980). January 12, 2008. Qala,” Hewad [Kabul], February 6, 2008. JULY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 8 The Musa Qala Taliban were not Abdul Salaam is a charismatic and quick response development programs destroyed in battle, but moved largely controversial figure. He is using his in a way comparable to the United to adjacent districts in 2007. Helmand tribal and religious connections to States,17 and, according to the Economist, member of parliament Nasima Niazi has talk with authority figures to help “a growing number of British officers claimed that the Taliban remain active consolidate the government position in grudgingly recognize that America in Musa Qala despite the reoccupation.10 Musa Qala. Abdul Salaam’s major theme is learning the lessons of irregular Security outside the district center is to portray the Taliban as outsiders, warfare, drawn mainly from British remains uncertain. reflecting that many of them are either colonial experience, better than the foreigners or Afghans from other areas modern British Army.”18 By strengthening the Alizai connection and tribes. Western press reports have with a district chief with tribal legitimacy criticized him extensively. To British Since the initial withdrawal from who can point out that the Taliban are Lieutenant-Colonel Ed Freely, “He Musa Qala in 2006, the British image largely foreigners, Kabul may be looking appears less interested in governing his for military capability in general and to get the population of Musa Qala to people than reinforcing his own personal counter-insurgency competence in resist or at least limit cooperation with position of power.”14 To the Kabul- particular has suffered a number of the largely cross-border insurgency and appointed chief of police of Helmand setbacks, by no means all in Afghanistan. narcotics. Currently, while Musa Qala is Province, Brigadier Mohammad The success of Iraqi forces in Basra in growing a significant poppy crop, Kabul Hussain Andiwal, he is a “war criminal” 2008 was widely seen as them doing a is not aiming to eradicate it (unlike in involved in the slaughter of prisoners job that the British had left unfinished Greshk, Nawa, Marja and Nade-e Ali and a “leading heroin producer.”15 for political reasons. Britain’s relations districts and the capital Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province).11 This reflects Great British Setbacks “The loyalty of the Alizai Kabul’s concerns that an eradication The military operations in Musa Qala campaign would undercut the counter- since the reoccupation have been may be a significant insurgency effort. carried out by a broad range of Afghan indicator of the overall and coalition military forces. U.S. The most obvious change is the Marines have been playing a major situation in the south.” appointment of Mullah Abdul Salaam, role in recent operations in Helmand an Alizai of the Pirzai clan, as district Province. Yet, Helmand remains a chief. He was the former Taliban district British area of operations, and the role chief of Kajaki and acting governor of of Musa Qala in the 2006 fighting—plus with Kabul have suffered a number of neighboring Uruzgon Province prior their withdrawal and the subsequent setbacks, from the removal of diplomats to 2001, the highest-ranking former truce with the Taliban—make success following direct negotiations (bypassing Taliban official serving under the in 2008 an important objective.