CURRENT FIELD ARTILLERY NOTES Wastage of German Artillery A SECRET report issued recently from the office of the Chief of the German Staff, signed by Ludendorff himself, shows the alarming losses of German artillery. It takes the form of an argument in reply to domestic criticisms, and on the technical points raised the old warrior has no great difficulty in justifying himself. For us the chief interest of the document lies in certain figures it contains. It stated that during grand operations the average number of guns lost by a single German army in a single month either by wear and tear or by enemy fire are to be found as follows: field guns, 870; heavy pieces, 585. This is a remarkable confession. A great industrial strain is the necessary result. The arsenals and workshops have had to make or repair pieces to the extent of three- quarters of the whole artillery establishment merely in order to keep up the existing strength. The industrial strain of such efforts makes it easy to understand why Ludendorff found it necessary to answer his German critics. Further, we have valuable statistical proof of the efficacy of the allied counter-battery work. Of an average of 1455 guns put out of action, it appears that 655 were lost by wear and tear, and 800 by the allied bombardments. Ludendorff offers his critics this figure by way of reply to their contentions that fire against the enemy's batteries is relatively unimportant and that it is only the bombardment of infantry that seriously matters. The reply is decisive. (The Canadian Military Gazette, Ottawa, December 26, 1917.) German Methods of Co-Operation Between Artillery and Aircraft A NEW edition of S. S. 560 "The Employment and Duties of Artillery Aeroplanes in Position Warfare," is entitled "The Artillery Aeroplane and the Artillery Balloon" and was published by German G. H. Q. on October 1, 1917. It embodies certain ideas which are summarized below. Special attention is paid to battle conditions and moving warfare is considered though the principles of co-operation remain unaltered. 289 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL General: (a) Full use must be made of aerial registration with a view to (i) Economy of ammunition. (ii) Registering over a more extended area than is possible with ground observation. An increased volume of fire for effect can thus be brought to bear when occasion arises. In such registration both offensive and defensive possibilities are to be kept in view. (b) All squadrons and balloons must be able to co-operate with artillery. (c) The aerodrome itself should be near Divisional Headquarters. Failing this there must be an intermediate landing ground in the vicinity, and the squadron must send to Divisional Headquarters a liaison officer (Fliegerverbindungsoffizier), who will be attached to the artillery commander. (d) It is laid down that additional protection should be afforded to artillery aeroplanes by counter-battery work directed against antiaircraft guns. In Battle: The allotment of aeroplanes is slightly increased. The division has at least 6 to 9 machines, for both artillery and infantry work, and, in addition, the artillery commander has a few machines at his own disposal. Special squadrons, fitted with combined receiving and transmitting wireless apparatus, will be allotted by the Army to super-heavy artillery as necessary. Both field artillery and heavy artillery commanders are to make the greatest possible use of aerial observation for controlling fire both in the offensive and the defensive battle. Its value is particularly emphasized for: (a) Bringing fire to bear on fleeting targets. (b) Keeping a continuous watch (especially from balloons). (c) Observation and correction of destructive and barrage fire, and of the general grouping of fire. (d) Controlling and switching both artillery and Minenwerfer fire as occasion arises, especially in the defensive battles. This may be done by infantry aeroplanes (contact patrols) as well as by artillery machines. Balloons: The only feature of any interest is the suggested employment of balloons for the registration of heavy guns. "Balloon registration of heavy flat-trajectory guns will be facilitated 290 CURRENT FIELD ARTILLERY NOTES by the employment of two balloons at a considerable distance from one another. One stationed in the line of fire observes for line; the other, stationed well to a flank, observes for range." Telephone Equipment Allotted To Field Artillery AN order of the German Ministry of War, dated August 2, 1917, prescribes the amount of telephone equipment for field artillery and cancels all previous allotments. The following extracts of the table attached to this order appears particularly interesting: ALLOTMENT EQUIPMENT REMARKS For each For each Bat. Hq. Field Btry. Army telephones ................................... 4 6 Instead of the central switchboard Spare microphones, in tin boxes........... 4 6 with buzzer call Field batteries of 3 cells each, with (Summerschauzeichenschrank) carrying strap..................................... 4 6 there may be issued a switchboard shutter signal similar to that used Spare field cells..................................... 3 3 by the Postal Department, Model Cases of accessories for Army O. B. 1915, with either buzzer or telephone equipment ......................... 1 4 induction coil. Central switch board (buzzer call)........ 1 . —— Army cable, pieces of 500 metres each 20 40 The cases of accessories can only Cable reels............................................. 8 8 be delivered after a certain Insulating material (Chatterton) on period when all the Army rolls of 16 metres, in boxes of 666 General Staffs have been 2 2 provided. Battery testers........................................ 1 1 Regulations entitled "Telephone Equipment of Field Artillery" (Das Fernsprechgeraet der Feldartillerie).. 3 3 Terminal box, in case, with shutter and signal ball ................................... 4 6 (Vermittlungskaestchen). Gloves ................................................... 3 3 Transmitters, in case ............................. 1 1 (Ubertragerkaestchen). Communication In Defensive Combat (a) The telephone, although frequently cut and destroyed in moments of great need, is nevertheless the best method of communication. The linemen must remain constantly at their work, even under the most violent fire. (b) Wireless stations have only given results intermittently on account of jamming by aeroplanes. (c) Ground telegraphy has given good results. (d) Visual signalling works with difficulty in the first lines on account of smoke and dust. It has worked well in the rear lines. (e) Runners and relays of runners have rendered excellent results. 291 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL (f) The divisional message centre has given excellent results. Liaison agents brought in information from their regiments which was transmitted to the higher commands by telephone, or in case of a break in the line, by mounted orderlies. This message center, as organized, was not able to supply the artillery and could not be used by it, a condition which had serious disadvantages and should be remedied later. (g) Colored light signals used to request barrage fire or fire of annihilation were generally effective, but as the signals fired by the first line could not be seen by the artillery, signal pistols were supplied to the men of the relays of runners. (h) Sirens used to request barrage fire could not be heard by the artillery. To obviate this disadvantage, two men provided with signal pistols were placed at the end of the series of sirens. (i) To obtain close co-operation between the infantry and artillery when urgently needed, it is recommended that each regimental sector be equipped with a battery of light artillery which is to operate in immediate conjunction with the infantry in case of an attack or raid. (j) An aeroplane landing ground or a collecting post for dropped messages with smoke cartridges established near the command post of the division have proved invaluable. Furthermore, there was with the command post of the division an aviation liaison officer in constant touch with the squadrons assigned to the division. German Principles of Elastic Defence TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENT 1. OUR methods of conducting at elastic defence, by distributing our forces in depth and fighting in a defensive zone organized in depth, are known both to the French and English. They have found no means of defeating it, and their great attacks, intended to break through, have failed in face of it. They now appear to attack with limited objectives, and by piecemeal battering, carried out, however, with a considerable expenditure of force, attempt to wear us down, to inflict losses on us, and gradually to press us back. We must, nevertheless, reckon with the possibility of their making a renewed attempt, at one or several points, to attain their final aim, namely, to break through on a large scale. Our system of defence will also be able to cope with these tactics most successfully, if, in accordance with the experiences gained on all the battlefields of the Western front, the divisions employ their three regiments in line, side by side, within the relatively narrow divisional sectors, and distribute them in considerable depth. In this case, the actual divisions in line will usually be able to repulse attacks with limited objectives 292 CURRENT FIELD ARTILLERY NOTES by means of their own troops, without the assistance of elements of the counter-attack division. They must, at any