54044®Flight Safety iss 96 22/9/14 15:07 Page 1 ISSUE 96 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY 14 AUTUMN The official publication of the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee ISSN 1355-1523 54044®Flight Safety iss 96 22/9/14 15:07 Page 2 Contents The Official Publication of THE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN: 1355-1523 AUTUMN 2014 FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journal devoted Editorial 1 to the promotion of best practises in aviation safety. It includes articles, either original or reprinted from other sources, related to safety issues throughout all areas of air transport Chairman’s Column 3 operations. Besides providing information on safety related matters, FOCUS aims to promote debate and improve networking within the industry. It must be emphasised that FOCUS is not intended Flight Data monitoring for corporate operators 4 as a substitute for regulatory information or company publications and procedures. by Dave Jesse Editorial Office: The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HU Temporary Reserved Areas (TRAs) 6 Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 e-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Brave New World 8 Advertisement Sales Office: by Wayne Rosenkrans UKFSC The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HU Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 Datalink: the story continues 13 email: [email protected] by Jenny Beechener Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Printed by: Why and when to perform a Go-Around maneuver 15 Woking Print & Publicity Ltd The Print Works, St. Johns Lye, St. Johns, by Michael Coker Woking, Surrey GU21 1RS Tel: 01483 884884 Fax: 01483 884880 e-mail: [email protected] Web: www.wokingprint.com UAV – Are they a threat to you? 19 by Capt Sarah Clachan FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose of improving flight safety and, unless copyright is indicated, articles may be reproduced providing that the source of material is acknowledged. Prepare to be Surprised 21 Opinions expressed by individual authors or in by Sunjoo Advani, Jeffery Schroeder and Bryan Burks advertisements appearing in FOCUS are those of the author or advertiser and do not necessarily reflect the views and endorsements of this journal, the editor or the UK Flight Safety Committee. Members List 24 While every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein, FOCUS accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions in the information, or its consequences. Specialist advice should always be sought in relation to any particular circumstances. Front Cover Picture: Emirates A380 taking off from Manchester Airport. focus autumn 14 54044®Flight Safety iss 96 22/9/14 15:07 Page 3 EDITORIAL Rockets and Risk by Dai Whittingham, Chief Executive UKFSC he appalling loss of MH17 is an event answers. But finding answers in zones where In responsible nation states there will be a set Tthat will continue to resonate long the rule of law has broken down is notoriously of conditions imposed, so-called ‘Rules of into the future.The previously unthinkable difficult, especially where there are strong Engagement’, that govern the use of force by has happened. Whether this was an political vested interests in play, and the those people bearing arms on behalf of the accident in the strictest sense of the word answers on causation may not necessarily be state itself; you would rightly expect such or whether it should more properly be found using traditional accident investigation conditions to be far more stringent in characterised as a crime, there is no methods. And what are the implications for peacetime than in all-out war. Even in war denying the scale of the human tragedy future investigations? there will be conditions, if only to ensure that involved. The understandable need for you don’t take out someone on your own security meant that two weeks elapsed In terms of preventing a recurrence, and as the side. However, if the rule of law no longer after MH17 was downed before official Chairman points out in his column, operators prevails and the institutions of government investigators could gain access to the crash and crews need to know where they can safely are weak or non-existent, the reality can be site. Sadly, militia, media and local people fly. Over-flight has a very different risk profile very different. have had almost unrestricted access from when compared with arrivals and departures, the outset. There is distressing TV and so operating over a conflict area needs to be In the MH17 case it appears from anecdotal other evidence of bodies and personal considered separately. Lower altitudes can evidence that those in possession of the SAM effects being looted and even footage of place you within reach of the smaller, man- fell into the “weak or non-existent journalists rooting round in baggage as portable missile systems (MANPADS) but you government” category and so lacked the part of their reports; clearly the wreckage are already vulnerable to small arms fire on disciplined command and control has been disturbed and there are amid the approach if someone really wants to take arrangements that would have allowed them worrying suggestions that some parts a pop at you, as was recently demonstrated in to properly identify MH17 as being non- have already been removed by 3rd parties. Pakistan on 24 June when two PIA crew military (squawking traffic, flight plan, track Given the size of the debris field, the members were injured and a passenger fatally behaviour, origin etc). One could maybe argue nature of the terrain and the ongoing wounded by gunfire on approach to Peshawar. that the attack was an unintended conflict it is also likely that some smaller There is also no public indication as to whether consequence of the internal conflict rather pieces of wreckage will go undiscovered. the attack was deliberate or, for example, just than deliberate targeting of a CAT flight, but poorly-timed celebratory gunfire. That said, it the result is tragically the same. Fortunately, the CVR and FDR are in the is actually quite hard to hit a moving aircraft possession of the investigators, though these without some sort of assisted aiming or So perhaps one of the lessons from MH17 is may not provide any real answers as to why an specialist training, and most large CAT aircraft that, for our threat equation, political will as a apparently serviceable aircraft should have a good chance of surviving a MANPAD form of restraint can quickly be subverted by suddenly break up in the air. However, hit because there is plenty of system lack of control. It follows that it would be wise photographs exist of wreckage showing the redundancy, the warheads are small and the to avoid areas where you have knowledge that tell-tale signs of a blast fragmentation missiles are heat-seekers so will head for an SAM systems (and/or fighter aircraft) are warhead; recovery and forensic examination of engine, the loss of which pilots are trained to present and where there appears to be no, or the physical items and passenger injuries will deal with. But if there is a serious risk that poor, political control over the people bearing be crucial if there is to be absolute proof the someone will have a go at you with an AK-47 arms. But instability and violence on the aircraft was destroyed by a surface-to-air or a MANPAD, you should not be there in the ground does not necessarily mean an area is missile, as seems highly probable. Even with first place! unsafe for over-flight; you still need the the addition of military intelligence capability to attack aircraft at high level for the information and the forensic results the The same is not true when considering the threat to be meaningful. conclusions of the inquiry will be rejected in larger vehicle-mounted SAM systems, like the some quarters, for one reason or another, and Russian-built Buk (SA-11), which bring normal Syria is a classic case for concern and possibly the whole sorry episode will for many remain CAT operating altitudes firmly into the missile avoidance at the moment, simply because wrapped up with web-based bizarre engagement envelope. But does the mere there is a known presence of highly capable conspiracy theories. presence of a system make it a threat? It all SAM and a civil war that is seeing possession depends where you are. For a threat to be of some hardware passing to the opposition So will an investigation tell us anything that genuine you require the capability (the rather than remaining in government hands, will help prevent a recurrence? What lessons equipment) and the political will to use it – whatever you may think of that government. do we take from the aftermath? The relatives one without the other gives you useless A similar situation of instability prevails in and friends of those who died want answers. equipment or empty words; it is the principle Libya. There is understandable caution with Governments want answers. Aviation needs on which deterrence is founded. Iraq because of the current ISIS insurgency and focus autumn 14 1 54044®Flight Safety iss 96 22/9/14 15:07 Page 4 its extremist approach to life or, rather, to the nature of the information become publicly operations can be conducted without undue casual taking of it; there is little doubt that a known, and there will be capabilities and risk. In this respect it is always worth weapon system would be used without techniques that intelligence agencies would reinforcing the message that safety and compunction if the opportunity arose, not wish to see compromised under any security are essential pre-requisites for regardless of the consequences.